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To the Youth of Dominica who wi3.1
replace these colonials before long

PREFACE
My interest in Comparative Government dates back
to

ray

days at McMaster University during the 1969-1970

academic year.

My interest in that field was further

heightened when

I

came into contact with Dr. Howard

Wiarda at the University of Massachusetts.
under Professor Wiarda

I

decided to specialize in the

area of Latin America and the Caribbean.

three years

I

Studying

During those

worked with Professor Wiarda and other

graduate students at the University of Massachusetts,

I

was able to grapple with the concept of political change.
'Writing my dissertation on Dominica, I was able

to utilize my knowledge of political change.

write on Dominica
Indies

— because

—a

I

chose to

member state of the British West

this is one of the areas

It is a small country which makes such

a

I

know well.

study manageable.

And besides, to the best of my knowledge, no complete

political analysis of this country is presently available.

Chapter

I

deals with the concept of "political

change," which has been used instead of "political development."

The latter word seems to impede agreement on the

ensure a
theoretical assumptions which are essential to
in their
clear cut understanding of the new nations
In dealing with
attempts to improve social conditions.

vi

politics, "development" seems to be too vulnerable to

value-laden concepts.

"Development" as it has been used,

seems to imply change in a certain direction.

In contrast,

"change" is a less specific concept on which wider agree-

ment as to meaning might be possible.

It is more general,

and is less likely to have value judgments built into its

definition.

It seems to be more neutral.

A chapter is devoted solely to an examination of

the many constitutions Dominica has had.

Thus in a sense

Chapter II is an extension of Chapter III in that, it

examines the present constitutional arrangements in

Dominica in relation to past constitutions.

The consti-

tutions of these colonial countries should always be

examined because they have conditioned the behaviors of
the actors in the political system.

Chapter III takes

at the impact of colonial-

a look

ism on the Dominican political system.

The component parts

the
of the colonial situation are examined to determine
effect these may have had on the present political

possible
system.

analyzed in
The political parties in Dominica are
to
The functions of the parties are examined

Chapter IV.

"better" Dominican
see if they are working to produce a

society.
the activities of
Chapter V describes and assesses
TV,-? c
is not the most powerful
This
the Black Power Movement.
*.

-i

<5

vii

interest group in Dominica, but it is the only group
which has openly challenged the Government and other

supportive groups in the system.

Presently the group

is weak, but its leadership is both young and intelligent.
It is getting more cohesive, and within a few years other

groups in Dominica, such as the Roman Catholic Church
and business elements, will be forced to reckon with it.

The many attempts at federating the British West

Indian Islands are reviewed in Chapter VI.

There have

been two major attempts in recent times to form a
"Westindian" nation, both having failed.

Finally in the conclusion, the problems which con-

front Dominica are reviewed.

Possible solutions to these

problems are stated.
I have tried to make this study as comprehensive

as I could.

But it must be emphasized that this is a

case study which deals specifically with Dominica,

British West Indies.
The findings here do not apply to all countries

which were colonies.

The problems of Dominica are unique

in some ways, but they are not all that different from

those found in the other former British colonies of the

West Indies.

Many of the problems, such as poverty or

unemployment, are the same, but may be called by different
names.
lies in
The usefulness of this case study really

viii

identifying and in attempting to solve the major problems

which beset Dominica.

If the leaders can agree with me

that there are major problems in Dominica, then this study
has more than an academic effect.

At this point let me express my great appreciation
to Dr. Harvey E. Kline for accepting to chair my disserta-

tion committee.

He did a fine job in questioning my ideas

on the subject.

He was most sensitive to the need of

reading the sometimes disorderly manuscript very quickly.
Thanks are also due to Dr. Gerard Braunthal for
his many pointed comments on the study.

good job in helping me finish my

He also did a

last few days at the

University of Massachusetts.

Finally thanks are due to Dr. George

E.

accepting to be the third reader of the study.

professors only helped.

Urch for
These

The errors and interpretations

remain the property of this writer.
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CHAPTER

I

POLITICAL CHANGE
Purpose
The purpose of this chapter is to present the theo-

retical framework for the study.

It attempts to review the

literature on political change with

a

view to extrapolating

from the literature a meaningful description of what change
in the colonial situation might entail.

tate

a

This is to facili-

clearer understanding of present day politics in

Dominica.

One cannot simply dismiss lightly the literature

on political change, which has grown over the years, with
the trite remark that it is neither value-free nor appli-

cable to the emerging nations.

This may be so, but ig-

noring it might be likened to building

a

costly road to

a certain point when there is one already available.

By

all means new paths should be created, especially if they

lead to the desired destination more quickly, but the

contour of the old tracks can be of great help, especially
if these can be widened, precluding the great expense of

building brand new ones.

2

Introduction
Writing in 1966, Alfred Stepan lamented the fact that
none of the major political scientists chose Latin America
as an area of specialization to test their theories about

nation-building.

He was particularly disappointed since

the study of a Latin American nation would have helped

immensely in sharpening the tools used in studying political change.

The same can be said for the Commonwealth

Caribbean"'' countries since they too have many of the ills,

albeit to

a

lesser extent in some cases, that Afro-Asian

countries exhibit.

The Caribbean

v/as

even better suited

than Latin America for testing the models on development
since they are relatively small.

English is the main

language spoken and it is relatively cheap to travel to
and live in.

But the Caribbean has been ignored, probably

because its era of revolution was not upon it yet, in

contrast to the exciting events in Africa and Asia.
Political change, and henceforth referred to as
change, is a very elusive concept which has aroused an

enormous amount of emotionalism.

political system is not

a

It is accepted that a

static one which has led some

political scientists to look at the development of nations

this study the term Caribbean will be used to
West
refer only to the former British Colonies in the
th
with
The term will be used interchangeably
Indies.
West Indies.
-•In

3

as a mechanical process, meaning that
development - reaching
to that "higher and better" level - can
be planned.
This

process has been deceptively likened to the
building of
house which "one can fashion to one's taste. "^
Milton

a

Esman writes of change as the ability to deliberately

fashion

a

community in

a

fixed geographic boundary.^

He

further states that innovative institutions engineer change
and it is when these institutions are institutionalized

that the developed society becomes inevitable.^

The

question is can an institution build

An in-

stitution may disrupt

a

a

society?

society rather than build it.

It

becomes more important for the institution to blend in

with the people that it is serving.

Even then, there

is no guarantee that it will succeed in directing society

to that higher goal because institutionality involves a

complex set of interactions between the institution, with
its component parts, the people and, of course, the enTo survive, the institution may have to

vironment.

accommodate; if it cannot, this may be the source of its
demise.

^Karl Deutsch et al . , eds., Nation-Building
Atherton, 1965), p. 3.
York:
3

(New

Milton Esman, "The Politics of Development Administration," Comparative Administration Group, Occasional
Paper, 1963, p. 1,
,

4

Ibid .

,

p.

40.

^

4

Political Change and Traditionalism
This mechanistic view of development may be the result of the low regard that the theorists have shown toward

what they consider a traditional society as opposed to an

advanced society,

Rupert Emerson writes that the first

problem to be successfully handled in nation-building is
to destroy tribalism because of its disruptive force.

Still dealing with traditionalism, Claude Welch

sees "traditional mores" as an impediment to modernization.

The primary aim then is to v/eaken them.

He quoted Gustave

LeBon, approvingly, "to respect tradition is a condition
of existence for a people, to know how to disengage from
it is a condition of progress."

To second Welch's posi-

tion, S.N. Eisenstadt says that traditionalism retards

creativity and innovation.

7

For this reason, it must go

because today, the very base of traditional instructions
have been routed, of course, by the progressive life.
CoS. Whitaker took off from where Eisenstadt left off and

tells the world that psychologically a traditional people

Rupert Emerson, "Nation-Building in Africa," in
Nation-Building by Karl Deutsch, et al. (New York: Atherton,
1965), p. 105.
^Claude E. Welch, Jr., ed., "Introduction" in PolitiChange
cal Modernization A Reader in Comparative Political
TBelmont, Cal. Wadsworth, 1967), p. 9.
the problem of
"^S.N. Eisenstadt, "Some new looks at
modernization.
relations between traditional societies and
445.
Economic and Cultural Chgnoe (April, 1968), p.
,

:

:

5

have seen the need to emulate the more advanced peoples.

The whole society of the new states must change con-

currently since no segment of it can be held back by
tradition no matter how deeply it is rooted. It has to
be so, since the influential part of the society will be

the first to enter the modern era, and having seen the

benefits of modernity, it will make the whole society
modern.

8

Thus, Marion Levy writes gleefully that a uni-

versal solvent has penetrated the traditional society.
does not matter

hov/

It

this solvent came there, change is

always "in the direction of.

.

.

the modernized society."

9

Perhaps the relationship betvyeen traditionalism and

development has simply been misunderstood.

Further

analysis of this misunderstanding will be discussed below.

Political Development and Ethnocentrism

Concomitant with this belittling of traditionalism
is the blatant ethnocentrism which has characterized the

literature on change.

Myron Weiner contends that it was

because of the tremendous impact of Darwin's evolutionary

C.S. Whitaker, Jr., "A Dysrhythnic Process of Political Change," World Politics (January, 1967), p. 198.

^Marion J. Levy, Jr., "Patterns of Modernization and
Political Development," The Annals of the American Academy
30.
of Political and Social Science (March, 1965), p.

6

theory of the survival of the fittest that Europeans sought
to impose their model on the "New World. ""^"^

By implication,

European governments were the fittest because they had
"developed faster and better" than African systems.

As a

result, it became the "white man's burden" to direct and

hasten positive gov rnment.

As a start, cultural diffusion

was the key to this new phase modernization.

Eisenstadt

admits, to confirm what had already been suspected, that

the path to development came from Europe and spread during
the 19th and 20th centuries to South America, Asia, and

Africa. '^

Clearly, the non-Western models of governments'

(Latin America sometimes included), have been looked upon
as infants or as deviant examples of the Western experience.

12

But the zenith of European ethnocentrism is seen in the

following statement by

B.

Malinowski:

European agents [have] constitute jZj everywhere
the main drive in change; that they were the
determining factors as regards the initiative
took
of change; that it [was? they who plan,
measures, and O.mporte3 things. . ., that they
that they took away land, labor
withheld
and political independence and that they
;

"Political Modernization and Evolutionary Theory," Social Change in Developing Areas A reR«
in teroretation of Evolutionary Theory ed. by Herbert
1965),
Co.,
Publishing
Schenkman
Barringer (Cambridge, iXass.:
p. 105.
Develop•"^S.N. Eisenstadt, "Bureaucracy and Political
ed. by
ment," in Burea ucracy and Political Development
Press,
University
Princeton
Joseph La Palombara (pFTHceton:
1963), p. 98
Sociological
12,
Peter Nettl Political Mobilization, A
1967), p. l^J
b'aoer,
(London:
Analysis of Methods and Concepts
•^^Myron Werner,

;

,

,

,

7

themselves £were] in most of their actions
have been determined by instructions, ideas,
and forces which had their origin outside
Af rica. -^^
On first reading, it could be hypothesized that Malin-

owski was being sympathetic to the plight of the Africans,

especially when he writes about the taking away of African

property by the Europeans.

But one quickly discovers that

the reverse is the case since he asserts elsewhere that

African culture had no discernible impact on other cultures.
He advises the British that "a wise control of the forces of

change can guarantee
Africa.

a

normal and stable development" in

Malinowski does not state why change is needed

or why the British variant was meant to be imposed on Africans,

but Cyril Black gives a partial answer.

Writing as late as

1966, he says that African traditional culture has proven

incapable of sustaining modern institutions,

15

which the

Africans, presumably, want.
In response to those who not only want traditionalism

Malinowski, "Dynamics of Culture Change,"
York: Wiley,
Social Change ed. by I. Wallerstein (New
"•^B.

,

p.

13.

Situati
^^Quoted in G. Balandier, "The Colonial
41.
A Theoretical Approach," ibid., p.
^^Cyril Black, The Dynamics of Modernization

York: Harper and Row, 1966), p.

i'^^'

8

wiped out but the European variant of developed government imposed, Henry Bernstein writes that the traditional/

modern dichotomy is too neat.

All traditional societies

are not the same; in fact, the ideal traditional or modern

society is non-existent.

Consequently, the idea that the

modern society is the "participant

society""'"^ does not hold.

Those societies Daniel Lerner would label traditional are
also participant and the nature of participation in the so-

called modern societies is not even clear.
is of the opinion,

Henry Bernstein

and quite correctly so, that this di-

chotomy is purely heuristic.

This model can serve as the

basis of a dynamic approach which shows

between traditionalism and modernity;

17

a

relationship

that is all it can

do.

In addition, the assumption that modernity and tra-

dition are radically contradictory is a result of misreading what tradition is all about in
polity.

a

so-called backward

It also involves a misunderstanding of what moder-

nity involves in an "advanced" polity.

It seems that the

understoo
close relationship between the two is not clearly

Institutions,"
^^Daniel Lerner, "The Transformation of
B. Hamilton
William
by
ed.
in The Transfer of Institutions
^i.
1964),
p.
(DuHI^m, N.C: Duke University Press,
and the Socio17
Henry Bernstein, "Modernization Theory
Journal of Development
logical Study of Development," The
Studies (January, 1971), p. 147.
,

8

9

This has to be the case because no society relinquishes its

traditional mores totally.

Elements of traditionalism

always remain as indelible marks on the new born society.
It is as though the umbilical cord of tradition has refused
to be cut av7ay because no instrument is sharp enough to per-

form the seemingly simple operation.

The fact is in the

Western sense, "no society is wholly modern"; some part of
the old remains with the new.

1

Indeed tradition can be used

to bring about modernity.

Concept of Change
After considering various approaches, it was de-

cided to handle this section topically.

Only a few theories

which deal with political change will be discussed here.

To

this end, it assesses the equating of political change with

functions, the handling of

a

series of crises successfully,

the growth in complexity of institutions, social mobilization, integration, the existence of democratic institutions,
and the capacity of top leadership to control desired changes

in a political system.

The section ends with a treatment

of the relationship between law and political change.

"Conclusion,"
^^Robert Ward and Dankwart Rustow, eds.,
(Princeton:
Japan
and
P olitical Modernization in Turkey
1964),
pp. 444-5.
Press,
Princeton University

10

Barring the fact that Almond did not
visit a "developing" country^^ before he built his
models for their development, one cannot minimize the impact that
he has made
in the field of political development.
In the introduction
to the book he helped edit, The Politics of
the Developing
Areas, he endeavors to show the importance of the
political
systems of the new states.
He uses the systems approach
of

structural functional analysis to show the importance of
the component parts of those political systems.

Although

Almond does not deal specifically with the concept of political change in that work, he implies that change entails the

ability of any political system to deal with any strains which

may impinge on it.

He maintains that since all political

systems have component parts which perform functions to sus-

tain those systems v;here these functions have been performed

satisfactorily, change has occurred. 20
It was in 1966 that Almond, together with Bingham

Powell tried to articulate an explicit concept of political
change.

They wrote that

"

Change

results when existing

structure and culture of the political system is unable to

19

Gabriel Almond. Political Development Essays in
Theory
(Boston: Little, Brown, 1970), p. 21.
Heuristic
:

^^Gabriel Almond and James Coleman, eds., The Politics
of the Developing Areas (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1960T7 PP- 8-11.

11

cope with the problem or challenge which confronts it without further structural differentiation and cultural seculari-

zation."

21

The political system must be able to handle well

what Lucian Pye would later call crises.
Thus for Almond, the theory of political change

deals with functions.

What he does is to stress the prob-

lem solving capacity of the system.

It demands or draws

attention to participation and centralization.
new role structures and personal belonging.
some unanswered questions.

It links

But there are

To what extent should both

participation and centralization be tolerated?

Is partici-

pation absolutely necessary to keep any political system
alive?

Further criticism of the systems theory can be found at

parts of the
the end of the chapter, where the component

Dominican political system are analyzed.

But suffice it to

Almond's descripsay at this point that what detracts from
which gives one the
tion is his heavy emphasis on stability
is after is in
impression that the dynamic system which he

reality a very static one.

^2|£|£|tix|
^^Gabriel Almond and Bingham P^^^^l^ ' Little,
Brown and
f
(Boston:
Politics A Developmental Approach
Company, 1966), p. 34.
'

:

1971), p. 102.

12

On a more mundane level, Lucian Pye describes change
as the successful handling of a series of six crises by a

country.

23

These are that of identity, legitimacy, pene-

tration, participation, integration, and distribution.

Identity means simply that

a

people see themselves as part

of something they call their country.

Some have argued that

the West Indies will never be a nation since its people have
not been able to identify with something called the West

Indies because they did not have to fight for their "freedom."

Legitimacy is the acceptance of the right of a
But

government to rule regardless of how it came to power.

the accepted procedure for changing governments must be re-

spected by the contending parties in the political system.

Penetration is the ability of the governmental machinery to
go out to reach the people to ensure a certain degree of
It also involves the conscious effort of

participation.

genuinely trying to reach out to the people with goods and
services.

Participation is the deliberate encouragement of

and private
the masses to partake in the running of public

affairs.

Pye

•

s

shortcoming is that he does not indicate that

stability,
extensive participation, which may jeopardize

may not be

a

necessary ingredient to the survival of

a

political system.

Development
^^Lucian Pye, Aspects of Political
63-66.
(Boston: Little, Brown, 1966), pp.

.

13

Pye refers to integration as the government's ability
to effectively coordinate policy to ensure its efficient

execution.

Obviously, this is only one meaning of integra-

tion, but the other crises cover other meanings of the term
to a great extent.

Finally, distribution means the sharing

of available resources with the polity at large.

Pye cau-

tions his readers that these crises may not necessarily

occur simultaneously or separately.
that

a

crisis exists?

But when does one know

A nation may misread a problem and

act frantically to handle what it has diagnosed as a crisis,
and it turns out that such did not exist.

Pye's description is too neat and he could have been

more precise in indicating what each of these crises entails.
His analysis is too broad; for example,

a

participation

crisis for Burma may not be the same as one for Jamaica.
But,

as if Pye did not create enough confusion with his

description

of political change as the handling of a series

they
of crises, in 1972 a group of scholars probably thought

were writing the definitive work on change by using the Pye
approach.

All well-known scholars in the developmental

Coleman, are
field, Leonard Binder, Dankwart Rustow, James

represented.

eds., Crises and Se^uen^
Princeton University
in Political Development (Princeton:
Press, 1971)

2\eonard Binder et

al.

,

14

Leonard Binder leads the attack by charging that
political change entails critical changes of identity from
religious to ethnic, from parochial to societal groupings.
To handle the legitimacy crisis well is to change from "the

transcendental to immanent" realities.

But contrary to

this belief, Jon Rosenbaum writes that the beliefs in the

nether world can be used to bring about modernization.

Superstitious beliefs may create "a credible coercive apparatus in the formation of a functional political system,"

25

the same thing that people like Binder would like see happen.

The Machiavellian dictum that if religion can help to keep
the Prince in power, it should be used but otherwise it

should be destroyed comes to mind.

Likewise, if a people

are steeped in other worldly beliefs, this can be used as

might
a starting point to bring a desired change which

destroy those beliefs, but in

a

very deceptive manner.

Binder continues with his analysis and writes about

participation as the masses getting involved in the affairs
should
which touch upon their lives - in effect, the group
implication what
become more important than the family. By
family cannot do
the group can do for the individual the
as well.

Rosenbaum and Peter C. Sederberg "The
Comparative Politics
Occ ult and Political Development,"
(July, 1971), p. 566.

^Son

H.

,

15

In dealing with distribution, Binder wants status to
be based on merit and achievement.

He insists on a degree

of "control and management of capital," and also a "degree
of administrative and legal penetration into the social

structure and to the remote regions of the country." 26
Change cannot take place where advancement is based on nepotism and ascription.

Binder does not end his discussion

here but goes on to prescribe solutions to the problems of
the developing v/orld.
To him, the solutions of these problems rest with

the type of institutions these nations possess.

If the

institutions are strong, complex, structurally differentiated,

the polity has a chance to develop; if it is not

developed yet, by extension its problems become solvable.
These institutions ,. namely

,

elections, bureaucracy, govern-

ment, to name a few, must be big to facilitate the increase
in services as the population increases.

But Joseph La

Palombara warns that the extension of services does not

necessarily mean that modernization is achieved.

28

Henry

change
Bienen echoes the same sentiment when he writes that
hastens to add
entails effective political institutions, but

26

Binder et al., eds., Crises

^"^Ibid.

,

,

p.

53.

pp. 69-71.

Political
2Qjoseph La Palombara, Bureaucracy and
1963),
Press,
University
Bevelopment (Princeton: Princeton
p.

29.

16

that they could be competitive or decentralized in any

system.

29

In fact, competition and decentralization are not

in themselves hostile to change.

A highly locatized deter-

mination of political decisions may not be tantamount to
chaos.

(The reverse might be the case; both Canada and

the Caribbean have demonstrated that point and even in the

United States, a most "developed" society, the trend is
toward local autonomy).

Consequently, the literature which

equates change with an increase of power or complex governPower does not have to be

ment must be read with cuation.

moved from the village to the city and thence to the national
level.

A decentralized government does not necessarily ne-

gate a degree of secularization that is required to perform

certain functions.

But the degree of secularization,

observes La Palombara, will depend on the goal the nation
has set for itself.

Pye still insists that the ultimate

large,
test of change is the ability of a people to "establish

complex, but flexible organizational forms."

Simultaneously,

procedures
there must be a multiplicity of individuals and
And even prior to Pye and Bienen,
to settle disputes.
"What Does Political Development Mean
World Politics (October, 1967), p. 141.

29,

*Henry Bienen,

in Africa,

"

Political
^^Joseph La Palombara, Bureaucracy and
Development p. 40.
and Nation^^Lucian Pye, Politics Personality
1966), p. ^i.
Press,
Building (New Haven: Yale University
,

,

"
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Samuel P. Huntington was equating change with a respect for

complex institutions.
zation or

a

But he always warned that mass mobili-

highly politicized people could prevent the growth

of these complex institutions. 32

Using the differentiated syndrome as

a

guide, Wendell

Bell sees Jamaican society as being developed since there is
an increasing "scale of society."

He was happy to report

that the elites were responding to the demands of the system.
Bell continues: "the organization of human effort

become more intricate

in Jamaica

,

and managerial and super-

visory personnel both in and out of government.
increased in importance.

specialization

,

had

.

had

.

Differentiation of function

rationality and impersonality

The society had developed politically.

33

had

,

increased .

But by 1970, the

Jamaica Government has become increasingly repressive as
citizens and residents demanded more services which the
elites were unwilling to render.

Bell was fooled into be-

lieving that mere passivity on the part of Jamaicans was a
sign of satisfaction, hence change.

^^Samuel P. Huntington, "Political Development and
386-430.
Political Decay," World Politics , (April, 1965), pp.
''The
change,
on
mind
Huntington has since changed his
Politics,
Change to Change: Modernization, Development and There he
283-322.
Comparative Politics (April, 1971), pp.
about change
argues that it becomes superfluous to talk
that process.
througa
since all countries automatically go

m

Elites in
^^Wendell Bell, "Equality and Attitudes of
p.
(December,
1962),
Jamaica," Social and Economic S tudies
429; (emphasis added).

•
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On another level, Claude Ake sees political change^^
as nothing more than social mobilization.

He concerns him-

self with the basic question which besets all developing

countries: which political system, with the minimum amount
of disintegrative effort, will in the short run bring about

social mobilization.

Ake is convinced that the authoritarian,

paternal, identific, and consensual political system seems
to be the answer to the political problems of the developing

countries
The process of integration is change for Myron
To him, integration could mean any of the following:

Weiner.

bringing ethnic groups together to form

a

nation out of a

state, establishing central authority with the periphery

acquiescing, linking the masses with the elite, having the

minimum value consensus to uphold

a'

social order, sustaining

or holding a system
a capacity to organize for a common goal
36
In the final analytogether by whatever means available.

"expanding
sis, political change concerns itself with

with
functions of the political system," so it has to deal
essential to enthe "new level of integration" which is
sure

a

smooth functioning of the political system.

Political
^^ciaude Ake, "Political Integration and 1967),
(April,
p. 488.
Stability: A Hypothesis," World Politics
and Political
^^Myron Weiner, "Political Integration
Political Development ed.
Development/' The HumaA Factor in
Ginn, 19/0), p. i^-l.
by Monte PalmeFTWaltham , Mass.:
,

^^Ibid., p. 194.
37

Ibid.

,

p.

200.
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supportive of Weiner is Claude Ake, who refers
to the same
phenomenon, integration, as "building a coherent
political
society, • .
which involves an increase in cultural

homogeneity and value consensus.

The

society elicits

from the indivudual deference and devotion to the claims
of the state." 38

As a result,

broadened and intensified.

social communication is

Essentially these two writers

are dealing with the ideal, but are not outlining how
it is to be arrived at.

Disturbed by the inadequacies of the literature on
change, Fred Riggs introduces a new phenomenon to the
field.

He dismisses the dichotomy between the traditional

and the modern society described earlier in this chapter.

Between these two societies, he puts what he terms the

prismatic society. 39

But by doing that he falls into the

same trap that those before him had fallen into, because by
his definition of the prismatic society, not fully modern,

not fully traditional, there exists no modern society since
no society drops all its traditionalisms.

A more detailed

analysis of his prismatic society shows that he sees it as
a halfway house where elements of the modern society exist

Claude Ake, A Theory of Political Integration
(Homewood, 111.: The Dorsey Press, 1967), pp. 96-7.
^^Fred Riggs, Administration in Developing Countries
The Theory of Prismatic Society (Boston; Houghton Mifflin,
passim .
1964)
,
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side by side with traditional elements.

In such a system,

certain people are favored because they have status.

Law

and practices are obeyed to the best of one's ability but
are sometimes disregarded as the situation presents itself.

The problem with this analysis is that he gives the im-

pression that these very practices outlined above are not
performed in the advanced societies.

They may be more

apparent in the new states because of their small size,
but these very practices occur in other parts of the world
and certainly in the advanced societies as well.
An additional problem with Riggs» analysis is his

introduction of administration as an independent variable
in the process of change.

and not independent.

environment.

Administration is not static

It demands a lot of support from its

How it can effect political change drastically

created more conis still not very clear and Riggs has

fusion than anything else.

When he writes about formalism

does not show
(legalism) in relation to the society, he
if the law makes
how it should be measured. For example,
that would be a
school attendance mandatory, to Riggs
many
But, if in that same society,
degree of formalism.
general statement be made
schools remain unused, can a
since the situation warrants
that this society is prismatic
Testing for formalism in rethe disregarding of a law7
this case becomes hazardous;
gards to school attendance in
school on a part-time basis.
some children may be attending
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How can that be measured?
Also, Riggs gives the distinct impression that the

society is on an ascending order and is being dragged
along by the main variable, the bureaucracy.

He commits the

same error that others before him had committed by insinuating that the traditional order will inevitably disintegrate
and will be replaced by a higher and better one.

Chalmers Johnson 40 describes change as the capacity
of top leadership to engineer complex programs to stimulate

social and economic change.

In the same vein, a few people

have seen the emergence of a charismatic leader as an interim
step to full political development which means that the

leader's primary role is to convince the people to accept
the state.

As it were, he tries to handle the identity

crisis satisfactorily.

Immanuel Wallers tein

41

conjectures

that this is particularly useful where there are deep seated

parochialisms.
simple.

This sounds plausible and indeed is very

But one must exercise caution especially after

countries with
reviev;ing the experiences of the developing

self-appointed messiahs.
Messiah, so be it.

If a country is looking for a

But a charismatic leader, or what passes

leader.
for such, is not necessarily a good

Carl

(Boston:
^^Chalmers Johnson, Revolutionary Change

Little, Brown, 1966), p. 104.

^Wnuel

Wallerstein, Afr^^: Tlr^
y^.
pendence (New York: Vintage Books, 1961), p.

9l In^^
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Frederick

42

v;arns

that it does not necessarily provide an

adequate type of leadership, though it certainly provides

power and selfishness and self-esteem which may preclude
innovations and new leaders with new ideas.

No further

argument is necessary to demonstrate that point; the Caribbean
has more than its share of examples (which will be discussed
in Chapters Four and Six).

Political change

is

often equated with democracy.
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Talcott Parsons is surely representative of this thinking.
He writes that the terminal goal of the developed society is
This des-

to be associated with democratic minded leaders.

Thus, the

tination seems to be based on the American model.

beginning of this long process is sometimes seen as negative
process," is used
and the phrase, the "non-Western political
The change process is analyzed as "problems,"
to describe it.
determinants," and a progression toward this

"conditions,"

miUenium.

Obviously, to achieve this

a

"stable democracy"^^

is mandatory.

and the Prob^Varl Frederick, "Political Leadership
(February,
Charismatic Power/' Journal of Politi^

lem of
1961), pp. 3-24.

^

Modern
^^Talcott Parsons, Sociological T_heorx
t^iy1966), p.
Society (New York: The Free Press,
Development and Socioi\ieeuxeL, "Political
^^M;,rtin
Martin Needier,
America," Amer ican
y^tin A,.erica^
of Latin
Economic Development The Case
see
Political science Revie^
°ther articles and books which
addition there are several^^^her
^^^^^
-^^^^"^ Development:
:

.^

.
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La Palombara disagrees and says that the Anglo-

American model is not the logical end product of political
change.

Democracy is utterly opposed to rapid change.

He

further states that the degree of complexity of the political
system is not related to democratic
La Palombara'

s

forms.'^^

To re-emphasize

point, Karl de Schweinctz^^ argues that the

political possibilities of the developing countries do not
allow for democracy.

Because the developing countries have

been shown that there is

a

need to catch up v;ith the advanced

countries, they can ill-afford to practice American democracy.
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Finally, political scientists increasingly are

They argue that the

relating law to political change.

lawyers from the developing areas have all been trained in
the metropole and for this reason bring certain values back
to their countries.

They become the leading politicians and

Measurements and Analysis," American Sociological Review
(April, 1963), pp. 253-64; Seymour M. Lipset, "Some Social
Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political
Legitimacy," American Political Science Review (March, 1959),
pp. 69-105; David C. McClelland, The Achieving Society
(Princeton: D. Van Nostrand, 1961
)

Joseph La Palombara, Bureaucracy and Politica l
Development p. 10»
,

^^Karl de Schweinctz, Industrialization and Democracy
Economic Necessities and Political Consequences TNgw York:
John V/iley, 1964), passim
.

Macpherson, The Real World of De mocracy
Macpherson argues
(Toronto: Toronto UniversitTl^ress 1966).
to them.
peculiar
that they have a form of democracy
'^"''cB.

,

:
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get intiiTiately involved in the nation-building process
which
often follov;s the state-building process.
Because of this fact, the pundits from the developed
areas are increasingly writing about law as the basis for

political change.

Ralph Braibanti writes that law has acted

as a guide leading people to this "collective earthly exis48
tence."
Others have seen law as a major obstacle to polit-

ical change, especially in areas which were once under

colonial rule.

It is argued that since these lawyers were

schooled in the metropolitan areas they were taught that

rituals can regulate almost all disputes.

They somehow

believed that, and stopped any rapid change which is always
49
seen as disruptive.

Of course, to accept this analysis is to accept

Mr. Dunn's

(quoted above) idea of change which essentially

means emulating the more advanced countries.

What Dunn fails

to see is that a brake on rapid change may be positive con-

tribution to development (more on that at the end of this
chapter).

Indeed law is related to political change, but

the socialization process goes much further than that.

It

will be seen that there are other less tangible variables

which have greater effect on change.
Ralph Braibanti, "The Role of Law in Political
Development," Inte rnational and Corporative Law of the Commonwealth ed. by Robert Wilson~(Durham, N.C: Duke University
Press, 1968), pp. 12-18.
,

New
Dunn, 'Law and the Political Development of
20.
1971),
p.
States," Social and Economic Studies (March,
"^^W.M.
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Critique of the Systems Approach
It was suggested at the beginning of
this chapt(:er

that the system theory would be used to explain
and describe
the political situation in Dominica. Thus, it is
here that
the shortcomings of this approach will be outlined,
as far
as the author can discern,

in an effort to bypass the pit-

falls of those before him, who have used the same approach.
System is here defined as an organized and apparent

coherent body which tries to explain the inter-relationship
between identifiable variables.

"Identifiable" must be

emphasized since unidentified variables may be just as im-

portant as the identified ones.

Even v;hen other variables

are identified, the exact nature of their impact will prob-

ably never be made clear.

Secondly, it is assumed that

within this structure, the variables are sub-structures in
themselves; even the individual is

a

sub-structure, in the

sense that he possesses within him multiple variables.

Thirdly, it is assumed that this system has

which implies

a

a

structure

definite boundary and that its sole reason

for being is to remain stable, to revert to

a

level of equili-

brium, a situation where all parts function as they were

meant to.

Obviously, this is a ticklish problen^ especially

when one tries to identify how
to function.

a

certain element was meant

Then, finally, there is feedback based on

inputs and outputs which eventually change the nature of the
system, presumably in

a

positive way.

By extension,
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degeneration has no P±ace
place in this scheme of
things.
The system theory ^itiiiianas
i-h;.^y demands that

m

an assortment of
Skills are available to ensure
its smooth operation.
The
system is continually growing
more complex and for this
reason demands individually
trained experts to man the
emerging multi-complex structure.

All these factors sound good,
but there are innu-

merable problems.

First, one must set clearly
where the

boundaries of this system are to be
marked. In a continually shrinking world, boundaries
are getting more
blurred by the hour. Where would one
set the boundary of
the Dominican political system? Does
it include British
politics? It is true that Dominican politics
will never

affect British politics, as much as the British
can still
affect its politics, but what happens in each
system may
affect the other. For example, if for some reason
civil

war were to break out in Dominica and the British
overreacted
by deploying troops who went on to destroy Dominica,
the

British Government would surely be adversely affected by
this action.

There is no question that if Britain decides

to cut all aid to Dominica,

this will change the nature of

Dominican politics in one way or the other.

Does that mean

that the Dominican political system may have to include

outside limits?
Secondly, the system theorists give the impression
that all the identifiable variables act in a reciprocal

27

fashion: people, things, institutions.

The terminology

employed is, to say the least, ambiguous if
they are to
be applied in all situations.
For example, "interest

aggregation," "communication," "rule application,"
and

"adjudication" are always used with general applicability,

with little or not regard for the specific situation
under
study.

The theorists fail to realize that a mass demon-

stration in Dominica may be as much interest aggregation
as

a wife

insisting to her husband president that women

deserve better treatment in the society.
as

Labelling both

interest aggregation with no explanation does not seem

correct.

One critic writes that "a demand from

a

union

leader might be both interest articulation and communication;"

51

therefore, how does one label an action when it can

fall under two or more rubrics?

Thirdly, reasons for failure in the system are some-

times tautological.

The explanation for failure is simply

put: the system failed to respond to the challenges of the

time.

The theorists never ask the critical question of why

were demands made or

v;hy

they had to come sooner or later?

What really happened to bring about the system's downfall is

never explained,

Joseph La Palombara raises that very point in his
"Macrotheories and Microapplications in Conservative Politics:
A Widening Chasm," Comparative Politics (October, 1968), passim
^^Alexander Groth, "Structural Functional ism and
Political Development: Three Problems," The Western Political
Quarterly (September, 1970), p. 489.
52

^^Ibid.

,
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Fourthly, there is the problem of
relationships.
Why should one problem precipitate
a crisis?
Could it not
be that the crisis was already in
the making for years
and it took one small event to set it
off? in addition,
all crises should not be labelled as
pathological,
as

system theorist implies.

Further,

hov;

the

does one test the

system to diagnose its adaptability or disintegration
over a period of time?
asks,

v/ho

As Alexander J. Groth correctly

is to say that an urban riot is more destructive

to a system than the non-production of first-class
music

by a nation? 5 3
Finally, the over-emphasis on specialization because
of the so-called complex nature of the system seems to
be uncalled for.

Because a nation has a shortage of

manpower and it finds its several structures being manned
by

a

few individuals is no sign of its inferior nature or

its impending breakdown.

The reasons for breakdown are

far more complex than a lack of specialization.

And,

obviously, to go along with the several experts is to
accept the need and inevitable democratic structure which
the system theorists see as the best

^^Ibid.

,

p.

492.

v/ay

to maintain the
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system on tho desired course.

Groth

argues that the

opposite might be the case since democratic tolerance may

precipitate atomic behavior.

Open discussion does not

necessarily lead to the maintenance of social order.

By

the same token, the autocratic system may not be more

capable of distributing the services of

a

system.

Groth

calls upon the theorists to be more realistic in their

model building by incorporating some history into them.

La Palombara calls on them to explain the "black box,"
the system,

55

or go back to political science to explain

the basic structures of the government.

they get fancy

box

vjill

v/ith

Only then can

their explanations since by then the

no longer be black, nor v/hite, but transparent.

With these warnings in mind, we turn to

a

diagrammatic sketch and description of the Dominican
political system which has undergone very little change

from the time it was

a

colonial polity to its present

status of Associate Statehood - semi-independence.

^"^Ibid.

,

p.

493.

^^This point was made by Joseph La Palombara at a
lecture at the University of Massachusetts during the Fall
of 1972.
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The Dominican Political Syst<
The first major characteristic
of the Dominican
political system is that it is very
small.
This makes
anonymity impossible. Second, the
walls surrounding the
various groups are not impregnable.
fact, the diagram
shows that all the groups, save one,
in the system

m

are

connected in one way or the other.

The ruling party is

in the center of everything and draws
all other groups

into controversies at will.

The bureaucracy is under the

power of the ruling party, with the local government

agency replacing the trade union as an agent of
political
socialization.

The trade unions have since struck up a

relationship with the Employers Union, which has some of
its key personnel in the ruling party.

The dotted line

from the ruling party to the Black Power movement indicates

attempts made by that party to communicate with the Movement.

The Movement has not returned the courtesy since, in its
opinion, the ruling party has refused to tackle the major

problems of agrarian reform in the country.

But one may

notice that all other groups have not tried to communicate

with the Black Power Movement, though they have all shown

a

fear of it by their actions and pronouncements.

Another major characteristic of the political system
is the fact that both the ruling party and Black Power

Movement are highly influenced by outside forces.
ruling party has kept

a

The

close association with other
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British Caribbean Government
uvt^Lnmenus.
c;

shown

These governments have
c-

desire to c^-f-Fc^r-^T
tt^t
.ffec.ively
contain any revolutionary
elements which might upset the
existing system. The
Black Power .^.ovement has been
influenced by two sets of
people. First, it has close
ties with other movements
like it in the Caribbean, and
also corresponds with leaders
who have been forced to live in
places like North America
a

and Great Britain.

Thus, presently, the Movement
in Dominica
is fighting an uphill battle,
as the government has all
the
machinery to stymie its drive.

The other elements who might otherwise
join the

Movement to fight the Government have weighed
the credits
and debits of such a move and decided
against it. They

may be able to see the demise of the present system
in
the long run but have chosen to disprove the Marxian

rule

that even the bourgeoisie will join the inevitable
revolu-

tion to hasten the destruction of the system.

Instead,

the so-called opposition has joined forces with the

Government on the major issues, such as keeping the system
as

it is.

These elites have enough power to prove the

Easton assertion that constitutional equilibrium will always
be maintained in a political system as long as the various

classes agree on the rules of the game. 5 G

David Easton, The Political System (New York:
Alfred A. Knopf, 1963), p. 296.
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Although the elites have accepted the system
and
are generally satisfied with the scheme of things,
those
who do not rule want to rule. They want to enjoy
some
of the prestige that goes with ruling.

For this reason,

members of the opposition party will precipitate
flict which ends in crisis.
a

a

con-

A minor issue can bring about

conflict which can be helpful in any political system.

It can keep the Government from being too lackadaisical in

dealing with the various interests.

But crisis develops

when the response to the precipitated conflict is
of power.

a

show

Thus, since 1967, Dominica has experienced two

major crises which began as conflicts.
rounded the renaming of

a

The first sur-

street from Queen Mary Street to

Freedom Street, the name of the party which made the change.
The second dealt with the inability of

principal to communicate with

a

The first conflict ended in

handful
a

a

high school
of boys.

crisis because the

Government responded by initiating legislation in the
National Assembly to dissolve the local body, dominated
by Freedom Party members, which had changed the name of
the street.

The Freedom Party responded by including the

entire island in the struggle and marched to take over the

national government.

The second ended in a crisis (it

was a crisis since all the teachers left and the school
to
closed down) because instead of intervening peacefully
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investigate who was wrong, the government began accusing
the Opposition Party of running the school.

This was the

same charge the school boys had levelled against the

principal

v;hen he

refused to see them.

Both of these crises cost the people a tremendous
amount of money and the waste of valuable time.

There are

no signs that this pattern v/ill not repeat itself in the

future.

The government is increasingly gaining support in

the rural areas and encouraging a fight between the rural
and urban elements.

The Opposition Party is equally bad.

It lacks any form of unity and many of its members lack

credibility.

But one group which stands to gain is the

Black Power Movement,

It is the only group which has had

regional appeal in the entire Caribbean.

The leaders in

Dominica still feel that they can keep the Movement down, but,
increasingly, the machinery of police and army is losing
its monopoly on violence.

of violent elements.

The Movement has its own share

And besides, it is making a con-

certed effort to educate the people politically while it

continues to draw support of all kinds from the outside.
At present the system has shown no signs of changing.

The power wielders have
their hold.

a

firm grip, but they are losing

Within five years, they will have to reckon

with the Black Power Movement in Dominica.
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CHAPTER

II

CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENTS IN DOMINICA
Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to present a brief

constitutional history of Dominica, to put the study in
perspective.

Having described the location, size and popu-

lation make up of the island, the study moves to an assess-

ment of the Spanish, French and British occupations.
It is significant to note that the story of

Dominica really begins in the 1880

's,

when Britain saw fit

to rule the island directly to protect the population

against the upper class elements.
intention, turned out to be

a

This move, a good one in

major obstacle in the advance-

ment of the island toward the intended goal of self-government.

This had to be so because the person sent out of

Britain to supervise that job did not want any "trouble"

with the elites.

It was one thing to protect the natives

but it was another to ensure that protection.

The Governor

had his own career to protect and, further, he had to live

with these elites.

For these reasons, he played it safe by

keeping government at the minimum.
One cannot ignore the importance of the colonial

constitution.

It has always been a crucial variable in the

political system of former British colonies.

In these
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colonies, the British had impressed on the leader
the importance of a constitution; though, they themselves
never

bothered to write one for themselves.
took the British very seriously.

The Caribbean leaders

One cannot cynically

appraise the constitutions of the Caribbean Islands.
such appraisal is an indication of

a

Any

lack of understanding

of this instrument in its environment.

One will always be

fascinated by the independence constitution of

a

former

British Caribbean colony because it marks the beginning of
a

very tenuous situation.

In colonial times, a constitution

existed; but the Governor was above that constitution.

Now

the leaders are told they cannot assume a similar position,

though many try to.

It becomes fascinating to see how the

leaders react to the new situation.

A piece of paper is now

supreme and not the European.
Another good reason for reviewing the constitution
is the fact that it may derive its sustenance from the socio-

political culture, and in the process, may alter that culture or be altered by it.

It becomes important to look at

the fine print to uncover the amount of "spirit" that is

needed to keep the constitution operational.

For, in viewing

the Dominican constitution, if it leans heavily on props

which are non-existent or alien to Dominica, trouble will
inevitably ensue.

In addition, various contending parties

may enter the ring to interpret what might become
piece of paper.

a

useless

model
If the constitution is based on a
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which best suits an "advanced" country, and there are
indications that it does, trouble might also result. If

there

are "rules of the game" which are frequently disregarded,

breakdowns could become an established fixture of the system.
Certainly, the constitution is not the only important

variable in the colonial system, but it cannot be ignored.
And it is precisely for this reason that it is being re-

viewed here.

Location - Size and Population

Dominica (pronounced Dom-in-ee-ka) is the largest
of the six Associated States of the Caribbean, with an area

of 287.9 square miles and a population of 70,000 (1970 census)

The people
blood.

ar-e

mostly of African descent with some European

The population of J-iominica is said to be 99% mixed,

though by 1973, they all considered themselves Black.

Located between Guadeloupe to the North, and Mar-

tinique to the South (French islands), on latitude 15° 30"
(N)

and longitude 61° 15"

(W),

it forms part of the Windward

Group (not to be confused with the Dutch Windward group,
see map on following page).

Although so close to these

French Islands, the relationship between them is often
negligible.

Most Dominicans speak a French-Creole, spoken

background
in both Martinique and Guadeloupe, but its British
has precluded any French connection.

speak pure French.

If they do,

Very few Dominicans

this is no indication of the

Dominica in relation to the other islands in the Eastern
Caribbean

•
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French impact on the island.

From time to time a group of

French students and, increasingly, adults visit
Dominica,
only to be tucked away in some hotel. The native Dominican

may come around to view them.

The visiting French people

may even be warned to beware of Black Power advocates who
may try to indoctrinate them.

Should such an attempt be

made, they are warned, the police should be contacted immediately."^

In any case, the Dominican youth must keep his

distance, since he does not understand or speak French, in

spite of the amount of French that he is taught at the
schools.

The Government has not seen the need to encourage

the use of French but by 1972, the new wave was to learn

Spanish since plans were in the making to establish some
kind of relation with Venezuela, some six hundred miles
away.

Let it be made clear from the start that Dominica
is a land full of contradictions.

unimaginative and incompetent.

Its leaders can be very

It is not unusual to hear

the expression "typical Dominica" whenever something goes
wrong.

Anyone who studies Dominica's history closely, comes

out with the idea that somehow nothing goes right for this

unfortunate place.

The following section will support that

hypothesis

French
^Based on informal interviews with vacationing
1972.
of
Summer
students in Dominica during the
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The Historical Overview

The Spanish and Dominica ^
It is reported that Christopher Columbus came
upon

Dominica on November

3,

1493,

He named it Domingo in honor

of the day on which it was sighted.

the island was IVaitikubi.

The original name of

But this name change was an

indication of things to come, the virtual annihilation of
Dominica's original inhabitants, the Arawaks and Caribs.
Thus, the years 1493-1635 marked the heroic attempts of the

Carib Indians to prevent the Spanish from taking their
island.

Very little is known about the history of the Caribs
other than that they were very fierce and ate human flesh,

preferrably non-European,

They lived in the smaller islands

as they had pushed the less warlike Arawaks to the bigger
^

islands.

They

v;ere on

their

v;ay

to exterminating the Arav;ak

men, when they were interrupted by the Europeans,

Dominica

still has some of its Caribs but these have been made cul-

turally part of Dominica, though they live on

a

reservation,

the only one of its kind in the Caribbean,

Columbus and his men did not remain on Dominica
since prospects for getting gold. were bleak.

The inhabi-

tants had given them a little less than a warm welcome.

See Joseph Borome, "Spain and Dominica," Caribbean
Quarterly (December, 1966), pp. 30-46.
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During the 15th century, the Spaniards
returned to
Dominica but were unable to establish
themselves in
the

area because the Caribs were too unpredictable.

Because of

this situation many Spaniards tried to convince
the Queen
of Spain that Dominica should be taken forcibly
but she

refused, believing that the Bible could do the job of

domesticating these natives.

And since Dominica was too

small to be made into a separate province, it was placed

under the province of Puerto Rico.

This was to increase

the revenue of the Church and to pay for the maintenance
of the colonial administration.

But as the 16th century came to

a

close, Spanish

interests moved away from the West Indies to attend to more

pressing problems at home.

The Spanish Armada was defeated

in 1588 and at the same time both the French and British

were hurriedly trying to establish themselves in the

Caribbean.

At one time, the Spanish thought seriously of

trying to reassert their dominance over the Caribbean by
sending their nationals to reside there.

But this came to

naught as the harsh reality was only too clear: the golden

century of Spain was at an end.

Besides, this last effort

was underscored by the move of the French to annex Dominica

by Treaty in 1640, when Pierre Breton, a French priest set
foot on Dominica.

The Spanish never did settle Dominica.
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The French and Dominica
To mark the beginning and end of the French
occupa-

tion of Dominica is

a

problematic affair since it was during

that era (1635 - 1804) that the island changed hands
no less
than fourteen times. Thus to label this era (1635 1805)

as the French occupation is at best a neat way to
get around
a

complex problem.

There is no doubt that the French left

an indelible mark on Dominica.

language of Dominica today.

This is reflected in the

As stated,

Dominicans understand and speak

a

the majority of

French-Creole.

In addition,

the many names and customs introduced by the French still

persist today.
From all reports, it seems that the French had a

better encounter with the Caribs of Dominica.

The first

French inhabitants were Friars; the laymen were not too
interested in Dominica because it was too rugged and intimidating with its v/arlike Indians.

But somehow there were

more enterprising Frenchmen who were willing to brave all
the hazards.

These

v;ere less

fortunate Frenchmen who failed

to make it elsewhere and decided to try their luck in

Dominica.

But during that time (1660 's) the importance of

Dominica was in the accessibility it offered to the French
islands of Martinique and Guadeloupe.

It was also in that

very year, 1660, that Dominica was being signed over to

.
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the Caribs,^ as though it did not originally
belong to them.
This 1660 treaty came under the scrutiny
of both
the British and French in 1686, when the French
claim was

contested by the British who were settling in nearby
areas.
The problem was temporarily settled in favor of the
French,
because the British were not strong enough to forcibly land
on Dominica. The dispute over ownership flared up again in
1715; but this time, the British v;ere more concerned with
St. Lucia, which was a better area.

As Dominica was so

close to St. Lucia, there was no harm in acquiring Dominica
also.

The British claim was even more "justified," since

"Indian" VJarner, son of Sir Thomas Warner, was Governor of

Dominica.

Such a heated dispute ensued that both warring

nations suggested that they withdraw their claims and leave

Dominica neutral. 4
The War of Jenkin's Ear fought between the British
and French, was to interrupt life in Dominica for four

years (1744-8).
for ito

Both the French and British fought hard

The ensuing peace treaty signed in 1748, at Aix-

la-Chapelle, made Dominica neutral.

This neutrality was to

last eleven years, when the strategic value of the island

This treaty was "signed" between the Caribs and the
French.
By this treaty, the Caribs agreed to have Dominica
as long as they relinquished their claim to St. Kitts and St
Croix. An account of this treaty is contained in Cuthbert A
Burns, History of the British West Indies (London: George
Allen and Unwin, 1965)., p. 222.

^Ibid .

,

p.

265
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was again recognized.

The war (1759 - 1763), again fought between
the

British and the French, brought Dominica
of the British.

under the wings

It was during that time that the British

chopped up Dominica into estates, sold them to British
nationals and used the money to fill Queen Charlotte's dowry„^
Not a cent of the proceeds was returned to the colony„

But

although the British flag flew in Dominica, the French

people were already entrenched there.

When the French re-

turned in 1778, their job was made much easier because of
the presence of a huge French population.

But the French

soldiers committed the unforgivable mistake of burning
Roseau, the capital city, and, in the process, earned the

antagonism of their people since their property was desConsequently, by 1795 the remaining French people

troyed.

in Dominica began to change their allegiance to the British

who had shown greater compassion.

As it turned out, by

1804 when the French returned to occupy Dominica, they were

successful initially but were quickly routed by their own
mistakes.

In the first place, they had already lost the

respect of their own nationals.

Secondly, they lacked the
But the

courage to fight on even after great successes.

British remained and held on tenaciously, regaining Dominica

Alec Waugh, The Sugar Islands A Collection of Pieces
about the West Indies (New York: L. Cassell, 1958)^
pp. 281-284.
:

V.'ritten

^Cuthbert A. Burns, British West Indies

,

p.

520.
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in 1805.

The

saga,

of Dominica under British began to
take

shape.

The British and Dominica

'^

The first phase 1805-1897 .

Caribbean ended in 1807.

The slave trade to the

Slavery itself was outlawed in

1832, followed by a period of apprenticeship between 18321838.

This last period was intended to cushion the shock

of freedom for the Negro and the acceptance of that fact
by his former master.

The story of the Negro begins with

his plight to make it in

a

free but alien world.

With the

passage of the 1831 Brown Privilege Bill,^ the Whites wrongly
assumed that the upper crust of the Negro element

Coloreds

— would

— the

push for more rights for the Negro.

Little

did the Whites realize that this "threatening" element could
have been effectively coopted, and in the process dominated.
In fact, the Coloreds did fight the Whites, but the former

never intended to include the

gained benefits.

lov;er

class Negroes in any

The fighting Coloreds were acting on their

own behalf and not that of anyone else.

This section relies
Crown Colony Government Came
Studies (October, 1969), pp.
of the facts is that of this

heavily on Joseph Borome, "How
to Dominica by 1898," Caribbean
26-27.
But the interpretation
writer,

^The Bill granted full political and social rights
to all non-Whites.
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What emerged in Dominica were three
group interests,
two active and one very much passive.
The passive section,
the masses, were included in the conflict,
only when it
suited the purposes of the two other groups.The two active
participants were the Whites, clearly in the minority

numerically, and the more prosperous Negroes

— the

also a minority in relation to the masses.

This conflict

shed light on the intentions of the contestants.

Coloreds

The two

privileged groups were intent on not paying taxes for the
upkeep of the colony.

Though in all fairness to the upper

class Negroes, the Whites had a greater obligation to pay
for the colonial administration.

Before emancipation, they

received the benefits of the colony and even continued to do
so after emancipation.

This era marked the quintessence of elite politics
in Dominica,

The bankruptcy of the politicians of the day

was ably described in the following remark: "The politicians

were ignorant of the principles of government.

They were

uneducated and revengeful." 9
The first major fight came in 1850 when the Colored

leaders were intent on enfranchising the masses although they

9

The Dominican Colonist
Joseph Borome, o£_. cit .

,

July, 1854, quoted

m
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knew that the latter was mostly illiterate.

This was seen

as necessary to ensure the Colored elites
continuous domina-

tion of the Assembly.

Quite obviously, the Whites were

afraid of that move since it would mark the

-end of

their

mastery of not only the Assembly, but also the society.
The masses were not enfranchised, and the next

fight centered around making the Assembly

°

a

wholly nominated

body to ensure wider representation of the people at large.
Keeping in character, the Colored elites were opposed.

They

were sure to be replaced with more "acceptable" elements;

elements who could work as

a team to

improve the island.

The Whites were for the idea, although there was no guarantee
that their interests would be protected.

But the fact that

one of their own, the Governor, would be making the appoint-

ments, was soothing enough to make the idea acceptable.
By the 1880 's, there v;ere other issues which com-

manded the attention of the Colored elites.

Dominica was

in a British federation with the Leeward Islands (Antigua,
St.

Kitts, Nevis-Anguilla and Montserrat), but few Dominicans

were allotted key positions in the national government.
Other nationals held key posts right in Dominica.

This time

the Coloreds were led by a certain William Davies who was

determined to remove Dominica from that federation.

1898, when Crovm Colony Government was introduced in Dominica, the Executive and the Legislative bodies
formed the Assembly. .In 1951, the Assembly was renamed the
Legislative Council, With Associate Statehood, the Legislative Council has been renamed Assembly.
"""^From
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The idea of enfranchising the electorate
was brought

up again in 1886; but this time, it was
at the suggestion of
the Governor who intended to "displace a conflict"
he was
having with the Colored elites. His plan was to
get the

people politically conscious to help

hiin

defeat candidates

like Davies who had proven themselves a "nuisance."
The Colored elites were quick to catch on and informed

the masses of the "conspiracy".

But in the process, they

demonstrated their disregard of and lack of trust in the
people, whom they so frequently used in their fights against
the Whites.

They could have allowed the Governor to en-

franchise the people.

Then they could go on to beat him

at his own game, by defeating the cronies the Governor would

have put up for election.

They were intensely aware of their

own inadequacies, and were unwilling to put their "record"
on the line.

They had none.

Besides, had they been de-

feated, they kneiv too well that what they had tried to avoid,

paying their fair share of taxes, would have fallen squarely
on them.

By then, they v/ere the biggest shopkeepers and

land owners of the territory.
By the 1890

's

the Governor of Dominica had had

enough of the reactionary elements in the Assembly,
requested direct supervision from the Crown,

He

Before this

could take place, the British recommended that Dominica be
placed in the Windward group (Grenada, St- Vincent, St. Lucia
and Tobago).

The Colored legislators were so delighted that
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they quickly filed legislation to have
Dominica removed from
the Leeward Federation. The British were
not about to grant
the request.
Instead Britain decided to give Dominica
a
sum of $15,000 (BWI), provided that the colony
accepted

direct rule from Britain.
Britain was willing to give the aid, but it wanted

direct supervision of the allocation of those funds.

At

first, it appeared that Dominica was to lose its partially

elected assembly and become

a

fully-fledged colony.

But

Davies was quick to see the writing on the wall, and took
"his case" to the people by telling them that the anticipated

move was tantamount to depriving them of their freedom.

But

in reality, Dovies may have been afraid of losing the

ability to stymie all unfavorable tax legislation in the
Assembly.

Had he said that, he would have had no case.

But the idea of deprivation of one's liberty went well with
the people*

With the proposed Bill to have Dominica ruled directly
from Britain defeated, the Assembly, as was the custom, dis-

solved and new elections called.

When the votes were counted,

the Governor had gathered enough elected representatives to

have Dominica become a Crown Colony,
The second phase 1898 - 1950 ,

The era between 1898-

1950 in Dominican history was one characterized by constant

confrontation between the King's representative and the
elites of the island.

This era marked the "conquered
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colony, phase in the island's history.

it was an era of

frustrations and travail, as the
Dominican elites constantly
put the British on the spot in an
effort to have them release
the island from colonial bondage.
The Assembly, to be described below,
was make up of
six Official and six Unofficial^^ members
with a Governor
having a deciding vote in case of a tie. All
members
of

that body were VJhite with the exception of two.

Thus, there

was no question that Templer, the one representing
the

Governor in Dominica at the time, would have little
trouble
in working with the "representative" body, since this
was

the exact composition of the Assembly when Dominica was

voted

a

Crown Colony.

His job was even made easier by the

passing away from the scene of William Davies and A„Do
Lockhart.

Lockhart refused an Unofficial seat, although it

was continually offered to him.
In the meantime, the promised money for Dominica was

received.

It was used to build the much needed roads.

Be-

cause there was little planning, the result of the undertaking was

a

little less than

a

success.

An Unofficial member of the Council was one who
supposedly represented the masses. The Official member
was supposed to do the same, but it was generally accepted
that he would side with the Governor on all issues.

2
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Templer was succeeded by the youthful
and energetic
A. Heskeith Bell.
For all intents and purposes, Bell
niust
have been a good administrator, for he
gained the respect,
admiration, and praise of all elements of the
Dominican
society, including those who at one time
had little to do
with any English official. His tour of duty in
Africa may
have been beneficial to him where he must have learned
a

great deal about black people.

There seemed to have been

little question about Bell's competence for he was quickly

removed from Dominica and rewarded with

a

more prosperous

post elsewhere in the Empire.
But the good work of Bell was not enough to hide the

harsh realities of the unrepresentative nature of the Crown

colony system.

Agitation began in Grenada and spread to the

neighboring islands, such as Dominica.

The elites of

Dominica moved to join the bandwagon to demand more representation for Dominica.
In 1919 a Representative Government Association was

created in Dominica by members of the upper class.

purpose was to fight Crown Colony Government.

Its sole

One year

later, widespread protest against the colonial system in-

tensified.

Increasingly, the British got more sensitive

to these requests and sent out a Commission of Inquiry under
1
the command of Major Wood

to investigate the problems of

The Colonial Office, Report by the Honorable E.F.L
Dec.
VJood on His Visit to the West Indies and British Guiana
1921-Feb. 1922 (Cmd. 1679) (London: Her Majesty's Stationery
Office, 1922.
o

,
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the islands.
As a result or in spite of

l-Jood's

a new

constitution was introduced in 1924.
visions for a Governor to preside over the

recommendations,
it made pro-

Assembly which

was made up of six Official and six Unofficial
members.

The

Official Members with the Governor formed the
Executive
Council, the administrative arm of the Government.

This new

constitution was advanced in that it made provisions for
the
election of four members of the Unofficial delegation to the
Assembly.

The other two on the Unofficial side were still

appointed by the Governor.

This in effect marked the

beginning of the demise of Crown Colony Government in
Dominica.
The provision for the election of four members could
be interpreted as a reversal of the pre-1898 conditions of

elite domination of the political system.

In spite of the

introduction of rudimentary political participation in

Dominica politics, one still has to wonder whether this
type of participation can eliminate elite domination in

politics.

The four elected on that first occasion support

the idea that elite domination of the political systems
always seems inevitable.

Cecile A.
a

RaV'/le,

Trinidadian,

The first elected officials were

representing Roseau, the Capital.

v;ho

He was

had since made his home in Dominica.

For

his services to West Indian and Dominican politics, he has

been acclaimed

a

national hero.

The other representatives
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were A. A. Baron, from the Northern
district; H.D. Shillingf ord
representing the Eastern section, and Sidney
L„V. Green,

representing the West.

Anyone who is familiar with Dominican

society must agree that these four did not
and were never
really representatives of Dominican society. They

could not

sympathize with the plight of the poor Dominican
since they
were so steeped in making it big in their own businesses.

They were, in Dominican parlance, Nogocions (big shots).

In

any case they wielded very little power in the Assembly.

They

were outnumbered by eight representatives.

And besides, the

Governor had the power to frustrate any "deviations" to
maintain control.

The system was meant to tantalize the

people who came close to power.

V/hen

they attempted to grab

power to use it, they were denied it.
The Dominican leaders were determined to wrest more

power from the British.

To this end, in 1927, they formed

the Tax-Payers Association, followed, in 1931, by an associa-

tion named Constitutional Reform.

Both were simple pressure

groups, and, as the names imply, were composed mainly of

those who were directly affected by the modified Crown Colony

Government.

This writer does not accept the view that these

leaders were motivated to obtain "liberty" for their people.

The people would have remained in the same conditions of

poverty had the local elites initially been made rulers of
Dominica.
In 193;? two significant events occurred in Dominica
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which affected Crown Colony Government,

First, the six

Unofficial members of the Assembly, including
the two appointed by the Crown, stormed out of the
Assembly in protest
against the system.
It is not clear what
-precipitated

that event, but there were so many things wrong
with Dominica
and so little was being done, that a walkout was
justified.
The second event, which will receive greater attention
in

Chapter Six, was the conference held at St. Gerard's Hall,
Roseau, presided over by Dominica's Rawle.

This conference

was not only attended by Dominicans but by all leading

politicians in the Caribbean.

The topic for discussion was

ways and means to have the British give up their tight control of all the islands.

Between 1932 and 1936 nothing substantial took place
in Dominica.

After the 1932 Conference, the Caribbean leaders

had much praise for each other and in the characteristic

Caribbean fashion, everyone lost interest in the idea of
federation.
In 1936, another "advanced" constitution was imposed
on Dominica.

This change provided for a majority of Unoffi-

cial members in the Legislative Council.
not bring any meaningful change.

But again, it did

The Governor still retained

the power of absolute veto on any piece of legislation (an
14
idea which received praise from the local newspaper.

'^F.A. Hoyos, The Road to Responsible Government
(Barbados: Letchworth, 1959), p. 57.

^Chronicle, September 24, 1949, p. 6*
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The Governor's judgment counted far more than the
other
parts of the Council.
Since the Second World War was already then in the

making, and utmost loyalty was demanded from the Crown,
the

situation quieted dovm

a little.

But between 1938 - 1939

riots broke out all over the Caribbean, beginning in Jamaica
in the North to Trinidad in the South, including Barbados

which was least expected to go against the Crown since it
had prided itself as being little Britain.

The riots were

not initiated by the elites of the islands, as they had too

much to lose financially, but by trade unionists, who were
by any standards, very poor.

The trade unionists were forced

into prominence by the very elites who could have helped to

better social conditions.

The riots of 1938 were not

politically motivated, but they soon took on

a

political

character as the political elites, like Bustamante of
Jamaica, joined the fighting to benefit themselves.

system had created

a

The

situation where partially educated

people, local elites, used the people's fight to further their

own careers.
islands.

These are the present day politicians of the

.

The political elites quickly seized the cause of

the people and became heroes.
a

In a sense, the elites were

retarding force to this revolutionary drive because they

were the ones who reached

a

compromise with the British.

Had the fight been left in the hands of the masses, little
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compromise would have been made.

There would have been

more massive destruction, but
Britain was now being criticized
by its own people for the way it
had "joined forces" with
the island elites to keep the poor
in their
places.

The war years (1940-45) saw an air of
domestic
complacency, but also emergency measures
undertaken in the
island to successfully prosecute the war.
As soon as the
war was over, the fight against the Crown began
again.

Nineteen hundred and forty-five saw the emergence
of the
first island-wide Trade Union Movement, under the
leadership of A. Christopher Loblack.
But Loblack had to wait
until 1949 to show his close connection with tne people.
He successfully prevented the estate owner of Geneva Estate
(VJestern part of the island)

"squatters" from the land.

from forcibly expelling

Loblack was so strong that the

Governor himself, with an entourage of native policemen,
had to accompany the owner of the estate (Nassief, a foreigner)
to meet the people,"'"^

Adult Suffrage - 1951 and 1959 Constitutions
Adult Suffrage and 1951 Constitution

Britain was always reluctant to allow the natives
of its conquered colonies to select their rulers.

This fear

was sustained by the fact that the leaders of these polities

1

5

The Chronicle (Dominica), December

7,

1949, p. 8,

5 7

had shown themselves to be great
opportunists.

These

leaders were able to manipulate the system to
arrive at
their goal.
But the refusal to allow the people to
chose
their intermediate leaders should have been
.followed by some
form of training to acquaint the people with the
idea of

voting for their representatives.

Britain believed that

somehow the people could learn on their own.

When the time

was ripe, they would be allowed to choose their own govern-

ment.

By 1951 the 21-year-old-Dominican was able to exer-

cise that British given right.
Adult suffrage .

The coming of adult suffrage did

not cause great stirrings in Dominica.

In fact one prominent

citizen, who at that time was the editor of

a

leading news-

paper, told this writer that it was "no big thing."

Adult

suffrage was proclaimed for the Dominican, and people voted
in the ensuing elections .

On further investigation, this

assessment turned out to be correct.

The leaders were

apathetic and even apprehensive about the ability of the
natives to select their leaders.
moved.

The people were even less

They certainly had little knowledge of its meaning.

In fact, right about that time, the nascent banana industry

was being pushed.

The papers v;ere criticizing the British

for not paying more attention to that event rather than

giving the people adult suffrage.

The paper went on to say

'•^Interview with J.H. Carlton Grell, who WaS the
editor of the Dominica Tribune.
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that

Dominicans did not need adult suffrage?'^ It is
also interesting to note that the then editor of
the major
paper in Dominica, The Chronicle was a politician and

was

,

in the process of running for the mayoralty. of
Roseau.

He

did not see the contradiction in his position of wanting
to
serve, and at the same time not wanting to be appointed by

those who he desired to serve.

elites are sounding

a

But today, the political

different tune.

Though one can still

suspect their contempt for the people's ability to choose
their leaders "rationally," they all say that the intro-

duction of adult suffrage was not a mistake.

Their reasoning

is that it had to come some time.

The basic structure and philosophy of elite

domination of the Dominican political system did not change.
But the new Order in Council-

(adult suffrage) had the

following provisions which deviated from past practices:
(1)

Literacy qualifications were abolished which

allowed the unlettered to mark his ballot with an "X" next
to the symbol of the candidate of his choice.
(2)

The ovmership of large property as a provision

for candidacy was dropped.

can become a candidate.

Now anyone who can muster f25

This did not have the effect of

increasing the quality and quantity of candidates since the

•^•^

The Chronicle ,

(Dominica), April

5,

1950, p, 5.

'^The Dominica (Constitution) Order in Council, 1951
(London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1950), p. 4.
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very ones who had run previously continued
to dominate
Dominican society.
(3)

The Government was given the chore of
compiling

lists of all eligible voters throughout the.
island and to
make them available in public places to ensure that
everyone,

twenty-one years and over, was placed on them„
(4)

The secret ballot was introduced, with proper

provision to ensure "secrecy" for the incapacitated to cast
his vote,
(5)

The sale of intoxicating beverages was pro-

hibited on election day„

This last provision has not closely

been adhered to, but since all parties have broken that
provision, it goes unnoticed.
(6)

Finally, a district residential qualification

of six months was imposed on voters, but no restrictions were

placed on candidates.
This last provision has had negative results in

Dominica.

It is not certain how many voters are disenfran-

chised because of this provision, though it really does not
matter.

The Government has no adequate measure to check

one's place of residence.

But the non-residency requirement

for the candidates is not the best provision.

It was based

on the British view that once one is elected, the national

interest will somehow be served over any local interest.

This view should hold more so for
Dominica, but it does not.

a

small island like

Once a candidate is elected.

GO

invariably, he pushes for his own district.

present era of party politics in Dorninica,

And in the
a

govornmenh can

wJthold services to any district which did not
vote for it.
An added anomaly of this fact is the relative
ease with
which a national figure can change his constituency
and win
in his "adopted" district.
He can place weak c^mdidates
in "safe" districts and himself run in a "difficult" area

where he is sure to win because of his national appeal.
In the event that he loses he can make a weak candidate

resign, force a by-elechion and get himself elected.

"forced-oub" candidate is given
The 1951 Constitution .

a

The

job in the Government.

The provisions of the 1951

Constitutions were good in principle, but they did not
change the power relationships in the society.

The Governor

could allow them to take effect, since whatever the outcome
of an election, he st;ill had sufficient power to keep the

elected at bay by his power to veto everything.
The nature of this constitution was such bhat pro-

vision was made to have

a

majority of the members of the

Legislative Council elected.

This might give one the im-

pression that Dominican politics were at long last dominated
by the people.

In theory,

this was the case but in practice

the people were dispensable.

The majority of the Legislative

Council was popularly elected, but the Constitution sti-

pulated that if the Legislative Council "failed to pass
bill or motion wd thin such time and in such form as the

a

9
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Governor may

t hink

reasonable and exp pd.-^ni-, the latter at
any time in his discretion may. .
.declare that such bill

or motion shall be in effect as if
it had been passed by the

Council." 1

Ultimate control of Dominican local politics

remained in the hands of Britain.
The 1956 "advanced" constitution .

There was a

vague attempt in the 1956 Constitution to transfer some

responsibility to the people's "representatives" by earmarking the Executive Council as the "principal instrument
of policy."

But the Governor remained the ultimate head

of Government, giving and taking power away.

The law was

very explicit.

He could ignore the Executive Council "in

any case which

was

Our

British

of such a nature that in his judgement

services

to the masses

would sustain

material prejudice by reason of his consulting with the

Executive Council." 20

He could also act with prior approval

of the Secretary of State for the Colonies in Britain,

contrary to the advice of the Executive Council "in the
interest of public faith, public order or good government"
and in the interest of financial concrol at any time when

the colony received money from Britain to balance its

1

9

The Dominica Constitution
(Emphasis added.)
paragraph 3,

,

1951

,

Article 12,

^'^Great Britain, The VJindward Islands Royal Instruc

tions (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1956)^
Article 12, paragraph 3,

-

)
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budget 21 (Dominica has remained on the British
"payroll"
for a long time).
In this Executive Council, the elected members
held

half the number of available seats.

Membership to it was

not based on membership in a party, but on the basis of

having been elected by the Legislative Council.

in that-

Council, both elected and non-elected members were to be
found.

All members of the Legislative Council had an

equal chance of being selected to serve on this "policy

making body." 22

Those elected to the Executive were named

Ministers and were made "heads" of departments.
partment had

a

Each de-

Principal Secretary appointed by the Governor

The secretaries were above the Ministers but could not

dismiss them.

Any Principal Secretary could submit dis-

agreements directly to the Executive Council without the
prior knowledge of the Ministers, 23
The possible power struggle which could have

ensued was alleviated by the fact that the first set of

21

The Dominica (Constitution) Order in Council
1956 (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1956
Article 13, paragraph 2,
22

Great Britain, The Windward Islands Royal
Instructions Clause 21, section 1.
,

^^Ibid.

,

Clause 8, Section

3

(f).

,
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Ministers in the Dominican system were
not the best.
They
realized their limitations and vented
their frustrations on
the British rather than on the first
three Principal Secretaries who were all Dominican and had served
in the

Colonial bureaucracy for some time.

But clearly, the

position of the Ministers in the Executive Council
was
tenuous at best, because the Governor had the authority
declare

a

seat vacant at his own discretion.

to

For all

intents and purposes, the Executive Council was responsible
to the Governor and not the Legislative Council.

Dominica's thrust into that brave new world in
1956 was a little less than spectacular.

In the first

place, it can safely be said that there was absolutely no

training in the workings of a ministerial system.

ently no one knew about it anyway.

Appar-

To be sure, an English-

man was sent out to "train" Dominicans on the v;orkings of
the British House of Commons.

The accounts of the three

lectures were reported in The Chronicle which praised the

Englishman for the splendid job he had done,"

Of course,

the naive and unpretentious Dominicans did not see the

stupidity of the whole affair.

They could not understand

that the operational structure of the British system was
24

An Englishman named D.W.S. Lidderdale prepared
Dominican leaders for the nev; ministerial system. He delivered the following lectures: a) Parliamentary Government
in Britain, b) How the House of Commons Works - General
Principles, and c) How the House of Commons Workd - Rules
The Dominica Chronicle reported that Lidderof Procedure.
dale was able to "keen the audience spellbound with the
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just not applicable to the Dominican
context precisely
because "the spirit" which accompanies
the British system
could not be transplanted to their own
leaders.

The 1959 "more advanced" Constitution
.

The 1959

Constitution was not that much more advanced
than the 1955
Constitution. The Executive Council was kept
as the principal instrument of policy, but this time it was
explicitly
stated that it would be "collectively responsible.
the Legislative Council.

.

.to

In theory, that was a good idea,

The Governor was part of the Executive Council.

Thus, if

this provision was observed, he would have come under the

scrutiny of the Legislative Council.
was provision for a Chief Minister.

dividual who, presumably,

vsfould

in addition, there
He had to be an in-

command the respect of a

majority of the members of the Legislative Council.

This

was hard to achieve since the underpinning structure of a

party system was non-existent in Dominica at the time.
This was another one of these contradictions found in the

colonial situation.

An instrument was imposed on a people

fascination, grandeur and beauty of every aspect of his
subject matter since this knowledge could hardly be found
in books." February 11, 1956, p. 7,
25

Dominica Imperial Instrument no, 3 of 1959
Statutory Instrument 1959 no, 2199 . The Dominica (Consti
tution Order in Council 1959 (London; Her Majesty's
Stationery Office, 1959), Article 12, Section 2.
,

)

,

^^Ibid.

,

,

Article 13, Section 1.

-
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to bring about "political advancement"
but no foundation

was erected to sustain this "progress."

Out of necessity,

very tenuous party coalition was created (discussed
in
Chapter IV), and it subsequently suffered the fate of
a

"new

wine in old wine skins."
In consultation with the Chief Minister, the

Governor appointed three other Ministers from the Legislative Council. 27

The intent of this new constitution

was to bring Dominica up to the same level of political

development as found in Jamaica and Trinidad to ensure a
better working of the proposed federation of 1958.

But

the Governor still retained the absolute veto over all

legislation.

He had to consult the Council, but could

act against its advice if "law and order was being dis-

turbed."

The Governor did not use his veto power frequently

but the fact that he could may have had a dampening and

intimidating effect on the Council members.

General Characteristics of the Dominican
Political System Before 1967
The following seems to be the more salient features
of the colonial constitutions of Dominica.

The Colony was

tightly controlled by the intimidating power of the Governor,
Britain inserted this power in all Dominican constitutions

because the British taxpayers' money was being used to

Ibid .

,

Article 14, Section

2
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sustain Dominica.

On the other hand, the machinery to

sustain parliamentary government was not
encouraged and
could not be encouraged because of the nature

of the system.

The system gave all power to one man,

a

principle which

clashed with both modern British tradition and the
parliamentary system. The parliamentary system demanded

the

machinery of

a

party system to ensure a comprehensive policy.

The system demanded discipline from groups who sought to

win elections to implement their programs under their own
power, regardless of how wrong these may be.

Then it

becomes incumbent on the Opposition, which will have developed, to convince the people that it can do

a

better

job than the ruling party.

Unfortunately, that was not the case in Dominica.
The system allowed individuals to

v;in

elections, but did

not allow them to be responsible by being forced to im-

plement their declared programs.

This writer finds it hard

to believe that the British did not allow elected officials
to exercise power only because Dominica could not balance
it own budget and needed British financial aid.

This

denial of power must have been rooted in the fact that the

British did not have faith in Dominican leaders.

And quite

understandably soj the leaders of Dominica did not prove
themselves capable of ruling themselves.

because they were never given

They could not,

a chance.

If British colonial policy had been meant to develop

.
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Messiahs like the Governor
uvtiLnor, It w,->3
surely successful in
Dominica.
But this was not i-u^
the intention of the British,
British colonial policy failed
because the desired objective, to "guide the colonial
territories to responsible
self-government within Ithe Commonwealth
in conditions that
assured the people concerned both
a fair standard of living
-i

4-

,

and freedom from oppression from
any quarter"

always materialize.

did not

in fact, this overly cautious nature

of British policy did keep Dominlci, and others like it,
in a state of immaturity.

And when Dominica "arrived at

statehood," it did not know the responsibilities of an
"adult."

The nominiting system

h-.3

p-'-rsis

ted.

It has been

increasingly used to place inccnp'^tent people in the Assembly
It was meant to be used to get

intimidated by the pains of
the Council.

^n'-rving people who might be

ei-'C'

But it has been

oril politics to sit in

u.':.''"1

to provide seats in the

Council for defeated candidat-j.In the final analysis,

•"•'•'^

by Lord Beswick that the islan'la

c

-nnot accept a statement

.^n had a "long ex-

.'-.-v/.*

perience with democratic gover r:'«''r,t ,

-

"

The intention may

^^Quoted in D.W. Strx\"--''' ';J-itish Colonial Public
.?JL (June, 1967), p. 195.
Finance," Social and Econornji',
^^Great Britain, P.ir;!
Lords Official Report (Lon'i"
Office, February, 1967), p,

'

'

^

V rebates. House of
.ijesty's Stationery
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have been to achieve that.

But the authorities fell far

short of the mark.

The 1967 Constitution
In 1967 Dominica became an Associate State of Great

Britain which meant it was "no longer

a

colony,"

it has

internal self-government and Britain is responsible for its

defence and foreign policy.

The exact nature of this

arrangement is still developing and the only way to understand is to look at the provisions of the latest Dominican

Constitution.
The Setting
Sir Ivor Jennings wrote, the "constitutional

developments

in the dependent territories

are

not

always empirical because these places have different origins
and traditions."

30

Although the British relied on the "man

on the spot," the Governor, Constitutions for the colonies

emanated from

6,

Downing Street.

The Constitutions were

first debated in the British House of Commons and then

discussed with the leaders of the colonies just around the
time of their independence.
them on the people.

The leaders in turn, imposed

To be sure there have been deviations

from this rule, but Dominica is not one of them.

The 1967

^"^Ivor Jennings, The Approach to Self Government
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Pres.-, 1956), p- 165„

,
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constitution was made and approved in London.
even suspects that not too many Dominicans

This writer

are even aware

of its existence.
It is important to understand the economic and

political background in which this constitution was implemented.
Dominica is small and sparsely populated, making

administration very costly.

Minerals are non-existent.

In

fact, Dominica has been a victim of boom and bust in the

Brazilian style, albeit on

a

smaller scale.

The latest

saga of Dominica was the folding up a trucking company

which had promised great prospects for development and
employment.

The banana industry, the life line of Dominica,

is ailing very badly.

Even tourism, a one-time thriving

industry, has been crippled by the latest

Indian nationalism.

v^rave

of West

The Government has tried to help, and

keeps repeating that things will be better, but conditions

worsen and jobs get fewer.
There is a general shortage of skilled labor since
the skilled Dominican can command better salaries elsewhere.

Those who remain are not called on to help because they may
be of a different ideological bent.

This policy precludes

meaningful cooperation with the Government,
Dominica is no longer

a

grant-aided territory, but

still receives sizable aid in the form of schools and

teachers from Canada, Great Britain and even the United
States
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The bureaucracy is not the
best and is very inefficient.
Quoting from the Report of the
Director of Audit for
1970 the following statements adequately
describe the state
of affairs in the bureaucracy,
beginning with the major
department, the Treasury Division:

^^^^
Sank Reconciliation susZ.^J^'f^^''''"^
ceptible
to audit has not been prepared since 1968."^^
Ministry of Agriculture, Lands and Cooperatives:
"52 -_This Ministry has repeated its
performance of
previous years, by failing to submit any statements.
It^might well be that it has lost count of its
outstanding debts during the period 1968-1970
and its account book was inaccurately kept."

Ministry of Education and Health:
.expenditure was exceeded by a total of
.
$42,541.54 BWI without the necessary authority
of virements or special warrants,
and store
recording remains unsatisfactory. " 33

Ministry of Communications and Works:
.^.has fallen in line with other departments by
exhibiting to some extent a lack of proper control
over expenditure, the amount of $659,602.00 were
exceeded ivithout the authority of virements or
special warrants. "34

31

Report of the Director of Audit on the Audit of the
Accounts for 1970 (Roseau: Government Printing Office, 1971),
p.

7.

32

33

34

Ibid .

,

p.

8.

Ibid .

,

p.

9.

Ibid .

,

p.

11
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Ministry of Home Affairs:
"the errors brought to light in the
cash book appear
to be the result of carelessness and
disinterest
on the part of the officer responsible
for the
record, " ^

The above speak for themselves and require
no further comments.

These are the few errors made public; others

remain hidden.
The constitution refers to advancement in the

civil service system on the basis of merit.

It is assumed

that all persons are equal until one has surpassed another
by way of one's work.

For example, the British bureaucracy

may be able to tolerate and handle well the appointment of
individuals in key positions purely on the basis of party
affiliation.

And surely that is not the only variable con-

sidered in making appointments to the British bureaucracy,
since the appointee is usually competent in his own right.

What is being argued here is the fact that in Britain the

appointees to the bureaucracy may belong to the party in

power but they are as qualified as any other person who could
be considered for the same jobc

The Constitution assumed

that this practice would be followed in Dominica, where

appointees would be party

35

Ibid .

,

p.

men and would also be qualified.

12,

This writer has been able to discern greater
irregularities in the course of his research which he can
not document here.
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such has not been the case as both
key members of
the two major parties admitted to
this writer that neither
organization had enough qualified men to
fill the available
political jobs. Thus, the critical function
of elite re-

cruitment in both the bureaucratic and political
realm needs
to be handled more seriously.
The present recruitment pattern in

a

system may be

reaction to previous custom; but if the present
system
demands a certain procedure or pattern which is not
a

available,

the system itself may crack under the heavy strains
that may

follow.

It may be reshaped if it is sufficiently flexible

or be completely destroyed.

But under no circumstance will

it remain the same if the factors which su3tain it are

radically changed by the personnel who man its sustaining
elements.

It is too early to predict the future of the

Dominican political system, though already heavy strains
have been brought to bear on it.
It is no secret that recruitment to the bureaucracy

and the parties has been along particularistic lines while

the system is demanding universlaistic principles, as will

been indicated later.

The civil servant is so aware of

that fact that he is unable to express his opinion in the

newspapers.

He is forced to pass his opinion to a sympa-

thetic editor who in turn composes

a

letter for him and

'
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publishes it under

a

pen name.^'^

Quite obviously the civil

servant is forced out of politics and
sees it as the game
of a chosen few with large followingsThis condition precludes mass participation
in

politics (participation defined here as taking
part in
decision making, etc.). it is the small group which
can
convince more people to its persuasion and which becomes
the dominant party.

Such a party becomes very hard to beat.

All benefits which come to the country from the outside

arrive in its name.
The Component Parts of the 1967 Constitution
The entire constitution will not be examined.

It

is only those parts which this writer believes that have to

function well to ensure success v;hich will be reviewed here
the Governor, the electoral process, the Assembly, and the

Judiciary,
The Governor . 38

The Governor is the ceremonial

head of State and has no legal responsibilities for running
the Government.

He is supposed to be dignified and above

party politics since his constituency is the whole of
Dominica.

Holding office at Her Majesty's pleasure, he may

37

Interview with a prominent editor of a leading
paper in Dominica.

^he Dominica Constitution Order 1967 (London: Her
Majesty's Stationery Office, 1967), pp. 20-21.
•^
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be allowed an additional five years
duty after the first
five, the traditional term of office.
In the past, a

Governor could be elevated to
he had done his job well.

continue in the Caribbean.

a

higher post elsewhere if

This practice

is-

unlikely to

What is more likely to happen

is to allow a man an indefinite tenure,

especially if he

satisfies all interests well.
By inserting the phrase "at Her Majesty's pleasure"

when referring to length of office, Britain is showing

concern over that office, lest it be used
prize.

as a political

Britain does not want that now, but in the heyday

of colonialism, that is exactly how it was treated.

Be

that cs it may, the vagueness of the phrase, "Her Majesty's

pleasure," demonstrates the British lack of appreciation
of Dominican patterns of behavior.
be used as a political prize.

The governship should

Since the Governor does not

have the role "to protect" the masses against the "irrespon-

sible," "demagogic" local politician, his job could be used
to reward a faithful party follower.

But the British

rationale for the protection is to ensure

a

second term

for the Governor who would otherwise be replaced after a

first term.

39

Presently the Governor of Dominica has very little
political power, but he is the highest paid public official
Thus, rewarding a loyal party official
of the territory.
with that job is quite appropriate.
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Apparently both the British and
Dominicans are
operating under different assumptions.
The British assume
that the Governor is head of State
because he
attaches his

signature to legislation, while all
Dominican bureaucratic,
business and political elites admit
openly that the Premier
is the de facto head of State.

In effect Britain is forcing a spirit,
a kind of

"gentleman's agreement" on Dominica, where it is not
necessary. it tells an incoming government to accept,

without question, a man appointed by

a

previous government.

It is more appropriate to have this office as a political

prize than that of Speaker of the House, Public Relations
Officer, or even Local Government Commissioner.

The Office

of Governor has become negligible, ineffectual and very

subordinate to the Premier of the country.

The offices of

Public Relations and Local Government Commissioners are

critical ones, since they can help build up

a

credible

image for the government in its efforts to penetrate and

communicate with the people.

In addition, if local govern-

ments are organized well, there is no question that these

could provide able leadership for the national level, even

though the emerging leaders may oppose the government.
the long run the national interest

v/ill

In

be served.

The Constitution itself shows the futility of the

^^Based on interviews with twenty political elites
and forty-five bureaucratic elites.
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Governor, since he cannot act
on his own, but in conjunction
"with the cabinet... He attends
no Cabinet meetings.
He
is given .'the power" to
remove the Premier and the Cabinet,
but this is superfluous because
of the nature of the
arrangement.
the past, whenever this was
attempted,
crisis was precipit ated/^ Presently,
there are many things
working against the Governor. He is
a local man, which
takes away from him ..the respect" which
was afforded the
European. As a local, he just does not have
the finesse
or charisma that his predecessor possessed.
An effort has
been made to keep him on par with the European-born
Governor
by keeping all the dressings and ceremonies that
Dominicans

m

are so used to.

person.
a

But these do not lend credibility to his

He remains a "juju," "a mas," "a papishow.'"^^ of

papiermache.
It was anticipated that these external trappings

would create legitimacy for the Black who occupies that
office.

But the fact remains legitimacy is one of those

concepts that is hard to transfer.

timacy because he
the Queen.

v;as

The European had legi-

white and because he was put there by

His intellectual background was not important.

A constitution has never been suspended by a Governor
but one was suspended in Grenada in 1962.
Rioting broke out
when the leader of the dismissed government contended that
the Governor had no right to suspend the Constitution.
42

display.

These are Creole-patois words meaning

a

clown on
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No one in the colony cared about
that anyway.

His decora-

tive medals and MBE's and Sir's
and OBE's were sufficient
to make him competent.
Attempts have been made to give the
local the same titles, but somehow
he is pLagued by the
fact that he is a local. The situation
is even aggregated
by the known fact that the present Governor
of Dominica
got his post not so much because he was
competent, but

primarily because he had always allied himself
with the
Government in power. Dominicans have not cared too
much
about their present Governor.
They only poke fun at his
speech defect.

He stutters a great deal.

It is not being argued here that the Governor should

have his dictatorial powers restored.

This writer believes

that the office should be abolished in its present form,

since it is too costly.

In a society where unemployment

is about forty percent,

and the average pay is only $100

a

month, the office of Governor becomes an expensive luxury.

His annual salary is in the range of $13,200.

He has an

annual allowance of $3,000 duty free and in lieu of customs

duty he receives $1,200, payable during the period of performance in Dominica.
additional $1,300.
43

43

For domestic staff, he gets an

The present Governor already has

In addition he receives retirement and gratuity
benefits: gratuity equivalent to 1/10 of the aggregate of
the salaries paid to him during his term of office and an
annual pension of 1/2 of the salary paid to him at the
date of his retirement. If he has a previous pension, he
will not receive that one.

78

retired from

a job as

Secretary to the Windward Islands/^

But the Ordinance does not say
that he could accept this
last retirement if the money received
is greater than that
of the previous position.

The Electoral Process/^

countries can be

Elections in most small

risky business.

a

it becomes even more

risky when the small country is carrying
out the process
by "itself" for bhe first time, as is the case
in Dominica.
The basic assumption of the Dominica constitution
is that free elections will decide who wields
power.

The

winner will assume office, while the loser will wait in
readiness to form

a

government should the ruling government

falter for whatever reason.

But the size of Dominica makes

electioneering both easy and difficult.

contain about two thousand voters.

Most constituencies

These are further

broken down into smaller sections, to facilitate voting.
The supervisors of these polling stations are supposed to
be non-partisan but some "break the law" and campaign

secretly for "their" condidates.

Thus, there is no telling

what form this campaigning may take. 46

44

.

.

Dominica Official Gazette "Governor's Emolument
Ordinance 1967 ." (Roseau: Government Printery, 1967), p. 4,
,

45

The Dominica Constitution Order 1967

46

,

pp.

32-34.

This writer was reliably informed by the son of
servant that during the recent election in
Dominica (1970), his father campaigned secretly for the
Dominica Labor Party. In addition, there have been charges
made against the Labor Party for promoting certain members
a top civil
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Smallness is an asset, since
the candidates c.:an
easily reach their voters. But
this smallness is al:-SO
.conducive to buying votes through
various means such as
throwing a party in a constituency.
Smallness
leads to

gossip and false accusations, which
may lead to unnecessary
confrontations.
In Dominica, the Governor, supposedly
non-partisan,

supervises and runs elections.

This does not mean much.

The only implication of this provision is
that the report
of the elections can be picked up from the
Governor's

office,

The supervisor of elections has always been
servant.

a

civil

For this reason, he has always been intimidated

by the incumbent government .

"^"^

The method outlined for setting up the borders of

the constituencies seems pretty safe, at least on paper.
But the spirit which should go along with it does not seem
to be present.

The Speaker of the House, a political

appointee, is Chairman of the Constituency Commission, which
is made up of four other members.

All are appointed by the

of the Police Force immediately after the said elections.
These charges seem to be true in part, because there were
relatively unknown policemen who made it to the top in a
short space of time. They could not have made it on ability,
since there is no objective test in Dominica v\;hich seeks to
evaluate the performance of policemen,
47

In an informal interview with the last supervisor
of elections, he told this v;riter that during the court
fight of the two factions of the Dominica Labor Party, a
top Government Official wanted him to favor the LeBlanc
faction of the Party, It is interesting to note that the
Courts subsequently decided against the LeBlanc faction. This
did not matter since LeBlanc v;ent on to v/in the elections (1970)
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Governor, two with the Prer^ier's
advice and two with the
advice Of the leader of the
Opposition. From the start,
the Commission is heavily in favor
of the ruling party becuase members of that body are prone
to be .highly partisan.
Except for the Speaker, membership in
the Assembly or in
any public service disqualifies one
from membership on this
Commission. Legally, this body can act on
its own and
generally a member will vacate his seat every
time the

Assembly is dissolved.

Anyone on the Commission can be

removed if he becomes incapacitated or misbehaves
as
determined by a Commission appointed by the Governor.

charge of misbehavior can only be brought against
by the party which appointed him.

a

A

member

The report of this

Commission must be presented to the Assembly as soon as
possible.

Any modifications of the report can be carried

out in the Assembly by a procedure outlined by the ruling
party.

This may lead to many charges of gerrymandering

districts to ensure the return to power of an incumbent
government. This eventuality is mitigated though, by the
fact that no modifications will have to be made in the

Assembly since the prepared report of the Commission will
reflect the wishes of the ruling party.
There are several flaws with the Commission.

been said, it favors any ruling party.

As has

The Speaker, in

British fashion, is supposed to be non-partisan, but this
is not the case in Dominica where he always has been a
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staunch member of the ruling party.

Secondly, the two

members appointed by the Government are
supporters of the
ruling government. They are given instructions
as to how
the constituencies should be divided.

On the other hand,

the two appointed by the Opposition are also highly
partisan.

The only way the Opposition members can come close

to having their way is by taking their cause to
the people.

If they can generate enough sympathy to effect a major
con-

frontation with the Government, they may influence the
Government.

But in its present form, a government can

increase or decrease the number of constituencies at will
to ensure its success at the polls.

For this reason, in regard to elections, the

Constitution is too legalistic and formal.

It does not

take into account that politics in Dominica revolve around

rewarding friends and punishing enemies.

This writer is

surprised that the present electoral process has not caused
major confrontations, although the 1970 election reports
speak of a tense atmosphere which prevailed in Dominica. 48
The House of Assembly .

system is unicameral.

House of Assembly.

The Dominica political

The legislative body is called the

It is made up of eleven elected men,

representing as many constituencies (districts).

There are

in addition, three nominated members, two of whom are

"^^Dominica, Report on the House of Assembly General
(Roseau: The Government Printery, 1970), p,
Elections, 1970
,
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Government nominees, including the
Deputy Speaker, and one
an Opposition nominee.
The House is dirocted by a
Speaker.
The Attorney General is a member
of the
House, he could

either be

a

civil servant or

a

political appointee.

In

either case, his role is to defend the
government.
The Cabinet. The Cabinet is made up

of the Premier

and four other Ministers who meet every
week, to "discuss"

public policy.

Cabinet members are termed Ministers and

they now head departments or divisions.

They are appointed

to their posts, even before elected, by the
Premier, who is

also leader of the majority party.

But the Constitution

specifies that it is the Governor who appoints them officially.

Those elected on the slate of the majority party

who do not hold the title of Minister are presently referred
to as Parliamentary Secretaries.

Ministers Without Portfolio).
for any absent Minis er.
I,

(Formerly they were called

The latter can substitute

But Dominica, in its typical own

way, has had the "normal" situation persisting for some

time, where Parliamentary Secretaries are not qualified to

substitute for absent Ministers, far less to take over the
job permanently (Chapter IV).
It might be incorrect to assert that the Cabinet

system in Dominica is not working if the past history of

Dominica

v/ith

Cabinet Government is used as

a

yardstick

for evaluation.

But since the Constitution was nob made

by Dominica, one

mu.Gt

admit that the imposed system has

.

83

failed.

The Cabinet system of
Government meant that there
would be collective responsibility,
but that did not preclude individual inputs into
the decision making process.
In fact, it anticipated
and demanded a differentiation
of
functions to reach a higher level
of collective responsibility.
It required that many avenues
be considered before
a plan was implemented.
As will be shown in the following
chapter, collective responsibility in
Dominica has meant
one or two men's responsibility. The
majority of members
in the Cabinet seldom make an input
into the decision making
process

Procedur e in the House of Assembly .

All the tri-

vialities of the B-itish House of Commons are to
be encountered in Dominica. The House of Assembly in
Dominica
meets every six months to tell the people what has
already
been decided by the ruling party.

Since only a majority

is required to enact most legislation,

and any party with a

majority forms the Government, meetings in the House to
present programs become

a

mere formality.

The meetings

only build up unnecessary tensions v/hich have the negative
effect of making the people think even more unfavorably of
the politicians.

Making it harder for the Government to

have its way is not the answer.

The answer seems to lie

in finding better qualified men to take over the government.

The following exchange between the Deputy Premier and the

Leader of the Opposition on August 17, 1972, is fairly
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typical.

It demonstrates the level
of debate in the

Assembly.
The Leader of the Opposition
was requesting more
time to consider a five year plan
for Dominica which the
Government was about to enact.
the Opposition_(T,,^ Mr. Speaker
Y^^^W^h^—^^^
I would like to make a suggestion
to Thi^House.

Interrupted by Nr. Armour, De puty Premier (P.P.).
^Peaicer, please tell the Honorable Leader
Opposition that suggestions are not allowed in of the
the
House.
Mr Speaker
Mr. Moise (L.O.), you can make a motion
but suggestions are not allowed here.
:

Answer (L.O,); Mr. Speaker, I cannot make a motion
because I know it will be defeated the composition
of the House at the time was 8-2-1 against him
.
But I would suggest that we postpone debate on the
five year plan. This would give us some time to read
u-t
the plan had been a secret before that day . We
should also leave out some elected representatives,
including Ministers, who have no mind of their own.
Mr. Armour (Do?.)
Mr. Speaker, under no condition
we should allow that. These people are paid $600 a
month to come here twice a year. They have no excuse
for not knowing what's in the plan.
Besides, Moise
is an illiterate, he will not be able to understand
the plan anyway,
:

Moise to Armour
Shut up you pig,
they could make you a lawyer.
:

I

don't see how

There is no question that the caliber of this

exchange is very low.

Any ruling government has it so easy

that the Deputy Premier could tell this writer that the

political system has failed.

It is always taken for granted

that Government will have its way and counting of votes is

rarely attempted in the House.
The Speaker of the House has shown himself to be

85

very partisan.

Merely Ayearst is wrong when he
writes that
political advancement has taken
place in the Caribbean
because the presiding officer, the
Speaker, favors
no

side.'^^

The Judiciary,

duced

The 19G7 West Indies Act intro-

common judicial system for all the
Associated States
of the Eastern Caribbean.
There is also a common Judiciary
and Legal Services Commission for the
territories. The
a

system consists of

a

Court of Appeals and a High Court.

The Queen, on the advice of the Lord High Chancellor,
ap-

points the Chief Justice while the Puisne Judges (High
Court
Judges) are appointed by the Legal Services Commission.

_

Tenure ends because of age (for the Justice of Appeal age
65,

and for the Puisne Judges age 62),

mind, and misbehavior.

sickness of body or

Misconduct is determined by

a

tribunal of judges which has power to look into issues at
hand and make its recommendations.

Removal from office

because of misconduct can only occur on the advice of the

British Judicial Committee of the Privy Council.
Premier of each territory can bring

a

Only the

complaint against

•

the Chief Justice.

The judiciary remains regional and seems to be above
politics.

Its powers also seem to be great.

The Constitu-

tion does not specifically state that there is judicial
49

Morely Ayearst, The British West Indies The Search
for Self -Government (London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd.,
1960), p. 163.
^^The Dominica Constitution Order, 1967, pp. 58-59.
:
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review of legislation passed by
the Dominica House of
Assembly.
But judicial review seems

to fall under the

clause which states that the Assembly
may make only laws
which the Constitution allows. And
there is no doubt

that the Court can interpret the
Constitution.

This is

another area which the framers have taken
for granted.
They assume, maybe incorrectly, that the
spirit

of co-

operation will always prevail between the
judicial and
legislative systems.
Finally, the highest court of appeal is the
Privy

Council in Great Britain.

This attachment to the Privy

Council is an umbilical cord which holds Caribbean law
to a high level giving it credence and legitimacy.

Conclusion
The Constitution is meant to be supreme.
now, no one has paid much attention to it.

Government denied due process to

a

Up until

In fact, ivhen

group of misinformed

students, who went around insulting White people (Chapter V)
the Opposition reported joyfully that Government was doing

something positive about this problem.

No one saw the

contradiction in this stance and all condemned the boys.
Increasingly, it becomes clear that there is no assurance
that basic human rights will be protected in Dominica.
fact, those

v;ho

In

need this protection most cannot afford to

lose such rights.

,

.
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The new Constitution has
added new elements, such as
equality before the law, which have
traditionally been taken
lightly or ignored. Law and order
may take precedence over
everything else. Conditions for such
are ripe indeed.
The judiciary may not remain as
apolitical as now.
It has managed to survive all
political manipulations, but
its future is not that bright.
The politicians of the islands will be filling this agency with
personnel.
Like

in

all advanced countries, that is the way
it should be, but

the stage is now set to involve this body in the
realm of
politics
The personnel to the judiciary will be coming from
the ranks of Attorney Generals and Magistrates, as has been

the custom.

The only difference is that the present Magis-

trates and Attorney Generals are appointees of the local

politicians.

And, increasingly, those who are raised to

these posts are the Government's sympathizers.

There is

no guarantee that they will remain loyal to the Government

after they become judges.

But the temptation to support

their former superiors, or be influenced by them, can be
great.
If the effects of smallness have any bearing on

aspects of Dominican life, the judiciary will not escape
this effect.

As the judicial system gets situated in its

environment, it will suffer the same fate as other component
parts of tne political system.

The politicians may be able
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to influence decisions.

It can safely be said that
the

new Constitution is proving too
comprehensive and uninteL
ligible to most Dominicans.
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CHAPTER

III

THE BRITISH VARIANT OF
COLONIALISM IN THE
BRITISH WEST INDIES

This chapter deals with the
colonial condition as
it existed in the British
Caribbean. it is divided into
six sections.
After raising some questions
about the definition of a colony, the study
assesses the colonial

situation vis-^-vis the metropolitan
area.
The social,
psychological, and political impact of
colonialism is
next examined.
The chapter ends with a look

at the type

of political leader that the colonial
condition has produced, and with some basic questions which
can hopefully
be tackled throughout the rest of the study.

Defining a Colony

There are about as many definitions of a colony
as
there are writers on the subject.
Each writer has found
it necessary to define a colony to suit his ideological

orientation.

But in all the definitions this writer has

uncovered, one point comes out clearly; and that is, a

colony is established when

a

stronger power has asserted

^
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its superiority over
another territorial entity.
addition, one writer,
Archie Singha., has added
a new dimension to the ide^^^l
r.-F
Ideal of
a colony.
He
..akes

a

distinction
between conquered and settled
colonies. ^ „e sees the
British Caribbean islands
as settled colonies
which were
later treated as conquered
ones. This distinction
is not
sin^ply academic.
A settled colony
enjoyed the privileges

Of British citizens.

On the
une nth^rother y.^.^^
hand, a conquered colony

had limited rights.

The Colonial Situation

The colonial situation is a
special phenomenon which
has not received the attention
which it merits. The tendency has been to look at the colony
as an extension of
the metropole, which emphatically it
is not.

it has

its own component parts and has a
dynamism which can be

discerned on close examination.

This is not to play down

s legalistic and static definition
Kohn, Ide a of Nationalism a study in its origin see Hans
and
background (New York: Collier, 195777
T^.
^F^a
very polemical definition see John Kautsky, The Political Consequences of Modernization (New York: John Wiley
1972 ), p. 60
,

,

^

—

A. Singham, The Hero and the Crowd in a Colonial
PQ^ity (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), p. 101.

91

the Close connection between
the colony and the colonial
power.
In fact, somehow this
connection acquires its
own dynamism and get
institutionalized in the colony.
^.
Thus the connection becomes
paradoxical - it is there
but has become a part and
parcel of the colonial situation.
The colonial condition in the
Caribbean was not a
happy one. it was so great and
intense that a backward
island like Dominica was never influenced
by its more
advanced French neighbors of Martinique
and Guadeloupe.
It is true that the people of all three
and Haiti speak the
same French-creole language, but that is
not due to any

direct influence of either Martinique or
Guadeloupe.
course, the influence of Haiti is out of
the

Of

question,

since it is too far.

French-creole is spoken in Dominica

because the French once occupied the island.
British colonialism in the Caribbean had the effect
of destroying any cohesion that existed in these
societies.

Where cohesion never existed, it was not allowed to take
root.

were no

It even destroyed the island's integrity.

There

further divisions to be created in the Carib-

bean, nature had made it easier on the British,

Its

colonial rule only heightened and accented those divisions.
Yet a tenuous unity emanated between the natives and the

dominating European.

The indigenous culture, whatever

little amount that was available, did not affect the

^

imposed European culture,
wnich did not
which
n^^completely remain
the same for long.
some kind of marriage
marriaae of convenience
emerged.
,

writing of the Caribbean
experience, Hugh Tinker
says that the colonial
impact was far deeper
there than
elsewhere since the resistance
to colonialism was
at a
mlni.u.. There was no
unifying element
of, say, an

Indian religion type to offer
meaningful resistance.
Philip Kason adds that the
Caribbean is the essence of
colonialism.
-The imposed spiritual yoke
is far greater
than the physical force which
lay in the background."

He

continues, "nowhere did this happen
more completely than
in the Caribbean."'*
It is somewhat ironic that Crown
Colony Government

was brought about to eradicate
what slavery had brought
upon the Caribbean countries. Crown
Colony Government
lasted for some sixty-nine years in
Dominica
(1898

3„

Asia,""

^

.

1967)

Tinker, "The Impact of Western Democracy on
Institutions in the World Today, ed. bv

n
Democratic

William Burraeister (New York: 195'8T7~p. 97.

Philip Mason, Patterns of Domin ance (LondonOxford University Press, 1970), p7 276";
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and after all that, the
living reminders of the
slave
syste. are so apparent.
The old huts surrounding
the
Great Houses are around.
Agricultural wor., detested
after slavery ended, is
detested today, because little
effort was ^ade to show its
value. The words "driver
and gang" with all their
derogatory connotations are
still used on the large
estates when one refers to a
group of field hands and a
leader-supervisor. The persistence of the slave mentality,
reinforced by the

'

'

colonial condition, has led Eric
Williams to write that
"Emancipation has left the new freemen
as much dependent on and at the mercy of his king.
Sugar, as he

had b'.en as a slave,

And where sugar has become less

important, bananas, "green gold," has stepped
in to take
its place.

Politically it was assumed that

a

benevolent

democratic British Government would gradually confer
self-rule on the natives,^

but in the meantime the

Caribbean area was used as an administrative experimenting
ground.
Such experiments would not have been tolerated

Eric Williams, The Negro in the Caribbean (New
York: Negro University Press, 1942), pp. 17-19.
Paul Blansh.ird, Democracy and Empire in the
Caribbean (New York: Macmillan, 1947), pp. 79-80.

^

xn the .other country.^

F,,ther. the «est Indian
islands

were only too happy to be
associated with the British
to
reject their close friendship
with one another.
A colonial Situation in
the Caribbean developed
as
soon as the British had
explicitly asserted their superiority over the natives. This
assertion was .ade first in
the area of economics when
the British companies took
it
upon themselves to run the oil
industry in Trinidad and'
the bauxite in British Guyana.
Gradually this assertion
entered the political sphere and
thence the social sphere
by a policy of discrimination and
segregation.
The colonial situation is a collective
fact.
It
is a sort of relationship between
human groups;
it
involves intercommunication ^ but it always
remains one
of dependence and subordination of the
dominated. ^°
,

7

John H. Lee, Colonial Development and Good Government; a study of the ideas expressed by
the~B?itISh
Classes in planning decolonization 1939-T964 (Oxford"official
Clarendon Press, 1967), p. 3.
g

Marian Mushkrat, "Some Characteristics of Colonialism and Its Product, African Nationalism," African
Studies
Review (September, 1971), p. 222.
9

Rene Maunier, The Sociology of Colonies Edited
and translated by E«0. Lorimer (London: Routledqe and Keqan
Paul, 1949), p. 5.
,

Thomas Hodgkin, Nationalism in Colonial Africa
(London: Oxford University Press, 1956), p. 20.
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Fanon writes that this relationship
degenerates into one
Of lust on the part of the
colonized. The native wants
What the settler has^^ and the
settler is aware
of that

fact.

The European in such

a

situation also undergoes

tremendous psychological strains.

He is aware of the

heavy toll that his assertion of
heroic superiority has
taken of him. He is constantly worried
about his numerical minority status and "hovers the
constant fear
that

the natives might some day overpower
him."^^

The

colonial situation in the Caribbean was most
cruel.

The Reluctance to Give Up Colonies
One is often amused at the reluctance with
which

colonial powers relinquished some of their costly
colonies
One is even more surprised at the overreaction of the

British during the Anguillan crisis in 1967.
Clearly the rationalization for maintaining the

Caribbean colonies was based on the assumption that the

""^Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth (New
York: Negro University Press, 1960), passim .

12

Robert Louis Delavignette, Freedom and Authority
in French West Africa
(London:
Oxford University Press,
1950), p. 353.

west Indian was incapable
of governing hi.self.
-ight have been afraid of
the despotism of

Britain

local leaders.
It was also believed
that the feeble financial
resources
of these islands precluded

independence,

John

S.

Furnivall writes that colonial
policy

^

was dominated by the economic
motive, followed by the
humanitarian element to justify
further policies.
Thus,
it is safe to assume that
independence for the Caribbean
was ruled out from the very
beginning because of its' tremendous source of sugar and other
commodities for the British.
But the general reluctance
to give up colonies is
echoed in what Ivor Jennings has
to say about independence
for some countries which were
showing signs of not being
able "to make it." He writes that
another six months of
imperial rule would have helped India,
two more years
would have put Burma on the right track,
and Ghana would
have benefitted from another year's
experience with
^

domination. ''^

Had he written about Trinidad, he would

13

John S, Furnivall, Progress and Welfare in
Southeast Asia A Comparison of Colonial Policy and "
Practice (New York: The Secretariat, Institute of"
Pacific Relations, 1941), p. 5.
:

14^.
Sir ^Ivor Jennings, Problems of the New Common
wealth (Durham, N.C: Duke University Press, 195877^
p. 23.

-

t
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probably have said another so
„any years could have
helped
Pri.e Minister Williams
correct the
racial problems of his

country.
But Lucian Pye has written
that the r.ajor flaw of

the Burmese political syste.
has been the inability of
the
leaders to communicate with each
other.
Would the recommended two years correct a
problem the British could not
correct in the many years they
dominated that country? Why
the magic number of six months or
two years, while the
British had so many hundred years and
they did not get
these colonies to be viable nations?

The reluctance to give up the colonies
seemed to
have been couched in the absurd idea
that they w.ere being
prepared for self government.
Self government was never
defined and one suspects that it often meant
an increased
familiarity of the natives with the British way
of life
so "that the peoples under temporary tutelage
shall be

enabled and encouraged to participate in the more
sophisticated culture.
The British conveniently ignored
the fact that these dominated peoples had governed them-

selves long before Europeans infiltrated their midst.
As John Plamenatz writes, the colonies may have been

15

Lucian V7. Pye, Politics Personality and Nation Building Burma' s Search for Identity (Boston: Little,
Brown and Co., 1966), passim .
,

:

1

6

The Times (London), June 22, 1949, guoted in
J.M. Lee, Colonial Developmen
pp. 14-15.
,

8

governed badly by European
standards, but .-by their
brutality, Europeans have
proven themselves unfit to
govern
others...^^

If the intent was to
prepare the datives well
to ta)ce over the reins
of government someday
in the future,

how does one explain the
rush with which an .'advanced"
constitution was thrust on the
Windward and Leeward Islands
during the early sixties? It
was done to bring them on
par with Trinidad and Jamaica
in order to form a federation.
Of course, this is an unacceptable
reason since "advanced"
constitutions by British reasoning do
not bring with
it

experience.

It is still very puzzling when
one looks at

the slovenliness with which Britain
has given the islands
a chance to rule themselves.
The British should have
listened to this pithy remark by Plamenatz
that "there are
many countries independent which are not free,
and no one

would suggest that they ought to be deprived of
their
independence in order to make them capable of freedom, "^^
or of ruling themselves.

John Plamenatz, On Alien Rule and Self Government
(London: Longmans, Green, 1960), p. 35.
'

1

Ibid,, pp. 22-23.
For a defence of the colonial
svstem see The Colonial Problem A Report by _a Study Group
of Members of the Royal Institute of International Affairs
(London; Oxford University Press, 1937).
;
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Since it cannot be discerned
why Britain has been
reluctant to release
lease its
it<^ r-r^c-t-i.
costly colonies of the
Caribbean,
it would seer, that it is
just too proud to do so.
The
/
colonies cost it a great deal
(see chart on aid,
p.
),
but the British still feel
that they have not been
given^
enough credit for the wonderful
work they have done for
the natives.
British eyes, the natives are
ungrateful.
This lack Of appreciation is a
sure sign of ir^maturity which
precludes independence. Finally, it
is the general feeling
of Dominican leaders that the
present generation of British
leaders should not be blamed for the
poor conditions

m

and

inadequacies of the islands since whatever
damage was done,
occurred at an earlier period of history.
This is correct,
but it is because of this abuse that the
present generation of West Indians have had to live in poverty.
Had

much of the money derived from the islands been invested
there, the story today might have been better..

Thus, the

apparent hostility of the present West Indian generation
towards the British today is not without justification.
But the indictment of the colonial condition has

not all come from those affected by it.

There have been

British critics who have voiced their objection to the
attitude of the British toward the colonies.

Ruth Hinden
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writes that:

4"Wp
.-v,!
-^e PRr-T
LBritishJ
cannot teach and preach
-i

democracy and liberty and
equality between all .en, far
less to practice these
principles.
.
without challenging
the syste.-. which exists
because of the very opposite
principles.!^ Another critic,
Sydney Olivier,
.

a

Governor of Jamaica, stated:

.'it

former

is impossible for any

white Official to understand
that these people fCaribbean
natives] are poor. , . and what they
produce costs them
a physical and intellectual
labor of which any white man
would be simply incapable under
^0
similar conditions
He was a little too sympathetic with
his assertion that a
white man could not work under similar
conditions; anyone
can work under any conditions if he has to.
But the point
is wall taken: what do these hungry people
care about

democracy when they have daily cares about the basic
necessities of life?
One of the most biting criticisms of the idea
of preparing the natives for self rule came from Plamenatz

Books,

Ruth Hinden, Empire and After (London:
1949), p. 169.

Essential

20

Sydney Olivier, Letters and Selected Writings
edited by Margaret Olivier (New York: Macmillan, 1948),
,

p.

32.
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Who simply says that "foreign
rule, in the very nature,
is undemocratico "^-^
Today, Britain still has colonies
in the Caribbean
and this will be the case for
a long time to come.
The
study will now turn to an analysis
of the social and
psychological impact of colonialism on
those who have and
are experiencing it.

The Social and Psychological Impact
of Colonialism
In the Caribbean, the social and
psychological

impact of colonialism has been

lasting one.

a

A distinct

new culture was created in the Caribbean
since the original inhabitants were annihilated.
Whatever culture the
slave brought with him from Africa was wiped out.

He

was discouraged to continue in his old ways and
could
not even communicate with others since a conscious
effort

was made to keep people from the same tribes apart in

order to contain any rebellion.

Consequently,

a

European

society emerged in the Caribbean for which the British
have taken the credit.

They had done such a good job that

it was reported that during the 1938 riots in Jamaica

2

]

Plamenatz, On Alien Rule

,

p.

92.
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woman defended
aea thf^
the Rr~T4--;oK
British Empire by saying
that "it is
next to the Kingdom of
God.-^^
^^^^ ^^^^^ ^^^^^ ^^^^
treatment of the West Indian
during slavery did not
deter
his reverence for the
Crown.
West Indians honor the
Queen
on her birthday, and sing
praises to her on Commonwealth
Day (which used to be Empire
Day).
a

How does one account for
this intense love of the
master? It seems to be in
appreciation of the protection
afforded by the Crown during the
period following emancipation (1832-1838). in 1832,
slavery ended but the exslaves were still attached to the
plantations. They did
not know what it was to be free,
and from all reports
the planters were not about to
cushion this trying period
for this unfortunate people. The
British stepped in to
help but that help did not last too long
as the Negroes
showed signs of asserting themselves by
entering politics.
The British were to return again to help
the Negro cope
with the harsh realities of living in an
extremely poor
environment. In retrospect, this second return
proved
a

stumbling block to West Indian nationhood.

Since

B.Lc St. John Hamilton, Problems of Administration
in an Emergent Nation
A Case Study of Jamaica (New York:
Frederick A, Praeger, 1964), p. 12.
:

103

Changes came to each island in
isolation, it has produced
a bitter rivalry among the
islands.
Further, changes
were made in institutions rather
than within the people
of each island, who
were not taught to work together

on a regional basis.

Colonialism robbed the West Indian
of his individuality
and, in the process, his self-respect.
His personality was
impoverished while his pride suffered and
his creative
power was dulled. The colonized was
made to feel
that he

had no culture, no history; he was not
even part of humanity.
Consequently, an inferiority complex crept in;
he

hated himself.

He had nothing; but he wanted something.

The only alternative was to mimic his master.

The West

Indian now has the reputation as the great mimic man.
VJest

The

Indian was totally emasculated as an individual.
This sense of v/orthlessnes s and dependence was further

rivetted into him because everything came to be done for
him.

He could not help himself.

For example, after a

Commission of Inquiry had exposed the benign neglect of
the West Indies, Paul Blanshard reports that "a comptroller
for Development and Welfare for the West Indies fwas

appointed] but he did not need West Indian help, he came

with

a

23

"staff of economic and educational experts," 23

Blanshard, Democracy and Empire

,

p.

323.
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With thei. expertise, they
.issed the importance of
trainxng West Indians themselves.
The hatred of West Indianism
was inevitable.
For
example, a conscious effort
was made to remove creolepatois in Dominican society
because it was generally
believed that it had the adverse
effect of hampering one's
ability to speak English well.
To speak English well
was
to be superior.
This is clearly demonstrated
by the

opinion of

member of the Dominica House of
Assembly
who raised serious objections
to giving additional funds
for Radio Dominica since the
announcers pronounced English
words incorrectly.^^
a

Philip Mason is not too far from the
mark when he
writes that "the deepest wrong that has
been done to the
Caribbean people is that they have been
brought up in a

society in which traditionally everyone wishes
he was
someone else. -'2^ Various methods of attempting

to induce

physical changes were even attempted;

attempts ranging

from marrying -light" to the use of cosmetic
preparations.,
The quintessence of this rejection of the Black
self

came from the mother who happened to have

a light

skinned

child when she reminded the child that he had to be

24

This exchange took place in the presence of this
writer during debate on a motion by the Government to increase
funds for the Radio Station, August 17, 1972.
25

Macon, Patterns

o_f

Dom i.nanc e

,

p.

288

(my emphasis).
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care.ul in w.at .e .oes
to prevent Xettin,
aown Ms coXo. "
The so-soci.Xi.ea
.Ml. ...
associating
Mac. With di.t, idleness,
un.eiiaMlity ana even
stupidity.
.

The colonial condition
heightened the importance
Of s.in color.
Increasingly, whites in
the colony refused
to associate with the
darker people, and anvone
of the
colony Who could "pass for
white" tried to be wMte.
still
to a great extent, one
one's
r^ir^rs
color is a very important
,
variable
for advancement in society.
The two major banks
in

Dominica only began Mring
people of darker complexion
in 1965. but they came
from the upper classes.
Originally,
Dominicans were kept away from
the banks by the ridiculously high qualifications that
they demanded, qualifications which were in no way
connected with banking. 26
By 1965, Dominicans still did
not have those qualifications; therefore, either banking
got easier or Dominicans
got smarter.

Besides the banks, the religious bodies
took part in this form of discrimination
by favoring

lighter skinned people over the darker
ones in their
hiring practices.

26

Originally they were required to have at least
the equivalent of tv/o years of school after Grade
12 or
two Higher School passes, but by 1965 some people
who
did not even have a High School Certificate were
being^
employed.
,

,

.
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The other side of the
coin has been the class
question.
As in many other
places
H-J-ciues, Class
clac,. is
. acquired
through a family name„ The
family name plays an
important
role and takes precedence
over color.
Certainly, this
class distinction was acquired
from British
rule.

The

Dominican knew his place, but
did not always struggle
as
Marx suggested because he
wanted to be like the first

,

classes and be accepted by them.
Class distinction is especially
noticeable in
Dominica where the language one
speaks may indicate one's
class. There are two languages:
one "superior," one "inferior";
English and Creole-patois respectively.
The
upper classes may insist, through
various means, that they
do not understand the inferior one;
though members of the
family may speak it at home. Furthermore,
anyone who has
spent some time abroad inadvertently
"forgets" his creolepatois.
If he has not forgotten it, and
speaks it on his
return, his admiring and often surprised peers
are flabergasted and may even lose respect for him.
On the other hand, if one were to approach a person

from the rural districts, where creole-patois is the

language and make an attempt to initiate
in patois,

a

conversation

the one approached might feel offended, even

though his mastery of the English language is not good, of
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cour.o, some people will
not ,n..ry ini.o such
a fa.ily
because i. is too low.
his ,o.ces Lhe f ..iXy
a black Sheep who gives
up family prestige to
.'uplift"
a darker skinned
family.

The class syndrome was so
deep in the West
Indian that -when the "first-class"
Kngri.h rejected his
company, the West Tndian
smoothed his hurt feelings by
surmising that thin breed of
Englishman
is not the real

thing, and that somehow the
better tJnglishman resides in
nritain^'7 though this breed
rarely reached the Caribbean.

The resulting complications of
race, color, and clans in
the Caribb.-an are well documontod
by C.T.Jv'. James.
There
were clubs which simply did not admit
iUacks.
One good
example was tho Dominica Club, whose, show
piece w<u; the
Covernor; it was rechris toned the White
People's Club (no
derogation intended). There were instances where
heated
discussions were carried on as to the possible
effects of
lowering the tone of an Institution by including
a Black

man.

m

1933, Cyril bionel Robinson James writes that

"the surest sign of

West

a

Indian

h,.ving arrived

is tliat

he kec^ps company with people lighter in complexion or

Raymond T. .Smith, "Social Stratification, Cultural
Pluralism, and Integration in We.<-.t Indian Societies,"
Caribbean Integra h ion Papers on Social Political and
Kconomi c Integra [:ion ed, by Sybil Lewis and Thomas G.
Mathews (Hio iMedras, P.R.: Institute of Caribbean Studies,
1967), p. 237.
;

,

,
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bigger in ns.e.^^^

The reverse of that is
also t.ue; that

the light-Skinned or
Mg-na.ed is doing the darker-skinned
or small-named a favor
by being in his company.
But it
must be emphasized that in
Dominica the family name is
taking precedence, though color
is still very important.
However, the color question
revolves around the major cities
unless the light-skinned from
the rural district also has
an
important name. a light-skinned
person from the rural
area is usually poor like other
villagers. He is often
ridiculed for being that color. He
is usually called one
or all of these names:
backra, vieux blanc, or shaben,
°^
povr e (poor white).

During and after slavery, the slave was
often
rebuked for his "slovenliness."
it never occurred

to

the master that this could have been the
result of ex-

haustion precipitated by undernourishment and
incentive.

a lack of

The same attitude of expecting maximum output

of the present-day worker has persisted with little
or no

change.

It is reflected in the answers given this writer

by the business elites of Dominica who felt that Dominicans should be working harder to better the country.

28

C.LoRo James, The Case for West Indian Self
Government (London: Hogarth, 1933), pp. 8-9.

.
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The following question
was asked of twenty
business
elites:
-A^e Dominicans contributing
enough toward the
economic development of the
island?..
au twenty said no
The follow-up question
posed was:
..In what ways could
they
(Dominican people) contribute
.ore," This was not an
openended question though the
interviewees were invited to
add comments to the following
options:
by (a) working
harder;
(b) using more local
products;
(c) saving n,ore;
(d) investing more at home;
(e) making less demands
for'
wage increases and, (f) any
other way. All twenty respondents chose option ..(a)., and
declined to give additional
29
comments
'

Apparently it has not sturck the
interviewees'
fancy that poverty and low wages
engender apathy

'

and lack

of enthusiasm for productive effort.

Indeed people resort

to a kind of foot-dragging slow-down
strike to resist

This writer is satisfied that the twenty
were
representative of the Dominican business elite.
He
even feels that his sample was too large since
an
ciation, the Dominica Manufacturers* Association, assorepresents the views of the elites. in interviews with
people very intimately connected with the Association,
the author was able to discern a yearning to have more
production from the average worker.

;

;
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that excessive exploitation.

They woDc at half-speed;

just enough to get by and
this is the "lazinessthat'
they are often reproached
for.
These assessments are
Often misleading, intolerable,
and malicious.
West

Indians working abroad have proven
themselves to be hard
and productive workers.
West Indians still live
in

Panama after having worked hard to
build the Canal which
bears the name of their new country;
and, of course,

innumerable West Indians migrated to the
United States,
Canada, and the United Kingdom to work
in

the lowest jobs.

They now own their homes and many businesses.

But, instead

of trying to find out the cause of this
"laziness" of

Dominicans, Peter Simple of the Dominica business
elites
quotes Gunnar Myrdal approvingly when simple
lists characteristic traits and attitudes that hamper development in Dominica,

the people are the main stumbling block.

The traits listed by Myrdal and quoted by Simple
are;
1.

Low levels of work discipline, punctuality, and
orderliness

2.

Superstitious beliefs;

3.

Irrational outlook;

4.

Lack of alertness - young boys stay
sports

5.

Lack of adaptability, ambition, and readiness
for change and experiment;

av;ay

from

Ill

8-

Chronic dishonesty, bobh
large and s.all scale. 30

But Simple chose the part
of Myrdal's work which
suited his purposes, his own
biases, and his lack of

understanding of Dominican society
and people in general.
He should have continued a
little further
and he would

have read that Myrdal writes that
"a stagnant society does
not come Into existence except
as a result of State
policy, "31
he could have added, business
policy too.
It is underemployment and
unemployment which induce

people to stretch jobs.

These are obviously compounded

by the no-name nobody who is forced
to be unambitious.
He cannot take a loan to begin

a

business;

he does not

know how to run one and does not receive any help
either.

^'eter Simple, "Of Men and Mice," The Dominica
Chronicle, May 25, 1968, p, 4.
Peter Simpl'iTook those
Ideas from Gunnar Myrdal, B eyond the Welfare State Economic Planning j_n the W elfare State and International Tmplica
(London: Oxford University Press, 1960), pp. 90=^^2;
:

31

Myrdal,

Beyond the Welfare State

,

p.

99.

-
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AS these islands get more
industrialized,

no effort is

made to cushion the transition
for the worker whose
working habits have been
patterned on his former condition
Of seasonal work.
As one expert has so ably
put it,
the transition from "agraria
to industria" is hard.32
In agraria, life was leisurely.
People worked their
"tass" (certain amount of work in
one day). They worked
when they wanted money.
industria, it is different;

m

production is the name of the game„

The biggest piece

of decoration in the fachory is
not the human being,
but the clock which is always punctual.
It takes time
to get adjusted to this new life style.
The pressure

on the individual is so unbearable that
there are

high rates of turnover, absenteeism, tardiness,
which
in turn discourage investors, which lead to
further

unemployment.

But in spite of this gloomy situation,

the West Indian can make it in the West Indies if he
is

sufficiently motivated.

He does not have to leave his

home to prove himself.

If the average peasant could

receive the needed advice, he would stop looking at the
land as a place to scrape up a bare existence until

Fred Riggs, "Agraria and Industria," Toward the
Comparative Study of Public Administration ed, by William
Sif f in Toioomingdale
J~.
Indiana University Press, 1957),
passim .
,

:
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something better com.s
com^s along.
^ir^r^r^

u
He
will change the attitude

that land is just to be had
for the keeping and that
efficient methods could make
production profitable.
The peasant could not see
production on a large
scale because the trained
agriculturist in the islands
was not interested in passing
on that information. The latter was more interested in setting
up a horticultural

experiment station to show the Royal
Family or its representative on their annual tours.
Furthermore, these
agriculturists did not reside in the areas
where the
productive land existed; they remained in
the cities
enjoy the fruits of the city.

to

The new brand of agricul-

turists have not done much better either.^^

They now have

elaborate offices in the city while the rural areas
are
manned by the beginners. Of course, there are exceptions,
and serious work has been done in certain selected
areaso

But considering the fact that many of these countries

have agricultural economies, more could have been done.

•^his writer was reliably informed of deals which
could not be accounted for when the new Director of
Agriculture, Dr. J. Bernard Yankey, took over in
Dominica in 1966.

.
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The Colonial Irnpach on Educr.tion
An area which has rccoivod
liLLle serious attention
because of the sensitive nature of
the subject is the irr,pnct of colonialism on Caribbean
education. The British

system of education was transplanted
wholesale
Caribbean with little or no modification,

to the

and with it

came the attitude that education was for

a

select few.

One observer, William J. Foltz, writes
that the educational
structures of the newest states reinforced
polarization

between elites and masses.

'^'^

Schools concentrate on ele-

mentary subjects; high schools are few (four and
in Uominici.)

university was

in Jamaica.

half

and these are run by religious sects, except

for the one and
A

a

a

half which is run by the Government
--ibsent,

until one was established in 1948

Subjects such as international relations, which

could have given the West Indian nn idea of the non-role his

country was playing

:i

n

the world, were almost always avoided.

Of course, subjects dealing with the West Indian's heritage

were unheard of and the authorities did not have to

explain their exclusion,

Raymond Kennedy writes

tliat

William J. Foltz, "Buildincj the newest Nations:
Short-run Strategies and Long-run Problems," Nation-Building
ed. by Deutsch et £l .
p. 110.

,

,

35

This writer refers i.o the newly built school at
Portsmouth as a half school since it' goes up to Grade 9 only,
though the GovernmenI reefers to it as a complot'^ high school.

these "subjects

were

deliberately avoided to hide

fror.

the native students their lowly
status in comparison
with free people and thus keep them
from inevitable dis-

content and rebelliousness.

This last statement

does not hold completely true for the
Caribbean, because
by all indications had the VJest Indian been
told about
his past, chances are that he would have
opted to discard it.
He would have acquired British ways since
the

latter had been so deeply inculcated into him, or if
not
fully inculcated, dangled in front of him long enough
to

make him want it over his own.
To complicate matters, secondary education has never

been free, though now it is less expensive than it used
to be.

The masr;es received primary education only,

A

select few from the masses made it socially, but that did
not do the poor elements any good, since that meant the

"better" part of them was bought off at an early stage,

British examination was, and still is, more highly valued;
thus, the reason for the long connection between the only

University of the West Indies and that of London was to
keep the former institution both honest and acceptable.

3 6

Raymong Kennedy, "The Colonial Crisis and the
Future," quoted in Blanshard, Democracy and Empire
,

p.

17.

'
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The West Indian University
has been so proud of that'
connection that it can still boast
that a second class
honours degree in the West Indies
r.ay command first cl
ass
honours at London. As a result,
.American degrees are
considered second rate regardless of
place of graduation.
Ironically, the people making the
comparison between
.

systems base their judgments on feelings
since they have
never been exposed to either educational
system.
This
indifference towards American degrees is shown
by an

account of attempts to recruit teachers for
Jamaica.
The informant writes that no efforts were
made to contact
Jamaicans in the United States, although many Jamaican

agencies could have obtained more than the reguired
amount,
The writer surmises that the deliberate oversight
may
have been made as

a

warning to those Jamaicans "buying"

degrees in the United States.

He based his conclusion

on the following statement by the Jamaica Board of
Education:

Students to American Universities and Colleges
intend to teach in secondary schools might
find it well worth their while when they are
deciding on the nature and content of their
study courses never to lose sight of the British
background and tradition against which they will

v;ho

work,-^

37

G.Io Durrant, "American University Degree," The
Torch (July 1958), quoted in St, John Hamilton, Problems
of Administration p, 34,
,
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colonialism gave

a

certain direction to education

by encouraging certain
professions.

education was for

in the colonies,

limited purpose, to benefit the
administration. No attention was given
to vocational training; there was no need for such
since no factories of
a

any

significance were maintained.
were

discouraged.

All "unnecessary" skills

Education was associated with the

present needs and Opportunities afforded
by colonial rule
which emphasized law and white-collar jobs
in the civil

service bureaucracy.

This general lack of interest in

education for its own sake (which

may not be able to afford)

a

country like Dominica

is reflected in

the lack of a

plan for education in Dominica.
In summation, the catastrophic effects of colonial

education are these:

there is an overproduction of

unemployable semi-educated people, with primary or secondary specialization.

The lopsided distribution of

specialization has the infuriating effects of inviting
expatriates to take technical jobs such as in the

communication and teacher training fields.
to be heavily subsidized,

These have

as Ivor Jennings warns,

to

lure them out of their secure jobs at home to the tenuous

positions in the Caribbean, which entails
amount of sacrifice.

a

tremendous

118

Associating

a

highly educated person with

a

white-

collar job has produced an
inefficiency in hu.^an resources
which a new nation, lilce Dominica,
can ill-afford. Consequently, the Government has a monopoly
on talents which it
cannot transfer to the private sector.
But why the attraction to the public service?
Historically, working for the Government
has meant
job security and an inefficiency which
has become unbearable.
The private sector has not provided that
security; hiring
and firing were carried out on a very
informal basis.

m

addition. Government has encouraged the talented
people
to leave the more productive private sector to
join the

non-productive service sector after colonialism in its
crudest form has all but disappeared.

For example, at one

time, the privately owned Bulletin Office was the biggest

printing concern in Dominica, but now it is on the verge
of closing dov;n because Government has inadvertently lured

the better Bulletin Office personnel into its printing

concern.

This move was wrong on several counts;

"

a loan

to the Bulletin Office to expand its facilities would

have been much better, in that this concern was helping to

expand the economy v/hile the Government printery is main-

taining yet another bureaucracy which offers more security
but does not help expand the economy.

Government may have

been reluctant to subsidize The Chronicle since it is owned
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by the Church, Which is
foreign.

Another printing

concern, The Herald, could have
been substituted.
The unavailability of talented
people in the private
sector gets translated into the
attitude
of the local

business people toward expanding
their enterprise. They
have been taught to be satisfied
with what they have.
They have learnt not to be too avaricious,
leaving the
outsider the chance to risk his fortunes.

Because of the psychological content of
Caribbean
education which taught the recipient not to
be too uppity
or dynamic, it is faulty to assert that
Western education
hastened the demise of colonial rule.^^
fact, it

m

reinforced the rule.

The British never overtly taught

British ways to West Indians or even to Africans;
or the

importance of proper English as emphasized by two
educators in Dominica.

It was the local master, the West

Indian himself, who took it upon himself to transmit

38

The biggest business concern in Dominica is owned
by Astaphans, a one-time foreigner. Astaphans has made enough
money by now, and has since sold out the business to
the people of Dominica.
39

James Coleman, ed., "Introduction: Education and
Political D'^velopment " Education and Political Develop ^Q'^t (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press,
1965), p. 1.
,

„
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formally what he had acquired
from the British. The
local headmaster took it upon
himself to teach about the
grandeur of the Empire and the
tremendous deeds people
like Sir Winston Churchill et
al .
had accomplished
to

,

save that empire.

The general knowledge class was
devoted

to drilling the students to memorize
the meanings of

KCMG (Knight Commander of St. Michael
and St. George),
Qe

or KoC.

(Queen, or King's, Council), MBE (Member
of

the British Empire),

and QBE (Order of the British Empire)

The unassuming headmaster saw to it that
all stood at
attention on singing "God Save the Queen." The
child had
to abandon class for some two weeks to
practice his drills
to give a presentation that befits the celebration
of the

Queen's Birthday.

Of course,

songs such as "There will

always be an England," and "Rule Britannia' became standard

renditions and every school day began with the salute to
the Union Jack.

Having accomplished this, the Headmaster

feels his job has been well done and he may even receive
one of the citations from the Queen for his efforts.

Another myth which needs to be set straight is the

general belief that education hastened independence or

whatever variant the countries have of it.

It is correct

to say that those who pushed for independence v/ere

educated in K'orth America or Britain, but they would have

been educated there anyv;ay.

They were already independent
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since they were able to leave
their countries at will
to
study abroad„
fact, .any of the educated
returnees
had beco.e American citizens.
Further, .ost educated West
Indians were not concerned with
the uneven political

m

and

economic development among the
islands.
instilled pride of being better

The British had

than the next, while a

well-controlled communication system
kept the less developed islands satisfied. No well
educated West Indian
rose to the occasion to correct
these disparities;

a

hasty attempt was made in 1959 to
correct the uneven
political development to bring about
federation (see
Chapter VI) but this was done by Britain,
not by any

educated West Indian.

The educated West Indian, for

the most part, is afraid of independence
because this

might spell trouble' for him in his attempts
to keep
the masses in their places.
As to the do-gooder

who has

been educated abroad, one finds that he is

a

product of

the colonial situation regardless of how one may
think
he detests the metropolitan master.

The Political Impact of Colonialism
The present political situation in the British

Caribbean is

a

direct result of the colonial condition.

During colonial rule there were two important components

which affected the political situation.

They were the

bureaucracy and the aspiring politician who had either
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refused

Job in the bureaucracy or
had been hurt by see
policy which had adverse
effects on his business.
With
the end of colonialism,
one sees the struggle for
supremacy between the two forces
xurces.
Tf
e
It IS,
of course, only the
people who suffer the consequences
of this fight.
For these reasons, this section
is divided into
three parts. The first deals with
the general political
a

^

atmosphere under which colonial rule
has operated.
The
second part deals with the bureaucracy,
with an examination
of the role of the Governor during
colonial times, together
with the British attitude toward
incorporating local men
in the bureaucracy.

it includes an assessment of the

emerging bureaucracy, as politicians acquire
the power of
appointment from the colonial master. a strange
situation
has developed since independence in many
of these Caribbean
countries, as all the old bureaucrats are faced with
getting orders from politicians they once could ignore.
As vacancies occur, they are increasingly filled with men

who are more likely to be supportive of the ruling

Government's policies.

The old hands have nothing to lose,

but still feel threatened both by the new hands and by the

politicians.

The third part deals exclusively with the

type of politician produced in the colonial situation.
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Crown colony Government^^
was introduced to the
West indies in 1878; it came
to Dominica in 1898.
it is
important to note that it did

not malce its -appearance in

all the colonies at the
same time.

This promoted insular-

ity and hampered Caribbean
political integration (Chapter VI)
Crown Colony Government was introduced
in Jamaica
first because the whites were afraid
that the newly enfranchised Negroes would dominate them
because of their
numerical superiority.
Earlier, the whites could rule
in all the colonies since slaves were
not allowed
to

partake in politics.

But now the slaves were freed

and the operating system was open to anyone.

Rather than

work with the Negroes, the whites preferred added pro-

tection from the Crown.

There was no guarantee that the

new situation would give them either more protection or
prestige.

The whites knew fully well that they had been

cruel to their slaves.

By inviting the Crown to take

direct control could also mean added protection for the
ex-slaves; but that was the chance they had to take.

There were tv;o types of Crown Colony Government.
The "mild" form meant that a certain proportion of members
of the national legislature was elected, but the majority
was nominated by the Governor, The second type, the pure
form which Dominica experienced, meant that all members
of the legislature were hand-picked by the Governor, the
lawful representative of the Crown.
In both cases, the
Governor was able to rule the territory single-handedly.

.
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Britain may have waited for
this invitation.
it
had refused to take the
initiative and its talcing over
was timely.
But in retrospect, the
British blundered

very badly in their handling of
the islands.
so many years of British
political

After

coaching, the level of

politics in the islands is still
extremely low by any
standards. The British may have missed
a golden opportunity to train responsible local
leadership in the unit
legislatures.
One basic feature of this type of
government was
its strict constitutionalist nature,
which made the West
Indians great law abiders and stymied any form
of initiative
on the part of West Indians. They may fight
the British

system, but never want to destroy their inherited
system.

They only want to replace the Englishmen who hold
key
positions
The system also brought with it the situation where

few people made decisions; this still persists today, and
has led the present leaders to remark that responsible

government does not exist in the Caribbean.

Responsible

government signifies that the "Cabinet is responsible to
the Parliament."

This is a mockery since the statement

implies that Parliament is larger than the Cabinet and can,
in fact, overrule the latter.

reverse is the case;
makes

a

In the small islands, the

the Cabinet, or even an individual,

decision and Parliament cannot muster enough votes
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•

to defeat it.

Oo.inica any dynamic leade.
can have his
way in the present
situation. When one loo.s
.ac. at the
past history of Dominican
politics, one
sees that a

Governor performed

similar role, though his
.ethod of
operation might have been
harsher.
a

During recent times,
Dominicans either went to
the
streets, or were forced on
the streets, when they
did not
get favorable legislation.
They did not always
win since

the crown had a monopoly on
power and sometimes used it
to contain resentment.
The system had a way of
pushing programs on the people with or
without their consent. The
same
pattern is repeated today, which
leads to frequent breakdowns which fall short of a major
challenge to the system.
The system failed to promote
local government,

probably because local government
machinery was not considered necessary for an efficient colonial

administration.

The national government, if it could
be called that since
it was never national in character,
could and did stifle
local attempts to provide services to the
grass roots.
The loc-1 man who developed a reputation may
rival and

even challenge the legitimacy of British rule; for
this
reason he was thwarted. And even after independence, lip

service has been paid in Dominica to the development of local
governments.

The situation has often been aggravated if the

party or people in power in the local body is not in the

party of the national government.

Any action the local
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body .ay ta.e

wMch

is seen as inimical
to the ruling pa.ty

can precipitate a crisis.

The British had thought
that the best way to deal
With rancourous critics in
thei. colonies was to
throw the.
in prisons to bring the.
bac. to their senses. In
fact .any
national leaders were taken
from jail and brought to the
Prime Minister's palace to
lead their countries to independence/1 The same practice persists
in the Caribbean.
A

state of emergency lasted for six
months in Trinidad while
many people were held without trial
during that period.
Dominica, two days before the Government
planned to dissolve the local government, it banned
public meetings to
prevent local government members from
presenting their
cases to the people.

m

In commenting on the inherited political
systems in

the Caribbean, Charles C. Moskos, Jr. and Wendell
Bell chose
Jamaica to show that democracy and the general working

of the

system were most apparent there.

It is their opinion that the

long experience Jamaicans had with the system they now have
is

responsible for their success.

in the first place they

41

In the Caribbean, Bustamante fits that description,
though he was not removed from prison to lead his country to
independence.
In addition, Uriah Butler was jailed in 1939
for this trade union activities in Trinidad, while a Jamaican
writer was interned in 1945 because he criticized the British
system during the war of 1940.
42

Charles C. Moskos, Jr., and Wendell Bell, "Attitudes
Toward Democracy," Democratic Revolution in the VJest Indies
ed, by Wendell Bell (Cambridge, Mass.: Schenkman, 1967)
p. 74,
,
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Chose the «.ong example; If
they a.e concerned with
longevity
Of a political system
in the Caribbean,
Barbados is the best
example. To show the
superiority of aa^aica, they
used the
following criteria:

TABLE

Political Types By Territory

Percentage of West Indian Leaders
who were:
Democrats

PLACE

JAMAICA
TRINIDAD
BR. GUIANA

BARBADOS
DOMINICA
GRENADA

Source:

AuthoriCynical
tarian
ParliaIdealists mentarians

Authoritarians

No
of

Cases

39%

9%

26%

26%

23

18%

14%

27%

41%

22

8%

8%

38%

46%

13

19%

2%

26%

5

3%
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Wendell Bell, ed. , Democratic Revolution
West Indies (Cambridge, Mass.;
Hi
Schenkman, 1967), p. 70.

This table does not explain the high incidence of

authoritarianism in Trinidad and British Guiana (Guyana).
Perhaps the race question has forced the leaders to be

authoritarian and thus want to settle "this problem" once
and for all.

Their combining Barbados, Dominica and Grenada

does not help this analysis since it prevents a comparison
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between Jamaica and Barbados,
which has had greater
experience With self-rule.
Barbados never had Crown
Colony
Government.
Bell may have fallen in
the frustration-aggression
syndrome when he says that
aggression is the result of
frustration.^3
^^^^
necessarily follow that the
incidents of dissatisfaction in
the smaller islands are
the result of frustrations
engendered when they were faced

with working with an "advanced"
political system. The
system in the smaller islands is not
delivering services
which it can deliver; thus the
people are

not satisfied.

The ills of the small islands cannot
be hidden as easily
as in the larger ones.
Wages in Jainaica or Trinidad may
not increase in relation to rising prices
but that fact
is hidden by the fact that wages do
increase annually.

Increasingly people can work two jobs and keep
themselves
busy.

An individual in Jamaica or Trinidad can move
with

relative ease from one job to another.

He has countless

ways to release pent-up energy while the small islander
is not as fortunate as his other brothers;

and, besides,

the low level of resistance in Jamaica before 1970 was no

indication of the acceptance of the system.
It would be well to take note of Peter Lupsha who

writes that "Political violence is not the result of the

frustration-aggression syndrome.
43

Ibid., p.

76.

When frustrated, an
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.ndividual may forget his
goal and beco.e aoathetic
Aggression can .esult without
frustration. The events
In
all the Islands, big
and small, demonstrate
that there Is
something wrong with BelLs
analysis.
If the system was
so very much accpeted
how does one explain the
revolution
the Caribbean, beginning
in Jamaica - not
Montserrat,
the most backward and last
colony to receive a little
self-rule7 But developments
in the system cannot be
fully
understood unless one gets a clear
understanding of
the

role of the Governor and
bureaucracy, and how they worked
to run the system with the
exclusion of the colonial
politician.

The Gov ernor and The Bureaucracy
Crown Colony Government in its crudest
form meant
direct rule from Britain.
its ultimate purpose was to
prepare the West Indian to rule himself.
The one who was
designated to perform that task was none
other than
the

Governor, the cog of the system.

He was the "man on the

spot" who listened to public opinion; in
him all social
and political legality of the system
came
to a head.

He

had to be close to the natives, yet keep his
distance.

He

had the power to appoint people to the legislature
to ensure maximum representation.

But the word "minimum" was

substituted for the original "maximum" as one interest
44

Peter A. Lupsha, "Explanation of Political Violence
Some Psychological Th?ories Versus Indignation," Politics
and Society (Fall, 1971), p. 96.
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was represented, and that was that of
the Governor.
His
interest was to make himself look good
in the eyes of the
Colonial Office to ensure his promotion.
To ensure that,
he appointed people who would go along
with his measures
for the colony.

The result of such appointments created

a

great

deal of irresponsibility and cynicism on the part of
some

people who read the motives of the Governor.

The idea

of having to support Governments' legislation had the

effect of defeating the whole purpose of direct British
rule.

Further, the principled few refused appointments

because that meant giving up one's individuality.
The Governor continued to maintain the class

structure by keeping company with a few and shunning the
majority.

He recommended a few cronies to the Queen for

citations while more deserving people refused them or
v;ere

disregarded.

This practice continues and those

recommended and receiving are usually friends of the
Government.

tation of

a

Elite selection is nothing short of decapi-

native society by removing the native leaders

from the people.

45

But the biggest
Paul Blanshard, op. cit., p. 83.
on a Carib
bestowed
was
M.B.E.
when
an
was
joke of itaall
bestowHarvard's
to
likened
be
This
can
Chief in Dominica.
up
picked
it
Indian
first
the
to
ing an honorary doctorate
from the Reservation,
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The Governor and his lady,
the island's temporary
Queen, stood at the head of
everything.
His presence
was always punctuated by the
rendition of the first bars
Of "God Save the Queen," while
those present stood
at

attention,

if he were to appear at a
function where a

crowd was expected, the people had
to be at their posts
minutes before his grand entrance; when
he entered the
people would stand at attention, face him
and remain'

standing until he had taken his seat.

But people should

not have been deterred at the coldness and
aloofness of
the Governor, wrote Sir Ivor Jennings, since this
was no

indication of his attitude toward the natives.
so because he was English;

Ke was

if he were an Irishman, he

would have known how to act.'^^
The result of sending incompetent people to teach

something they did not know or understand was disastrous.
Its effects are now being felt throughout the Caribbean.

In England, the Governor may have been a nobody, but,
on becoming a Governor, he was suddenly catapulted into the

ruling class.

In England, he may have heard of the Empire

probably did not care too much about it, but now he formed
an importaunt part of this one time nebulous society.

convinced himself of his

ovrn

importance.

He

But when he took

up his post in the Criribbean, he realized that the natives

^^Sir Ivor Jennings, The Approach to Selr-Government
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1963), p, 131.

,
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were not as stunid
ouupxu sc:
as v^c^
ne u
had^ once
^in-e hf^^ir-H
neard„
He was even impressed with the natives'
atives
^^^1.-+-,
ability to speak English
and dress
just as well as himself
nimse.Lt.
Ho -k^
He
began to compare himself
with
the natives to find out why
it was necessary to
keep them
in bondage.
At one point, he even
relaxed and
4-

tried to be
part of the people, but he
suddenly became uneasy in
their
company and withdrew. He
rationalized his position with the
thought that he had a job to do
and it was not his business
to worry over the people.
He convinced himself that
the

present condition was

a

necessary phase in the scheme of

things; the time would come when they
would be able to stand
on their ov;n.
Yet the Governor was uneasy; he knew that
he owed
his raison d'etre to the system and for that
reason could

not show his lack of respect and ungratefulness
by challenging ito
He also knew that by being ungrateful

to the

system, he would be acting in the interests of the
natives

whom he had already begun to respect.

But love of Britain

took precedence over everything else.

He even eagerly

awaited such events as the Queen's Birthday or Empire Day
to pay his respects to the head of his country.

On such

occasions, he would spout out some platitudes to

a

gathering

of hungry and underfed children who had gathered under the

lashing rays of

a

tropical sun while he himself, dressed in

full uniform, stood shaded at the head of the gathering.
In the midst of such pageantry, the Governor forgot
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that the people he was
addressing were not Englishmen,
they
would never be, even though
s o.e would, in the
future, try
hard to be.
They were brought up where
they were and ^he
great majority would die where
they were.
In the final analy
sis.
the Governor developed a morbid
desire for the respect
and homage of those over whom
he ruled.
One unadmiring

critic puts it this way: "Uneasily
conscious of the moral
insecurity of his position, he was further
handicapped by
finding himself an aristocrat without having
been trained
47
as one."
Little wonder that many a Governor became
neurotic.

The intense contradiction within one person
had

to surface somehow,^®

Harold Laslci was very unhappy with the narrow base
from which Governors were selected.

He writes that the

quality was such that the one so appointed rarely questioned
the system or attempted innovations.'^^

On the same point,

Paul Blanshard writes that most Governors had no first hand

knowledge of dealing with the "institutions of responsible
democracy."

They were not recruited among those who would

most likely criticize the system.

47

CoL.Ro James,

V/e s t

"They had to conform to

Indian Government

,

p.

11.

'^^Gordon Lewis makes mention of two governors, one
in Antigua and one in British Guiana, who were sick. The
Groyyth of the Modern West Indies (London; MacGibbon and Kee
Ltd., 1968), p. 22.

Harold J. Laski, "The Colonial Civil Service,"
The Political Quarterly Vol. 9 (1938), p. 546.
,
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w.n

B^itisn

app.oval.

.

...a

«

,.ey we.e not a con.o^ist

the beginning, they
usually attained that
status long
befo.e the end of thel.
career," or even current
tour,
one
gets the impression that
it was beneath their
dignity to
sub.it to the approval of
the people with who™ they
were

supposed to work.^*^
The intent here is not to
condemn all governors,
because there were some good
ones.
But they were so rare
that one has to search hard to
find them.
However, there
is no question that generally
the ones on the Caribbean
circuit were not the best. The one so
appointed in the
Caribbean arrived without any detailed
knowledge
of his

post and within days he would be commanding
people who had
lived in that very area all their lives.
This situation
was that way only because he carried the title
of Governor
and, of course, he was a European.
to the Caribbean,

tions:

Of those appointed

Thomas E, Simey writes of their qualifica-

that their social backgrounds did not qualify them

to handle administrative planning; that they were engaged in

miseducating the people. 5 2

And, interestingly enough, of

the Governors working in Dominica, this writer was unable

^^Blanshard, Democracy and Empire

,

p.

14.

^"""Morley Ayearst, The British West Indies
The Search
for Self-Government (London: Allen and Unwin, 1960), p. 150.
:
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Thomas E. Simey, V/elf are and Planning in the West
Indies (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1946), pp. VI-VIII.

:
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to find out their Qualifications.

Their arrival usually

made the papers and their inauguration
made the headlines,
but usually the only qualification
published was the M.B.E.
(Member of the Order of the British
Empire) they may have
acquired and their having worked in Africa.

53

^^^^^^^1^^ account of the quality of men appointed
to the Governship during the war years
is contained in
Kenneth E. Robinson, The Dilemmas of Trusteeship
Aspects
of British Colonial Policy Between the Wars
(Londo~
Oxford University Press, 1965), pp. 46-47.
:

As of 195 7, Governors who made the Caribbean
tour and
their previous experiences are:
^

JAMAICA:

Sir Hugh Foot;
Palestine, Trans Jordan,
Cyrenacia Cyprus, Nigeria.
Sir K. Blackbone; Nigeria, Palestine, Gambia.

GUYANA:

Sir Patrick Renison;
Ceylon, India, Trinidad and British Honduras.

BARBADOS

Sir Roberb Arundell;

WINDWARDS

Sir Coleville Deverell;

LEEWARDS

A, To Williams;

Kenya, Jamaica.

Northern Rhodesia - for both
the Leewards and Windwards there were white
administrators on each island and almost all
had served in Africa previously.

BELIZE (British C.H. Thornley;
Honduras)
Uganda.

TRINIDAD
AND TOBAGO*

Tanganyika, Uganda.

Tanganyika, Kenya and

Sir Edward Betham Beetham;
Kenya, Swaziland, Bechuanaland and Windwards.
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in summation,

it can be said that
.any incompetent

people were placed in critical
positions which adversely
affected the desired progression
of the political syste..
The Governor's role was to
teach a people
how to be

politically sophisticated by
maintaining an air of compromise and strong leadership
without dictatorial measures
His role was to develop a complex
and structually differen
tiated system which could bring a
better life for
the people.

These ideals were never approxi-

mated; it became increasingly necessary
for the Governor
to demand conformity which negated
compromise and responsible government. The Governor became a pattern
to be

emulated in the system by the aspiring politician.
The Colonial Bureaucracy and the Governor
In the first section of this chapter, the idea of

introducing the bureaucracy

as- a

way to explain political

development/change was criticized, but no attempt was made
to portray it as an unimportant variable in the political

system.

In fact,

a

country which has experienced the

colonial bureaucracy and in the process inherited

a

cer-

tain structure during independence, can be understood

little better through an understanding of what that

bureaucratic system entails.

a
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Paradoxically, the colonial
bureaucracy was above
politics, but yet continually
in the midst of politics.
The Governor, already portrayed
as the king-pin
of the

political system, was at the apex of
the bureaucracy; he
made all appointments.
Because his judgment was superior,
there was no need for close supervision
by the British
Governments
In any case, the top personnel were
white
and knew how to administer.
Although the white bureaucrat
was paid twice as much as the local West Indian,
the best
did not make the Caribbean tour since both Africa
and the

Far East were more exciting.

The Caribbean was kept at

the bottom of the ladder and even there, there were levels
of better areas;
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an Englishman would opt to work in

Jamaica over Dominica.

But Jennings has offered an

explanation for paying the English more: that was to get
the best to come.
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The main feature

of the colonial bureaucracy, whose

members will be referred to here as the old hands, was
that entrance to it was open.

But when the Colonial

Office stopped staffing it with their own kind, only

certain people made it to the top.

It had a class bias

Blanshard, Democracy and Empire
Ayearst, The West Indies pp. 150 ff.

,

d.

15.

Also in

,

^^,Sir
.

129.

Ivor Jennings, The App roach to Self Government,
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and its own form of
stratification.

This sub-system

guarded against encroachment
from all sides, from politicians, from the people, though
encroachment was very
unlikely to occur; lines of command
were clearly marked
internally. it was powerful but
not innovative and was
was ambivalent toward any progressive
movement or person.
The crown gave it adequate protection',
thus worrying about
its legitimacy was not the rule.
From the interviews
which this writer conducted, the impression
was given that
the Dominican bureaucracy was always
manned by
locals.

This was not the case, and even those who
have since taken
over from the British still do not show any
noticeable

break with the system they once served as junior clerks.

They are still the carbon copy of their past seniors and
sometimes even more rigid in their actions.
The colonial bureaucracy was intimately connected

with the Government which was for all intents and purposes
the Governor, the leader of the country.

The old hand

was not part of nation-building; he was an advisor or

something less in this writer's view, but in the bureaucrat's view he was an administrator.^^
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G,A. Campbell, The Civil S ervice in Britain
York: Penguin Books, 1955), p. 308,

(Nevv;
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The old hand, steeped in his
colonial ways, today is
not that efficient.
Procedure becomes more important
simply because that is. how he has known
and done it over
the years.
But there were a series of changes
in
the

colonial situation which did have tremendous
effects on
the old hand.
As Government and Civil Service became
separated as a result of the imposition of "advanced"

constitutions, an intense battle between the colonial

politician and the conservative colonial bureaucrat
developed
V.'ith

the introduction of the ministerial system

where politicians, elected representatives of the people,
acquired power from the Governor and from the old hands,
the latter began to feel threatened. Some made their

departure very quietly, though at times he became

politician.

a

But the old hand was still in command;

he

was the one teaching the politician the ropes of the new

system.

He seemed to have done a good job of it.

But

suddenly something had gone wrong because in many interviews, the sentiment expressed

v;as

such that the old days

were better, the days when the elected representatives
did not have too much power.
It was not the good old days that were being

idealized for their own sake but

a

disappearance of
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power was being bemoaned.
^a.

This w./^'
writer must sympathize
with
some Civil servants
.ho have had to put
up with many incompetent politicians with
the coming of the new
system
Although the politician
was gradually being
made the leader
Of government, the
Governor was still the
unguestioned
head in 1956.
The Governor could accept
the erosion of
power because, as soon as
his major powers were
removed,
he left the territory,
and returned home.
But the old
hand saw the erosion of his
powers and could not leave
the system, especially if he
was not of retirement age.
He has commanded respect; knew
his job, and was never
pushed around.
in short, he had grown to
appreciate
his "well deserved importance,though his salary remained
the same and increased even at faster
rates.
spite of
what he may say, he had to make tremendous
adjustments

m

when the clean break was made in 1967, when
the Premier
of Dominica acquired the powers of the
European Governor.

Eighty per cent of top civil servants interviewed
by this writer indicated that they had to make little adjustments when this break occurred. On the other side of
the coin, about sixty per cent indicated that the politicians were doing their jobs well.
Expectedly, about fifteen
per cent did not answer that question' which tells this
writer that they have negative opinions about the competence
of politicians.
Twenty-five per cent admitted that the
politicians were incompetent. This question of competency
of politicians could have been more accurately stated the respondents could have been asked to name competent
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ha.pe.ea Oo^inica^s
aevelop„ent. He ^ay
Have prevent..
ayna.ic ..n.ste.s ..o.
initiating new p.o,.a.3.
sincere
himself can be ve.y
.esitatnt to try new things.^B
The
the iea.e..s action,
as being forced on
bi™ because of
votes to be obtained by
certain programs.

independence did bring

a

change of attitude for the

old bureaucrat.

The new politics has
made him switch
roles with the politician;
he now answers .to the
latter.
He finds himself subordinate
to the very people he once
snubbed and ignored at will.
But there is one other

Important feature of the new system
he finds hard to
accept, although he once practiced
it himself in his
own way.
Politics in Dominica today is the
game of rewarding friends and punishing the
enemies;
in many
instances, he himself is the number one
enemy.
Decisions
are crudely made on the basis of how
many votes such
and

and incompetent politicians-ministers.
But the
knows too well that no answers would have been writer
given.
The
civil servant is afriad of reprisal if he expresses
a negative opinion of the politician.
58

The same point is made by La Palombara, Buroauc^acy and Political Development p. 18.
.
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such a policy will bring
in the next election,
though a
certain policy may in the
long run have adverse
effects
on the government. Thus,
the old hand gives the
impression
that he is spellbound.
He balks at the relative
ease with
Which the common people can
approach their elected representative.
He sees that as a breakdown
of discipline.
This so-called breakdown in
discipline is very
revealing.
it throws some light on the
attitude of those
bureaucrats toward the masses and the
social relations that
exist in Dominican society. Under the
colonial system,
the ultimate head of government was
the Governor.
Because
of the amount of paper shuffling and
decisions the Governor
had to attend to, the civil servants
intercpeted the few
citizens who dared to go to Government House to
lodge a complaint. The civil servant did a good job in screening
the

"unnecessary" visitors and allowed the few chosen friends
to see the Governor, but with the coming of the present

government in Dominica (1961), an open invitation was extended to Dominicans to visit government at will.

To be

sure, many unnecessary complaints will be made, and have

been made, but because of the past history of the old hand's
turning the people away, the present government has seen
fit to pass on that invitation to the people.

Taking

away this important responsibility from the old hand has
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precipitated a major crisis because
everywhere, everyone
is talking about breakdown
in discipline

at all levels of

society.

The old hand sees the removal

of.

this responsibi-

lity as yet another way the
politician has decided to get
votes, but he seems to forget that
he was the greatest politician in his heyday when he kept the
more "disturbing"

elements away from the Governor.
The old civil servant cannot see any
good in an open
door policy of government. He does not
realize that if

people are sufficiently moved to visit government
that
this is a good sign of government's ability to
penetrate
the society and make the polity feel part of the
system.

The old hand must see politics in such a move because
he
is the product of his environment.

He is very shortsighted

and also small-minded, which is not unusual in any small

society where the one who makes it to the top has had to
struggle very hard and will do anything to gain respecta-

bility and admiration to keep his position which he conceives as very tenuous.
The old bureaucrat in Dominica has been so hurt by

being pushed around by local politicians that he deliberately
shirks

a

responsibility and function for which he is the only

one qualified to perform by the mere fact that he is more

familiar

v/ith

the governmental machinery than the "new"
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politician.

He has refused to
get warring politicians

together because he so.ehow
enjoys the open conflict a.ong
some ill-informed and
ill-prepared politicians.
addition, he has failed to prepare
the system for any
meaningful change. He performs his
duties callously and
very mechanically. For example, the
Deputy Premier of
Dominica told this writer in an interview

m

that for two

years his government has requested

a

comprehensive plan

for the Department of Housing and it was
not received up
until then. This lack of interest is further
precipitated
by the fact that the old hand's opinion is
seldom requested
unless he has shown a sympathy for the government
or
has

shown himself to be decisively apolitical.

The politician

criticizes him openly, something he was not used to and,

whenever the opportunity arises, he is replaced by
set of people, called here "fresh blood."

a

new

But these, by

all indicators, can be equally bad, if not worse, than

their former senior counterparts.

The new bureaucrats

are now directly under the control of the politician;

this fact could lead to better results if used properly
but,

at the moment,

that does not seem to be the case.

•
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The New Bureaucrai-.
The Old bureaucrat owed his
legitimacy to the Crown;
he could, and did, ignore
locally elected representative!.
But the new bureaucrat owes
his Job to the politicians
of
the day, though the r.yth is still
perpetuated that the
civil servant is apolitical. This
is the case if apolitical
means one cannot be objective, or
if one has to side with
a party, the ruling party takes
precedence. This myth
about the apolitical nature of the civil
servant is further
expressed in the attitude of the leading
politicians
of

Dominica and even among the top civil servants
themselves.
All of the top civil servants interviewed
indicated that
the service should be apolitical, but they refused
to

indicate whether in fact it was.^^
service was never apolitical.

The facb is that the

Promotions were almost always

based on political juggling and in the process good people
who never were able to prove their worth were snuffed off
at the bud.

Politics went so deep into the service

that it entered the awarding of college scholarships.
was not uncommon for

a

It

deserving student to be denied a

"schol," as it is called, because his family was not known,

They may have been afraid that the author ivould have
tried to find out why it is not apolitical. And it is not
apolitical in this writer's opinion, because of no great
fault of either the politicians or even the new civil servant
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or hostile to the
government,
u£ for
or
ror an unH.
.»
undeserving civil
servant to grap a schol
for
lor him^^Pi^
nimself and go on to
fail
the course (degree).
But the comments made
to this writer in
interviews
concerning the desired
apolitical bureaucrat are
very interesting and revealing.
just a few will be reproduced
here: the Dominican civil
servant is "to be li.e the
British
Civil servant,., which means
he must be just as
apolitical
in disposition.
Another respondent put it this
way,-"in
the first place, no civil
servant should align himself, with

any party - if he had and his
party failed

government, then he

should

'to

play it cool."

form

the

Quite interest-

ingly, some civil servants were willing
to concede that it
was hard to remain apolitical but were
always ready to put
the interest of the State before the Party.
This in itself
is superfluous since they are civil
servants precisely
because they are expected to put the State's
interests

first.

One suspects that their concession for party
affilia-

tion is

a

means to accommodate their partisan inclinations.

The politicians are overwhelmingly in favor of an

apolitical bureaucracy.

But one cannot discern clearly

what they mean by that.

If the present practice is an

indication of what apolitical means, this writer will have
to conclude that apolitical has a special meaning in

Dominica because clearly the top civil servants are not
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allowed to make any decisions
which will not benefit the
ruling party.
Perhaps that is the way it
was meant to be,
but the politicians do not seer,
to realize that a short
term hurt may well turn out to
be a long term
gain.

In

support of this argument this writer
can document several
decisions which would have had bad
short term effects but
long term benefits to the government.
As was anticipated,
these policies went by the wayside
along with the experts
who had initially recommended them.
The positive aspect of the new bureaucrat
is the fact
that he can he molded but cannot be removed
at will by
a new government.
One individual may be transferred from
one department to the next, but he may still remain
as

thorn.
s

Besides, there are just so many departments in a

11 country like Dominica.

a top

a

With every change of Government,

man cannot be asked to resign because the treasury

can support only so many pensioners, while gainful employ-

ment is not easy to find.

In days gone by, the so-removed

bureaucrat could pack up and head for the mother country
to begin a new life.

When all is said and done, the new bureaucracy in all
the former small colonies disproves the Riggs

'

hypothesis

that the bureaucracy can be a key variable in political

development.

The

nev/

bureaucracy has shovm itself able to

adapt very easily to its environment, and become a
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football.

TO put the pieces of
the colonial conaition
together, one wlU have to
review the type of
politician
produced and his view of the
whole colonial syste..

The Politician
immediately Before and After
Independence

Colonialism had installed

a

Governor as a virtual

dictator; he could veto any
legislation.

The bureaucrat

accepted this fact blindly since
he was effectively coopted into the system.
But the politician remained
a most
"horrible" element who was always
irresponsible in the
eyes of the British. The politician
had been refused a
say
the running of his country, even
when he

m

was an

elected representative.

He often saw himself as the

savior of the masses as opposed to the Governor
and
bureaucracy, whom he often criticized as the
greatest enemy
of the people.
But because of his inability to make

policy to benefit members of his constituency, he
read
that as a carte blanche to make the wildest of
promises
during election time.

When elected and

quite expectedly

did not make good his promises, he was not honest enough
to show the impractical ity of his promises.

Instead, he

lashed out at the system for not allowing him to implement
his programs.

The sad part of it was the fact that the

very people, the masses, whom both politicians and British
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tried to protect, suffered
at the end.
The British were
not tactful enough to pull
the rug from under the
demagogues by putting into effect
.ore adequate programs,
instead they were out to teach
these "irresponsible"

politicians

lesson by bringing change when
they thought
it was right.
What they failed to realize is
that
a

no

matter how long they waited to bring
these changes, the
politician would always accept and
receive the credit for
the changes. And when he accepts
the credit, he expects
the people to receive him as their
Messiah.
In his drive to get changes, the
politician was able
to appeal to most mischievous
passions of the people who

rarely knew why they were so emotionally moved
to partake
in the satisfaction of one man's ego.
On the achievement of independence, the leader
has
to find a scapegoat to vent his frustrations.

Before it

was the British, but now it becomes anyone who happens to

have a different idea of how the country should be run.

The legal situation of the State changes but the leader

with his cohorts remain the same.

Eric Williams of

Trinidad is an excellent example of the mind produced by
British colonialism.

He feels very happy about every

detailed gain he has made over the British.
revengeful and bitter.

He is always

He can write that all British

historians spoke ill of the West Indies (very much untrue)
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but can .e.use Sto.ely
Car.,chael entrance to
T.ini.ad
because he was p.eacMn,
a raaicaX .o™
o. .Xac. o.iae
the ve.y iaea Wlnia.s
himself „.ote about as
early 33'
1939.
The colonial politician
carries with hi„ to
independence a hatred he once
reserved

for the British,
but now his disposition
demands he passes it on to
his'
own people and the bureaucrats.

The politician usually
presents a political party
as a front to hide his own
authoritarian personality. He
speaks Of all kinds of reform,
but refuses to allow all
others to partake in this enterprise
since he, like his
masters before him, has a monopoly
on expert knowledge of
reform. Thus, one sees'a system
which has a leader who
jealously guards his position against
all encroachments.

The "new" politician may strike

a

responsive chord by

echoing the need to build roads, but by and
large, placing
o£ roads might be restricted to areas where
the politician
has garnered many votes and other rewards.
The colonial

politician becomes, after independence, aggressive,
vindictive, and of course afraid.

Eric Williaras, Capita lism and Slavery (LondonI'jjy), passinu

George Allen and Unwin,
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Conclusion
It has been argued in
these pages that the
colonial
Situation is something special.
it, is not a .e.e
appendag
Of the .other country.
Further, it was stated that
the
present pattern of politics in
the British

Caribbean is a
reflection of the "training',
received during colonial rule
But the colonial situation,
on the surface, looked
har-

monious, though realistically it
was riddled with contradictions.
For one thing, the Governor owed
his legitimacy
to an outside power, the Queen.
But increasingly, the
local politician was getting the
people to back him during
his frequent attacks on the political
system.
The politician saw himself as getting his power from
the people.
For this reason, he felt he should enjoy
more power than
the Governor, who was an outsider. This rivalry
did not
lead to many open confrontations because the
politician

knew quite well that the Governor was stronger than him
because he was white.

Secondly, the politician had seen

the British use force to quell disturbances elsewhere.

Under these circumstances, the politician waited for his

chance to assert himself when the British left.
When colonialism ended, the politicians were quick
to institutionalize the machinery which could give them

back both legitimacy and respect.

They created the army

and with British help, built more police stations.

Lavish
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constitutions, outlining
people.s rights and duties,
wece
also introduced.
The politicians were
only copying what
the British had done before
the..
The strictures indicated that the wielders of
power were anticipating the
sa.e

confrontations which did not guite
materialise during the
colonial period. The politicians
were correct in anticipating trouble. But in their
desire and drive to be like
the British, they forgot that
time was against
them, and

that all groups in the political
system were just waiting
patiently for the superior power, the
British, to leave

in order to assert themselves.

Thus, the confrontations

in these former colonies have become
more frequent and

more serious.
this study.

The results are described in the rest of
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CHAPTER

IV

THE PARTY IN THE POLITICAL
SYSTEM IN DOMINICA

Introduction
The two previous chapters
dealt specifically with
the effects of colonialism on
the Dominican political
system.
it was concluded that both
the colonial constitution and other aspects of
colonialism did influence
and

sometimes determined the shape of the
component parts of
the Dominican political system.
Thus this analysis was
deemed necessary to set the stage to
review the actions
of the present actors of the system.
The political party
is presently considered, while a later
chapter is devoted
to other actors of the system.
The purpose of this chapter is to identify
the

functions of the Dominican political parties.

taken as a given that there is

a

It is

structure called party.

The structure acts and is acted upon in an environment.
This writer is aware of the hazards of trying to identify
the functions of any single structure vis-a-vis several

structures in any given system.

Thus measuring the func-

tions of the party alongside other groups and individuals
in those non-developed countries where, according to

Gabriel Almond and Bingham Powell, structures are not
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sufficiently differentiated and
individuals take on multiple
roles,
can be problematic. The
party may effect changes
on .any objects.
indeed, in the
"non-U'estern" world, the

role of the party is often
blurred and will be that way
for a long time to come.
Let us now review a few definitions Of the structure called
party to extrapolate a working
definition for this study.

Defining the Party
The experts do not agree as to what
constitutes a
political party, when they are dealing with the
non-advanced
world.
The tendency has been to use the structures
which
exist in the "advanced" world as a yardstick to
measure

those in the "less" developed world.

The following defini-

tions, though they were not devised expressly
for the de-

veloping world, are sometimes used when dealing with it.
Andrew Milnor writes that the party is the sine qua non of
liberal democracy; it is an organization of people with a

mission to provide alternative programs.
to seek power.

2

Thus it exists

The exact number of people in this

Gabriel Almond and Bingham Powell, Comparative
Politics A Developmental Approach (Boston: Little, Brown
and Company, 19fcb), p. 29.
:

2

Andrew J. Milnor, ed., Comparative Political
Parties (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1959), p.

1.
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organization does not see™ to be
important; it does not
have to be open to all. The
fact that it exhibits the
tendency to have its own place
and wants power ^akes it
party. Milnor's definition is
sufficiently broad

a

to in-

elude all groups regardless of
their chances of winning at
the polls.

Joseph La Palombara defines a party
as

a

continuous

living organization which is always
prepared to assume
power. 3 It IS an open body with
dispensable individuals
and permanent local units and it must
be constantly organizing.
Its leaders must make a conscious effort
to seek

national power to wield power with the backing
of the
people.

This definition is extremely tight and rigid.

Dominican parties under review

v;ould

The

disqualify under it.

They both depend heavily on their leaders.

Local cadres

are virtually non-existent, and are certainly not autonomous,
as La Palombara's definition demands.

Finally, the dynamism

which was so often attributed to African political parties

during the early 1960

's

is nowhere to be found in Dominican

parties since they crumble as soon as elections are over;
the winning party becomes the government, while the defeated

one loses its touch, its elites get disenchanted and resign.

3

Joseph LaPalombara and M. Weiner eds., Political
Parties and Political Development (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1966), p. 6.
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The losing party Is usually
taken over by a new set
of
elites who proceed to change
its na.e.
if that does not
happen, they become dormant
to be resurrected once,
annually,
at What they call a convention,
where lavish praise is given
to the leaders.

Joseph

LaPalombara's definition is not useful
for
this study, although ironically,
though not surprising,

he
was writing on the developing
areas when he used that definition. Of course, LaPalor^bara
is not alone in devising

unrealistic definitions to be applied to
developing areas.
Samuel Elderveld's definition that the
party is an open

organization with autonomous wards,

^ is

even more rigid.

It is cited here only to demonstrate
that at times parties

in the non-advanced world can approximate in
many ways the

roles attributed to parties found in the advanced
world.

Roberto Michels sees the party as

a.

clique dominating

the masses but this clique will prostitute itself to garner

support to continue its domination.^

Both Eldersveld and

Michels emphasize the open party

certain extent, and

to. a

this openness can be found in the non-developed areas,

including Dominica, but it is the nature of this openness

which needs closer assessment.

4

It is one thing to encourage

Samuel J. Eldersveld, Political Parties
(Chicago: Rand McNally, 1964), p. 3.

;

A Behavior -

al Analysis

^Roberto i-lichcls, "Organization and Discipline,"
Comparative Politics ed. by Roy C. Macridis and Bernard
Brov/n (Homewood, 111,: The Dorsey Press, Inc., 1961) p. 233.
,
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participation, but it is another
thing to have the same
people devise and carry out
policies. One quickly realizes
that mass participation is not
necessarily the best way to
satisfy the needs of the people.
At the same time, elites
should not be blamed for a lack of
mass participation.
..ass

'

m

all fairness to the elites,

it must be said that generally

the people do not know how to participate;
consequently they
give up and allow things to be done for
them.

This study could go further with definitions
of party
and the implications for the non-developed
world, but that
is not necessary.
The only crucial point now is to state
clearly a workable definition for the chapter. For
this

reason the writer has chosen the Epstein definition
stated
succinctly: "a party is any group, however loosely organized,

seeking to elect people in government under

a

given label. ""^

The definition is sufficiently broad to include all the

groups in Dominica which have paraded under the banner of
party.

This researcher's job is made easier because he

does not have to be too concerned with the "imposters,"

since they have usually been unmasked very quickly.
quite frankly, if

a

And

more rigid definition were adopted,

what exist in Dominica would not pass as parties.

Leon D, Epstein, Political Parti es in Western
Democracies (New York: Frederick Pracger, 1967), p. 3,

.

158

The important thing about the group
is that it seeks
to win elections regardless of its
chances at
the polls.

The label is even unimportant as both
party members and
supporters show little understanding of it. But
before we
discuss Dominican parties, let us discuss party
systems and
functions

Party Systems
The number of parties found in separate political
systems have often been neatly labelled under different

categories, with little knowledge of their strengths and
attitudes.

This has been done to make for easy analysis of

parties in environments with which they are constantly

interacting.
What is

a

party system?

Maurice Duverger defines

it as the number of parties found in the political system.*^

In undertaking a count, Duverger cautions against care-

lessness since parties come and go very rapidly.

But this

writer does not have to exercise this caution since he
accepts any group which seeks to win elections as

a

party,

Duverger divides the party system into three major
categories, and under each he has sub-categories.

The first

is the two-party system which does not preclude the existence

of minor parties.

In that system, there are two major

"^Maurice Duverger, Political Parties Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State (New York: John Wiley
and Sons, 1963), p. 282.
:

159

parties of al.ost equal strength.

Then he categorizes the

niultiple party system as the
system with three or more
major parties of equal strength,
and finally, the single

party system where one major
organization exists, but not
necessarily excluding minor parties.

Joseph

LaPalombara^ writes that competition
is the
key to party systems and more so in
the non-developed world
The important thing to be considered
in dealing with these
structures is whether competition is open
to all.
His

typology reverts around the acquisition of
power and how
it is preserved.
He detects two major systems; one Hegemonic, where a party or its philosophy dominates
over
an

extended period, and two, the turnover system, where
as is
implied, governments change hands very often. The amount
of time required to consider

a

system Hegemonic does not

seem to be too important and yet it is not arbitrary.

LaPalombara has come up with four heuristic models
There is the ideological-pragmatic model where

a

party is

interested in staying in power first, so it will yield to
some interests to achieve that end.

Second, the Hegemonic-

ideological system, in which the party has kept its ideological purity and wins elections or has had its philosophy

perpetuated even in defeat.
where the party has

Joseph
Parties, p. 33.

v;on

Third, the Hegemonic-pragmatic

elections because it has been

LaPalombara and M, Weiner, eds.. Political
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sensitive to both changing ti.es
and people.
Finally
there is the turnover-prag.atic
syste..
Party cornpetiti.-on
is intense as the people
respond to the parties on the
basis of past performance.
Using LaPalombar a s model
as
a guide, the Dominican
political party system would fall
under the Hegemonic-pragmatic
continuum, as the Dominic:an
Labour Party has dominated the system
since
•

1957 and

officially since 1961.

if it were to be defeated at the

polls, and this is very unlikely, its
programs would be
continued by the opposition.
In dealing with the so-called one party
states,

LaPalombara- specifies three varieties.^

First, there is

the authoritarian type which is non-totalitarian, monolithic, and ideologically unclear.

This is so as invariably

the chain of command in the party is unclear as one man

directs the operation.

The leader

clearly the policy to be pursued.

almost never states

Almost everything is

improvised, which has disastrous results, as subordinate

leaders are often reluctant to take the initiative lest they

make

a

mistake and earn the scorn of their superior.

In

this system, opposition is not tolerated; it is seen as a

conspiracy to detract the people.

The major setback in that

system is that the party, because of

a

lack of coordination

of policies, proves itself unable to carry on nation-building,

Ibid .

,

pp.

34-40.

161

second, t.e.e is the
one party
p,...,,3tic type .Here
competition is allowed
and somehow the
.est leaders do
e.erge to conduct the
nation-s a..airs. Third,
the totalitar.an party type which
becomes the state.
But the A..ican
countries which have da.hled
with socialism put it
differently
and Dominica may one
day put it that same way.
T.ey argue
that with independence
there is only one interest,
and
Since parties emerge to
protect interests, there is
no need
for more than one party.^O
^^^^^^^
^^^^^ ^^^^
coin is that there is also
a need for one leader
who has a
monopoly on solutions to the
nation's problems.
The one party totalitarian
type has a very rigid
ideological bent which gets the
nation built, but at tremendous cost, especially when the
nation in question is simply

underdeveloped

and' not

undeveloped.

The party usually ends

up squeezing water out of stones,
which precipitates frequent national crises.

Party Functions
The political party plays

a

function in the system,

although it is problematic to descern what
these functions
are.

It works not in a vacuum, but with other
actors.

This

gives it a status in relation to these actors,
which pre-

sumably gives rights and duties to it.

m

Quoted^
Rupert Emerson, Political Koderni zation
The Smale Pnrty Syst em (Denver: University of Denver Press.
'
1963), p. 24.
a.

•

;
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-ans

The party has been seen
as a modernizer, which
that it is charged with
bringing the traditional

the modern age with its
structural complexities.

'

to

But

Epstein disagrees stating that
it is not an agent of
change.^^
Others see it as a mediator of
social conflict since it
establishes allegiances cutting across
social divisions.

The party, as it were, establishes

a

link between the people

and the institutions of government
which makes it mandatory,

writes Hilnor, for the party to include
as many people as
possible in its ranks and to make the issues
clear to the
14
people.
Quite obviously a party does not have to
include
the people in its fold to make them relate
to institutions.
The people can even relate and respect existing
institutions
without understanding anything about government.
The party, it is said, articulates and aggregates

the wishes of the people.

As a go-between, the people let

the party know what they want and the party in turn lets the

government know the people's wishes.

But what about situa-

tions, like the Dominican one, where the parties disintegrate

after elections.
The party is supposed to socialize people into

accepting the political system.

In the process, it has the

'^Leon Epstein, Political Parties

,

p.

9.

12

A. Lifphart, The Politics of Accommodation
Pluralism and Democracy in the Netherlands (Berkley: University of California Press, 1968), Chapter 1.
;
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role Of recruiting the
potentially best to rule.
Thus, the
party is expected to ta,ce an
active part in the
educational
process to create better
citizens for a stronger nation.
Obviously, the party in every
systo. does not perform all
these functions; they .ay not
even perform well the few
they
attempt.
But because they have
tremendous responsibilities,

"

people Often forget that the party
is an artifact and, like^
everything man has made, has its
shortcomings and failures.
Of course these warnings are even
more conspicuous
in Dominica where the parties have
"a limited life span"
and are limited in scope and imagination.

Other agencies

and individuals have continued to
perform the role of the

parties perhaps because they were hurriedly started
in
Dominica to support a democratic system - which has

not

enhanced their position.

It has required the presence of

the "strong man" to keep parties from bursting apart
since
the delaying tactics of democratic party politics continually

threaten an erstwhile dictatorial system.
Worrying over the functions of parties has not

reached Dominica yet as more pressing problems such as
Black Power and full political and economic independence

attract more than their share of attention.

But there is

one problem related to parties which continues to cause
alarm in countries like Dominica; that is, how to achieve

unity v;ithout having to use dictatorial measures to maintain
it.
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Laclc Of

unity .ay lead to sterility
and .ay cause
considerable turnover in
.overn.ent as slim majorities
are
overturned by the defection
of one or two .e.bers
of a
ruling party. The leaders
of Do.inica do not see.
to realize
that a certain amount of
internal disunity is healthy.
This
r.ay make the party .ore
responsive to whatever ele.ent
which
causes this disunity. if unanimity
always prevails, it .ay
drive the party into complacency
or into demise.
Electoral Politics in Dominica

The "No-Party" Era
Before discussing the era of organized
party politics
in Dominica, it is important to review
the Dominican people's
involvement in politics. The people had the
franchise
since 1951 (discussed in Chapter II). And judging
from the

results of the election returns between 1951 and
1957, when
parties were formed, one sees a degree of sophistication
in

voting behavior which approximates any developed country.
The Dominican voted for the individual who made good his

promises.

The figure below illustrates the voting pattern

between 1951 and 1957.
There is no question that the people did very

v/ell

when they exercised their British given right to vote for
the people of their choice; only 1309 ballots were rejected.

They had no previous training in the art of voting and there
are reasons to believe that the Dominican elites never even
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bothered to explain it to
the..
Secondly, the chart shows
that by 1954 apathy ta.es
hold of the people, as
only
70%

bothered to vote.

The people had been
disappointed with
the performance of those
they chose in the previous
election and those who bothered
to vote told them about
it,

too,

By 1957 voting percentage
went up although there
was an actual drop in voters
from 23,835 (1954) to 23,348
(1957).
The reason for this drop is not
clear.
It might
be that the trek to England was
responsible because it was
during the mid-1950. s that the largest
number of Dominicans

emmigrated to Britain in search of
as it may,

a

better life.

Be that

enthusiasm, reflected in the turnout at the

polls, was due to

a

number of reasons.

The idea of West

Indian unity was in the air and all the talk was
to get
Dominicans involved in sending a solid team to
negotiate
with Britain to get a Federation' from which Dominica
could
benefit.

Secondly,

a

group of young individuals were able

to foster this enthusiasm by making better promises to
the

electorate.

More importantly, the people were fielding for

the first time their own candidate or candidates who looked

like them.

The 1957 elections marked the beginning of the

Dominican Labour Party which was largely made up of the
masses of the trade union movement.

This last fact was

enough to get spirits to run high.
Let us discuss the people's response to specific

candidates.

In Roseau North the chart shows that candidate
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Winston, .a':pro.inent estate
owner, handily defeated
his
opponent in 1951 but lost out
in 1954; the reason is
si.ple.
He was one of those no^ocion
roseau (big shots) who
felt he

could win elections by sir^ply
presenting himself to the
electorate. He won in 1951 because
it was believed that
he could use his influence to
provide more jobs for the
unemployed.
He did not live up to expectations

and was de-

feated by Eoyd in 1954, not because the
latter had better
plans for the people, but because the
former had failed the
people.

Boyd suffered the same fate as Winston
in 1957

because he was too crude and rude, getting into
frequent
slanderous fights for which he was once convicted.
His

attacking the Church in
proved

a

a

predominantly Catholic country

fatal mistake.
In Roseau South,

assessed but the loser.

the winner is not the one to be

When adult suffrage

caine

in 1951,

James was the editor of the newspaper which constantly

criticized the British for allowing adult suffrage at that

particular time.

For his arrogance he was repaid by a sound

defeat by Harris.
In the Eastern district, from the start, the people

were not too impressed with any of their candidates until
1957.

In 1951,

they allowed the winner only 28 percent of

the votes and v;ent on to turn him out of office in the

following election.

Then

another candidate, Didier,

continued to dominate the scene because he was close to
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the people, having lived with
them as a headn,aster for
some fifteen years.

The story in the Western district
is similar to
the Roseau North district.
No one cadidate won twice in
a
row.
Jeffers was favored over Charles
because he was more
trustworthy. Charles had shown himself
to be very stingy
and hard with the masses, hoarding
his wealth to make
around the world tours while people remained
unemployed
in the island.

But by 1954,

to mend his ways.

the people gave him the chance

He did not and suffered a defeat.

And

of course, his meddling with the Church did not help
his

cause either.
In both the Southern and Northern districts, the

candidates had

a

perfect record.

They were re-elected

every time they presented themselves at the polls.
Luce,

a

St.

carpenter in the South, was always close to the

people in contrast to his opponent, Pemberton, the owner
of large estates.

Although Pemberton had such

a

great

fortune, by Dominican standards, he did not put it to good

use to benefit the people.

Thus,' he was never given a

chance.
In the Northern district, Laville had provided work

on his plantation to those who needed the jobs, but his big
jump from 39.8 percent of the votes in 1951 to 85.4 per-

cent in 1954 must not be interpreted as

confidence.

a

greater vote of

This last figure was inflated because only
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one rival candidate contested the
election in 1954; the
same was the case in 1957, although
by then his margin
was considerably lov;er.
It is also significant that a
certain Armour ran in 1951 and got only
200 votes (10.3%).
The people were not to be fooled; he never
ran in another
election.
He was one of those foreigners who had
acquired
large estates in the district in which he was
running. He
had always tried hard to displace the "squatters"
from 'his

property and because of this lack of empathy for the people,
he did not stand a chance of winning an election.

There are many interesting things about the Ports-

mouth district; it was dominated by R„B. Douglas and his
cronies.

Douglas had Portsmouth wrapped up because he had

his roots in every facet of its life.

He was the manager of

the biggest industry (bananas) in the district.

He also

had the biggest business at sea, where he controlled a steam-

boat line, which plied betv;een Portsmouth and Roseau, the

only means of connection between those two towns during
that time.

It had to take a man like Edward Oliver LeBlanc

to unseat Douglas, and it was by a very slight margin as

the figures show;

Ironically, the very theme which had

precipated the downfall of two previous condidates in
other districts

carried

a

v;as

the one to unseat Douglas.

LeBlanc

compaign which emphasized the dictatorial measures

of Douglas, such as putting cronies in key positions in the

Portsmouth district, and the role of the Roman Catholic
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Church as the blood sucker of the
people.
people from Portsmouth were responsive

In 1957 the

and sent LeBlanc

to the legislature over their
long time favorite, R.B. Douglas.
It is true that the attack on
the Church may not have

helped to unseat Douglas, but the people
were intelligent
enough to see that Douglas was not doing
enough for
them.

Finally, one sees in the Northwest district
that
Shillingford was r-turned consistently.
Shillingf ord an
,

estate owner, was

a

staunch supporter of the Church and

provided employment for the many people in his district

Everyone in his district had some kind of connection with
him.

He was

a

friend to his people.

With little help, the Dominican voter has rewarded
his friends and punished his enemies.

He did return to

office the individuals he perceived to have performed well.
The others he turned away.

The same pattern seems to be

repeating itself in the era of party politics in Dominica.
The Organized Party Era

Accepting Epstein's definition of the political
party, there are two in Dominica.

One, the Dominica Labour

Party, has retained power from 1960 to the present.

other, known as the Dominica United People

grouped only during election time.

'

s

The

Party has re-

The latter is very coma

meaningful dent in

the lead of the Dominican Labour Party.

Before discussing

petitive, but

h?^s

been unable to make
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the roles of these parties
in the political syste.,
a brief
history of each is in order.
TheJDorninica Labour_Party .

The Dominica Labour

Party was an externally^^ created
party.
1955, Mrs.
Phyllis Shand Allfrey formed it
while in England. At the
inaugural meeting, /arnold Active, then
in

m

England, was

elected secretary (now

nominated member of the House).

Mrs. Allfrey was president, with her
husband Robert, treasurer. The party was heavily influenced
by the British

Labour Party with its brand of Fabian socialism.
takes

a

When one

look at the first constitution of the party,
it is

almost an identical replica of the British Labour
Party

Constitution with its desire to support the laborer.

It

was because of its socialistic stance which many members
and leaders did not understand that the party was always

in a running battle with the Roman Catholic Church over the

ownership of property.
By 1957, the party had convinced the workers, the

poor elements, that this was their -party in spite of or

because of the fact that its president was white, an emblem
of British colonialism.

Thus, by 1958, the party got almost

all Dominicans, especially the lower class elements, keyed

13

The idea of an externally created party is contained in Joseph LaPalombara and Myron Weiner, Political
Parties pp. 10-12. An externally created party is one which
comes about to challenge a group or party in a system. An
internally created party is one formed after elected representatives have taken office and decide to form a party.
,
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up on the word of "labour."

The party would get labor-

work-for the people, was the theme

of the tin>e.

The
results Of the 1958 federal elections
are shown in the
figure below,

^^^^"^

Election Re turns in Federal Elections
1958
VOTES CAST FOR:
PARTY
TOTAL

Allfrey, Phyllis
Bellot, A.
LeBlanc, E.O.
Lestrade
Lockhart
Royer

Labor
Labor
Labor
Independent
Opoosition
Opposition""-^""^

Source:

9

345

1*836
8*968
1,101
t

/iqo

975

Dominica, Report on Vae Federal Elections
1958 (Castries, Voice Press, 1958), p. 5.

It will be noticed that Allfrey came out on top

this time, although she was defeated in the Western consti-

tuency in 1957.

It is also significant to note that only

57.6% of the registered voters bothered to go to the polls.
This would lead one to believe that although the masses

were not sufficiently moved to go out to vote, the upper
class candidates were un-ible to carry the election.

election marked the coming to power of the party.

Christopher Loblack,

a

The
By then

trade union man, together with other

subordinates had effectively sealed the working man to the
party.

He made the party a mass party.

Between 1957 and

1964, Loblack was behind the party helping its leaders to

make it big.

He used to open all public meetings of the

,
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party by singing

Shall Overcome" and closing
the. with
a heated indictment of
the power structure.
Loblack, .ore
than anyone else, was responsible
for the penetration,
--We

communication, and integration which
the party had achieved
by 1966.
The elections of 1961 effectively
destroyed the
other party, as the Labour Party
asserted itself under the
able leadership of Edward Oliver LeBlanc.
He has since led
the party to victory in every election the
party has participated in, save one: the Roseau municipal
elections of

While the 1951 election marked the entrenchment
of
the party, by 1967 it began to lose power.
1971.

Between 1961 and 1966, the party continued to
stretch its lead over the opponent as it opened up the

bureaucracy to the people and delivered goods and services
to them.

In the meantime,

a

power struggle developed be-

tween LeBlanc and Allfrey over the party's leadership,

Allfrey lost out and was expelled because she had not
established herself
the party.

well,

enough

v;ith the

She overestimated her influence and openly

challenged LeBlanc for the leadership.
was dismissed from the Party.

expelled.

sub-elites of

For that, she

Subsequently Loblack was

The exact reason for this action has not been

made clear, but it can be assumed that Loblack

's

lack of

tact may have been responsible for his dismissal.

Loblack has shown himself to be man who likes to
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"expose., everything.

it is only i.onical,

though certainly

not surprising, that LoblaC,
although a loyal party .ember,
would be expelled because
he frequently took
independent

positions which went against
the party norm. The norm
reads "A member shall not make
any public statement orally
or in writing which tends to
discredit the Party."^^
Loblack is like any average Dominican
politician;

he is not

tactful enough.

He was never schooled in the
art of cir-

cumlocution and will say anything without
first reflecting
on it.
Dominican politicians do not understand
that disagreement can sometimes be shown by remaining
silent.
The
average Caribbean politician is too crude;
C.L.Robinson
James' description of him is surely applicable
to those in
Dominica: "^-/est Indian politicians only help those
who

praise them and can be savage and vicious as snakes to
those
who are not helping them win the next election. ""^^
The Labour Party has served the people, and it was

repaid with
10-1.

a

landslide victory

'in

1966 with a margin of

The turn of events since 1967 has had disastrous

consequences for the party and the people.

The party began

to be infiltrated with elements of the upper class who now

realized that this party was there to stay.

Unfortunately,

this last assertion cannot be supported with figures since
14

Dominica Labour Partv, Constitution and Rules
(Roseau: Bulletin Office, 1963), p. 31.

(

^^C.L.R. James, Party Politics in the West Indies
Port-of-Spain People's National Movement Press, 1960), p. 85
:
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the parties hardly keep

count on their me.bership;
and
besides, the upper class
elements do not have to be
registered members to reap the
benefits of the party. They
benefit through tar. incentives
on their businesses.
These
take the form of pioneer status
for new industries, which
means that a company is not
required to pay taxes over a
period of time, sometimes as long
as five years.
a

In addition to the businessmen, the
character of the
party was changed as more lawyers and
doctors became part
of it; one observer has termed this
transformation as the

"enbourgeoisification" of the party.

The same people who

indicted Dominicans for not working hard enough
suddenly
took control of the people's party.
Some ten years
ago,

these elements would not be seen in the company of
laborers
like Loblack, who has since been referred to as "LowBlack."
At that point,

the party preached socialism', although no

meaningful move was made in this direction; but just the
talk of it was sufficient to drive the elites away to

preserve their property.
The last major upheaval which the Party had to

handle successfully if it was to stay alive was the crisis
of 1970.

At that time,

three Ministers were dismissed

because it was alleged that they conspired to overthrow
the leader, Edward LeBlanc.

split in

tv/o

This caused the party to

to contest the 1970 elections.

One faction

was led by LeBlanc and the other Nicholson Cucreay.

Thus
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the 1970 election was a three
way contest with the Freedom
Party as the third challenger.
LeBlanc was up to the
occasion and beat his opponents,
winning no less than eight
seats.

The Opposition Party of Dominica
.

The opposition

party has changed its name so frequently
that it defies
more precise identification.
The succeeding body always
tries to disassociate itself from the
past body whenever it
suits its purpose to show that it has
a new image.
But

on other occasions, it will show that
the new is only a

continuation of the

old.-*-^

Adult suffrage did not bring with it political
parties, but the "advanced" constitution of 1959
required
that disciplined parties in the legislature be in
operation
to complete the political system.

As the constitution said, a Chief Minister had to

be appointed;

that is, a minister who seemed to command

the respect of a majority of the legislature.

the governor relied on his own judgment to pick

Originally
a

leader

but the members of the legislature realized that the best
v;ay to

lend legitimacy to that leader was to create a group

This writer raised that issue with a prominent
member of the P'reedom Party. The member said that the link
of the Freedom Party with past opposition parties of Dominica
was a conspiracy to detract from the originality of the
party.
But the leading theorist of the Freedom Party wrote
in the Star on October 10, 1970, that his party could be
considered a direct continuation of the dead Dominica
United People's Party.

7
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of which he can become head,
thus making the Government's
job easier.
As

result, an "internally'-^^ created
party, the
Dominica United People's Party (DUPP),
emerged which formed
the first government under the 1959
constitution.
But this
a

coalition of individuals was very tenuous
since it was made
up of elites who had either been expelled
from the Labour
Party (Didier, 1957) or those who joined the
coalition 'to
get

a

prominent place in the prospective government.

While

the leader of the DUPP was already designated as the
first

head of government, it had no roots and had no island-wide

support as a party.

its base of support was the major city,

while those elected in the rural areas won on their own
(Shillingford, Didier, Pemberton, Laville).

The breaking

up of the party was in the making from the start;

a

new

election was forced in 1960 when four members of the party
resigned from the Government (Didier and Laville).

In that

election, the heaviest blow was struck when that party's

leader was defeated.
The island

v/as

This signalled the end of the DUPP.

left without any meaningful opposition during

1961-1966 though this party tried

a

comeback in the elections

But Labour's lead was too much.

of 1966.

1

See footnote no. 13, p. 172,

8
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Between 1966 and 1968 there
was only one party in
Dominica, the Labour Party, which
continued to enjoy the
confidence of the rural elites while
the urban lot tried
to be vindictive through the
newspapers. This caused the
Government to overreact and give the
bourgeois element a
reason to regroup to save their interests.
But increasingly,
both the Labour and Opposition parties
were showing similar
interests in maintaining the status quo.
In any case, the government's attempt to
silence
its critics through muzzling the press created
an interest

group, the Freedom Fighters, composed predominantly
of the

urban elite, including the hierarchy of the religious
bodies
in the island.

The group was relatively successful in

getting the government to rescind the harsh and repressive
piece of legislation.

Subsequently, many fighters left

the group since their job was done.

But one faction had a

taste of power and went on to organize a party.
The Freedom Party .

This organization has tried to

involve itself in the problems of Dominica by organizing

every community into units of the party.

At present member-

ship (paying) stands at about two thousand out of

twenty-six thousand eligible voters (1970),
suffers from lack of unity.

1

a

possible

The party

As one prominent editor has

1968 Seditious Act wds withdrawn by Government
on the instigation of the Freedom Fighters.
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put it, he is afraid of the
competence of the Freedom Party;
there are too many leaders and
not enough followers.
Besides, the party has been
unable to convince the rural
elements that it is not a party of
the urban elite.
it is
dominated by the very elements of
the more conservative

Dominica United People's Party.

By 1972,

after four years

of existence, it has shown signs of
deterioration.

Key

members have since left the party, after
they were stymied
by another Labour Party landslide in the
election
of 1970.

The figure reproduced below shows the success of
the Labour
Party in the past three general elections.
The figure shows the number of votes the Dominica

Labour Party received relative to the strongest rival in
the elections of 1961, 1956 and 1970.

After the 1961 elections, the Labour Party secured
eight seats and formed the Government.

The people of Domin-

ica must have been satisfied with its performance between
1961 and 1966, because they returned the party to office
in 1966,

and gave it an additional two seats.

In the pro-

cess, the Dominica United People's Party was destroyed.

Dominica was without an organized opposition party between
1966 and 1968.

The 1970 election was contested under strange con-

ditions.

Two weeks before the election, the Labour Party

6

.
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1961
Numb egof Votes

Party
J. •

U U XT

•

4

5-

7.•
*

8.

9.

10.

1970

number
of Votes

er
Cent

of Votes

Per
Cent

ir

Number

Opponent

807
321

60.5
24.0

1067
461

60.0
26.0

1255
755

57.8
34.7

Opponent

912
843

39.0
36.1

1374
1075

53 3
41.7

1417
1254

48.5
43.0

Labor
Opponent

743
872

34.5
40:4

1199
1036

4Q S
42.8

924
923

35.0
35.0

564

13.3
42.7

969
418

28.8

977
353

63.6
23.0

Opponent

492
512

30.9
32.1

728
918

55.9

528
1144

29.0
62.8

Opponent

329
485

24.9
36.

705
542

55.0
42.3

729
539

52.7
39.1

X.*

cx

2

•J

1966

Per
Cent

Labor
Opponent
T

^ T^#^^
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DO . O

4<i

3

Opponent

1149
453

64.2
25.3

1397
425

72.3
22.3

616
758

23.2
34.8

Labor
Opponent

941
214

77.8
17.7

976
248

75,8
19.9

851
472

62.4
34.6

Labor
Opponent

707
422

56.9
34.0

1193
153

84.5
10.8

942
267

65.0
18.4

759
588

51.0
39.1

1190
86

76.5
5.5

1030
423

65,8
27.2

330
636

47.0
36.0

937
693

45.8
33.9

607

1214

29.1
58.1

Ck

i-^

\J

Labor
Opponent

11. Labor

Opponent

D oininica , Repor t on the Legislative Council Gener-al v',f:^i3f^S' ^"'"^
^-i^jj^^^L-A^ (Dorninica: The Go vernment Print ery)
\
X

L f

Opposition Party w^s the Dominica United
p2ni?SL^p2,-l//^^
^-S'^.
X-eopie's
Party, and
xn 1970 it was the Freedom Party.
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suffered a spllt.^O

Three of the Party-s elected
representatives were dismissed. They
were accused by the Party
of
planning to overthrow the
Party's leader. The three
dismissed individuals formed a
party to contest the elections,
While the leader of the Labour
Party chose his own candl- ,'
dates, and went on to win the
elections. The split
in the

Labour Party resulted in its losing
two seats in the Asse™bly to the Opposition.
But apparently the leader of the
Labour Party was
able to show the majority of Dominicans
that his faction
of the Party was the one responsible
for the "better times"
they were now enjoying.
Be that as it may, the issue at

hand is not to determine what Dominicans
have been led to
believe.
That is important; but the issue is to
decipher
to what extent the promised policies of the
Labour Party

have been realized.

This is done with a view to assessing

the impact of these policies in the state building
process.

20

This split centered around an alleged conspiracy
by three top officials to unseat the Leader of the Party.
But on further investigation this writer was able to find
out that the split was concerned more with disagreements on
land policy.
One faction of the Party opposed selling land
to aliens; while the other was in favor of it.
^

21

State-building refers to the structural difficulties of establishing control over an area and devising
policies to develop a bureaucracy, judiciary and party
system.
Nation-building is making a people feel a part of
some entity they call their own.
Nation-building seems to
be getting harder than state-building.
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The conve rsion process

.

in Chapter I, it was

stated that the systems theory would be
utilized to investigate the Dominican political system.
This approach seems
comprehensive and can be made dynamic. Its
essence seems
to hinge on what is termed the conversion
process,

means how inputs are translated into outputs.

-.which

The programs

of the Government of Dominica are seen as
inputs.

And the

effects (success or failure) of these inputs are
seen ks
outputs. In short, the role of the party, translated

into

such things as interest articulation, interest
aggregation,
rule making, rule application, rule adjudication and com-

munication is reviewed here.
Even though it has been argued elsewhere that the

party in Dominica loses its mass character once the election is over, what remains of it seems to perform all or
most of the above functions.

But it must be made clear that

most of what follows applies only to the Labour Party.

In

addition, it must be stated that the distinction between the

Party and the Government is often blurred.

The two are re-

ferred to interchangeably in discussing the conversion process.

The Labour Party and the conversion process .

The

Dominica Labour Party has not tried to impose unity in

Dominica in the form of creating one political party.

But

it has pledged to create "social justice for every citizen
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regardless of race or status, whether
poor or prosperous. "22
Apparently the party was aware from
the start that this
assertion could be meaningless unless
it was translated
into reality. To achieve this, the
party began a number
of projects.
Social Development,

In the area of social develop-

ment, the party has sought to improve
the water supply.
The United Nations has been approached
to provide technical
advice.
The party also pledged to create more
community

centers, equipped with libraries to improve the
reading

habits of the people.

There were- plans to have island-wide

electricity and telephone services to improve the communication system.

The party had plans to initiate a housing

loan program and "a stage by stage promotion of better

housing and sanitation facilities for the people."

Low

income housing projects at Canefield, Calibishie, Trafalgar vyere to be implemented, with additional plans for new

schemes at P. Michel, Plat-e Ma Pierre, Soufriere and Bath
Estate,

Finally,

a

comprehensive social security plan was

to be implemented to provide for workers

the event of sickness or incapacity.

'

compensation in

The National Provident

Fund, as the program came to be called, had to "provide a

These programs of the Labour Party are not contained in any one document of the Party, These pronounce
ments have been extrapolated from several sources such as
the Party's Manifesto for 1961, 1966 and 1970 elections.
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pension for incapacity or old age."

Agriculture and lands.

Dominica is dominated by

agriculture, with the mainstay of the
economy being bananas
The party which can implement more
schemes will command the

people's confidence.

The Labour Party devised plans to

push agrarian reform by acquiring land to
redistribute to
the people in addition to the Crown lands
that were already
available.
Plans were in the making to improve production
by getting. scientific methods to the people.

Soil surveys

were to be started and an Agricultural and
Industrial Development Bank was to provide the necessary credit to

under-

write the new undertakings.

factory was to be built.

Both an oil and fruit canning

With the increase in production,

hopefully the economy would begin to expand which would be
conducive to governments' plans to assist Dominicans in
their efforts to make it.

Large scale development planning and financial

backing for Tourist Centers in areas of special attraction
such as Prince Rupert and Douglas Bay areas, and the Fresh

Water and Boiling Lake areas were to be created.

Education .

The party had plans for a massive

increase in the number of primary schools to absorb the

growing number of children of school age.

A technical

college at Storkfarm was to be constructed to cater for
students in Agriculture, Technology, Commerce and crafts.
Adult education programs were to be increased and an
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industrial School at Mount St.
Mary was to be built to
accommodate the country's
delinquents who would hopefully
develop Skills in the construction
and industrial fields.
The University center was to
be fully financed by the
Government to allow it to make
maximum use of facilities.
The party's document reads that
there was to be a "much
greater emphasis on technical education"
to increase the
capacity of Dominica to industrialize
and make basic
technical education "a feature of all Primary
schools."
.

International com munications .

it has always been

the plans of the party to build a deep water
harbor to

facilitate large ocean-going vessels.

First, this would

bring more tourist vessels into the State, thus giving

a

lift to the economy.

Second, it would improve the banana

trade since the long

trek from shore to the large boats,

which carry this fruit to England, would be eliminated.
The fruit v;ould be less likely to be damaged if transported
in boats which would anchor right next to the jetty.

Finally, an international jet airstrip has been planned to

"increase the growth of the export potential and any substantial tourist development schemes."
Sport and culture .

These two items were originally

not included in the Party's program.

But over the years, it

has seen fit to lay heavy emphasis on both.

The Party

planned to as3ist the island's only sport association, v;hich

operates in the urban sector.

It indicated that it would
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provide '.proper coaches and
inproved playing fields all
over the island." Culturally,
the Party said that it
would
encourage the cultural potential of
the people.
Health.

Because of the poor quality of
health

facilities in the island, the party
prepared a very impressive and comprehensive program. There
were to be no
less than thirty health centers and
five small hospitals
in "strategic" areas.
The best treatment was to be available to the mentally ill.
mi schools were to be inspected
at least twice yearly by medical doctors.
Ee-ch district
was to have a trained midwife.
The output side .

The output side of the conversion

process is the policies of the Government.

Evidently, the

Party seems to have successfully implemented its policies
since the people have returned it to power in three con-

secutive elections, 1961-70.

But this writer refuses to

accept this simple analysis of equating success at the polls

with successfully implementing policies.

Thus each policy

discussed above will be assessed individually.
The road-building program which cuts across every

facet of Dominican life has been very impressive.

Speaking

with the rural elements, one cannot but be impressed with
their satisfaction

wi th

this program.

village in Dominica is served with

a

Presently, every

motorable road.

It

is because the people never had it so good that they are

prepared to overlook the state of disrepair that these
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roads are presently in.

Quality does not latter, as long

as the peasant can ride the jeep
to his home without having

to walk part of the way.

It is this misapprehension on
the

part of the opposition of why the peasant
is thankful that
the former tries to tell the latter
that the badly damaged
roads are a deliberate move on the part of
the Government
to frustrate non-supporters.

This might be the case.

But

the people have common sense which tells them that the
roads
are bad because the rain destroys them.
The peasants

reason that the Government cannot prevent rain.

The ex-

tent of the road building program of the Labour Government

appears on p.

189.

The Government has reorganized the Water Authority,
but it continues to serve the urban area.
are left unattended.

The rural areas

To date, only twelve villages out of

thirty receive tap water in the homes.

Quite recently,

four more villages had water facilities installed at a cost
of $73,249.00 (BWI) to the Government .

Though the topo-

graphy of the island does not lend itself to easy penetration with water carrying facilities, its record could have

been much better when one considers that there are no less
than 365 rivers in the area.

Government could have used

more effectively technical advice from outside agencies

such as the United Nations.

But of course, the political

^^"Four Villages now get Pipe Water," The Dominica
Chronicle, July 15, 1972, p. 4.
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gain to be had through a gradual
increase in water facilities should not be underplayed.
AS reported in an earlier chapter,
the Government

has not completed its plan for a
comprehensive housing
scheme.
The schemes mentioned in its place
have increasingly benefitted the upper class elements
while it has become
more difficult for the lower class people
to own their own
homes. The lower class elements cannot
afford the loans,
and are forced to live in slums.
But the government has
spent about a million dollars to construct
government

offices and some two million dollars on
tion in Roseau, the main city.

a new

police sta-

It is true that the funds

for the police station were earmarked in England to make

Dominica able to protect itself against an emergency, but
Britain did not send its construction firm to build the
building.

The Government could have constructed a police

station, and did not have to destroy an already existing

sturdy building, with some of the funds and use the rest
for some other meaningful project."

Instead, it followed

the letter of the law and put every cent in building this

which may cause the younger elements in the urban area
to be further alienated.

Both cooperative and local government agencies are
not functioning v;ell.

In an interview v;ith a prominent

member of the cooperative division, the writer was led to

believe that Government has not shown enough interest in
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this agency.

it has not allowed enough
funds to recruit

the field staff to educate the
people in the working of
cooperatives beginning at the priniary
school level. Thus,
although registered cooperatives have
increased over the
years, there seems to be little incentive
given the members
to keep the movements alive.
On the other hand, this
writer discovered that certain cooperatives
like the

poultry cooperative, have used its special privileges
granted by government

to create a shortage of the commo-

dity it is involved in to make the Government look bad.
For example,

a

restriction on poultry imports could put

the poultry cooperative in a good position to foster this

situation.
The Local Government departments do not seem to
be playing their intended roles.

They were instituted to

stymie the growing power of the national government, but
instead they have been used as
national government.

a

means to sustain the

The reports indicate that local govern

ments do not enjoy autonomy and the more autonomy they enjoy
the less benefits they receive from the national government.

This hypothesis is supported by the accusation by

a

top

government official that this agency was receiving too

much attention over other more meaningful agencies which
have affected Dominica in

a

more positive way.

Finally,

the national government has put itself in the ironical,

but not surprising situation of wanting to promote local

"
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government island-wide, but at the same
time wanting to
disband the foremost local government body,
the Roseau
Town Council, because that council tried
to exercise its
autonomy by renaming streets with names which
better "suited
Dominica.
In the area of agriculture, some attempts
have

been made to present better programs to Dominica
but the
results are yet to be seen, as the main stay of the

economy,

bananas, dissipate precipitously.

The problem has been

aggravated by the departure of top personnel from the
island.

Some have obtained better jobs, while others have

gone to further their studies, may be never to return.
An agricultural bank has been set up to sustain many schemes

but the sad report for 1972 reads:

assistance have been registered

''So

far requests

for

but few projects have been

approved and disbursement of funds have not commenced.

The report continues that lands designated to continue the

agrarian reform have been v/ithheld.
Further, in an effort to preserve the best lands of

Dominica for Dominicans, the Government has prohibited their
sale to aliens.

This seems to have been done too late.

One

can even question the sincerity of this policy since sub-

sequently aliens, probably seeing the writing on the wall,

Bernard Yankey, "A General Review of Agricultural Developments in Dominica for Period 1969-1972,"
Dies Dominica (November, 1972), pp. 18-20.
Dr. J.
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have Offered to sell their
holdings.
People have approached
the Government with very
comprehensive plans which could
facilitate the transfer of ownership
of these foreign-held
lands, but the Government has
categorically refused
to

accept them.^^

The Government's record in dealing
with education
is not a good one, as cited earlier.
The Government has
not made public a comprehensive plan which
was intended to
include all facets of education.
It continually allowed
the missionaries to take on the responsibility
of educating
the people.
Many school buildings were erected but they

continued to be staffed with predominantly untrained ele-

mentary school graduates and high school dropouts.

No

attention was given to technical, agricultural or adult
education, until very recently.

In 1972 a technical

college was opened but its fees ($90.00
prohibitive.

a

semester) are

The Government has failed to provide the

much needed training school for the children labelled delinquents while

a

poor attempt was made to start

camp which is terribly understaffed.

a

youth

No particular atten-

tion was paid to secondary schools as the government personnel dealing with educ?!tion were oriented toward primary
25

In July 1972 a group of farmers approached the
"Socialist" Labour Government of Dominica to have it sanction the purchase of farms in the Castle Bruce area. The
Government refu5;ed to help on the grounds that the project
was motivated by Communism. The details of this affair are
contained in Movement for a New Dominica, "V/orking Class
Struiqle in the Caribbean: The Cose of Castle Bruce,
Dominica." Unpublished paper.
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education.

The Govern.ent has not even
provided a secondary school for girls yet, although
one exists for boys.
There is no teacher training college.
Indeed,
in 1972,

DoiDinica had the distinction of
being the only island in

the British Caribbean without such
facilities of its own.
The most that has been done as of 1972
is that the Govern-

ment now pays the salaries of all the teachers
of the four
secondary schools of the island, and this was at
the request
of an outside force (see Chapter V).
The jet air strip and deep-water harbor have not

materialized though as of 1972 they were seriously being
considered.

The Government had already initiated plans

to study the suitability of a particular site to locate

the airport.

In the meantime,

extension facilities were

being considered for the present inadequate facility at

Melville Hall Airport.

The deep v;ater harbour was coming

close to reality by the passage of the Port Authority Act.
This legislation was passed in anticipation of the heavy

traffic that this port would handle.

It is not too im-

portant at this stage, but the location of this port may
prove costly.

The Government has decided to locate it on

an open roadstead in Roseau, while better natural facilities

at Portsmouth,

the second town, are passed over.

The state of sports and culture in Dominica is very
low.

tent.

Coaches and available fields are virtually non-exisThere a^e no full time organizers for sports and
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the little org,^nizing which exists is
primarily directed
to the major city.
this respect, the government had
failed to encourage island-wide
participation in sports.
Thus, to be recognized in sports one has
to travel to the
major city.

m

The state of culture, simply defined as exhibiting

what is typically Dominican, is in an even sadder situation
The more "cultured" elements group themselves into cliques
to sing Dominican songs of old.

They use much of the tax-

payers money to travel abroad to cut records and to wear

Dominican "national" dress.
the same elements who

singing
classes.

a

a

These groups are made up of

few years ago would never think of

local tune because it belonged to the lower
But since government has shown an interest in

reviving these, the elites jump on the bandwagon to deprive
the masses of what is their own.

Like all non-developed countries, the health problem is such that one oft-^n wonders why epidemics are not

more common.

There is one major hospital and two half-way

houses, all with inadequate facilities.

The better trained

doctors remain in the city v;hile the recently graduated man
the rural posts with even less facilities.

There has been

no noticeable improvement in the treatment of the mentally
ill as they are still kept in the same compound as prisoner

The only mental institution is badly staffed and the

personnel are poorly trained.

The availability of free
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inedical care to the school children is simply
non-existent.

An attempt was made by

a

politician of the opposing party

to initiate a free program of eye testing in the
schools,

but it was discontinued as the authorities became unco-

operative.

To be sure, this move of free testing could

have been politically motivated.
a

But the point is, it was

free service which was beginning to show results as the

doctor began to detect, at an early age, eye defects which
v;ould later affect the productive ability of these same

youngsters, who might later become leaders of the country.
In the final analysis, the Dominica Labour Party

has not delivered all the promised services.

Therefore,

its successes at the polls must be the result of a success-

ful political socialization process, v/hich makes the people

satisfied with what they have received.
The Organized Parties in the Political Socialization Process
The parties of Dominica are also confronted with
21

the problem of nation-building.

This refers to the psy-

chological dimension of cre'ting

a

the structural dimension.

It is an attempt to form

nous, national political culture.
.

.

country as opposed to
a

homoge-

This "political culture

.consists of attitudes, beliefs, values and skills

which are current in the entire population, as well as
those special propensities and patterns which may be found

within separate parts of that population (subcultures)."

26

23.
^^Almond and Powell, Developmental Approach, p.
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Political socialization is

a

process whereby political

attitudes and values are
inculcated as children become
adults and as adults are recruited
into roles.
Political
culture is continually molded by
various agents
in the

environment by the process of socialization.
deals with the Dominica Labour Party

This section

and the Dominica

Freedom Party, and their role in political
socialization.
The concept of secularization is used in
discussing
the evolution of a political culture.
Secularization
is

comparable to complexity in structure and is defined
as
".

.

.the process whereby men become increasingly rational,

analytical, and empirical in their political action. "^^
This section is divided into three parts.

The

first deals with the ideology of the Labour Party, the
second assesses the pattern it has adopted to push this

ideology, and the third deals with the results of attempts
to inculcate that ideology.

The last two are juxtaposed

against the attempts of the Freedom Party to carry on

a

similar process, with a view of indicating why the latter
has been unsuccessful thus far.

The ideological orientation of the Parties .

The

parties in Dominica are very hard to follow since they
have changed their positions so many times on issues which

^'^Ibid.,

p.

24.
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are diametrically opposed to
each other.
this or that party socialistic

Thus to label

or capitalistic on the

basis of party actions and
pronouncements can become very
hazardous.
But on the basis of the
constitutions of the
two parties one can discern the
orientation the parties
would like to undertake, but have
been unable to follow
because of the environment in which
they operate.

The original constitution of the Dominica
Labour
Party pledged its commitment to "democratic
socialism",

concept which was introduced by Mrs. Allfrey when
she
returned from England in 1955.
As reported elsewhere,
a

she was heavily influenced by the British Labour Party's

brand of socialism which envisaged the participation of
the State in many areas where private concerns had in-

volved themselves.

But with the expulsion of Mrs. Allfrey

from the party, the party did not change its orientation,

although it has done nothing which approximates socialism.
It continues to speak about securing for the workers by

hand or by brain the fruits of their industry "and generally
it seeks to promote the political, social and economic

emancipation of the people." 29

It does not say explicitly

in its constitution that it is only for the lower class

elements, but by implication it does, since it is determined

29

Labour Partv Constitution, pp. 1-2.
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to work on behalf of those
who have been exploited.
that does not include the
elites of the country.

Surely

In spite Of these platitudes,
it is safe to say that
this party has no ideology, if
ideology is defined as a

commitment to

a

principle.

This does not imply that an

ideologically oriented party cannot waiver
secure its domination of a political

a

system.

little to
One thing

certain is that the upper class element of
the party either
does not understand the meaning of socialism
or they are
using socialism to disguise their non-ideology,
which the
Deputy Premeir told this writer is pragmatism. For

example,

when this writer asked of the elites what their party
stood
for in relation to the op-position, they all said that their

party was socialist and that it was for the small man.

On

the other hand, they saw the opposition as capitalist,

meaning that the opposition stood for its own class interests,
and not for Dominica.

Like the Labour Party, the Dominica Freedom Party
does not have

a

clear-cut ideology.

Its leaders with few

exceptions accuse the Dominica Labour Party of being for
themselves while they are for Dominica.

This party speaks

of the four freedoms as an ideological stance and emphasizes

the importance of putting people before politics.

Freedom Party seems
Party.

a

But the

little more confused than the Labour

On the basis of interviews, the following came out

of the top leadership in response to the question: What does
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your party stand for?

Ansv;er A:

freedoms, people before party";
tion for the country";

foreign capital";

Answer

-The party stands for four

Answer B: "practical educaC:

"Development and bring in

Answer D: "largely socialistic, taking

the best from the Communists and Socialists."

This last

response is interesting since the party has constantly
accused the Labour Party of being

a

communist party,

a

very

far-fetched statement, to say the least.
How the parties inculcate their ideas .

In the

section dealing with the conversion process, it was difficult to show

a

distinction between the Labour Party and the

government in the process of State building.

The difficulty

is even greater in dealing with the role of the party in

the socialization process as distinguished from the role
of the Government, because essentially it is the Government

which does every thing v;hile efforts are always made to show
that the party helps in this important role.

The Government

is the party and the rest of the party withers away tem-

porarily.

Almost to the last man, party officials are

involved in the planning and execution of government policy.

Increasingly, even people in the bureaucracy, in top positions, including police and army, are sympathizers of the

party.

The Dominica Labour Party has changed in composition
over the years.

When the party began it used the already

established Dominica Trade Union as

a

base to bring the
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lower class elements inro
into Its
itq -FoIh
o^u
fold.
The union had already
established irseit
itself in almost
airr,/^c-+every section of the island,
making it easier for the party
to gain members once the
union had accepted that relationship.
fact, today there
are two former union leaders
in the Government, Patrick

m

^

m

John, who was once secretary to
a Waterfront Workers Union,
and Earle Leslie, who organized
unions at Portsmouth be-

ginning in 1945.

The Union which John led was at
one time

hostile to the Government when the latter
tried to pass
restrictions on strikes, but John was quickly

won over and

the law was passed.

But the Government had to contend with

the fact that the President of the union was
affiliated to

the opposition.

The president was quickly "forced out" of

active politics because in his words: "people saw him as
a

politician and not as

workers.

a

humble man negotiating for his

""^^

The Labour Party has since ignored the unions as

means to lure members into its fold.

a

It has taken on the

agencies of local government and cooperatives to accomplish
that end.

The two agencies are not used to bring an

ideology to the people, but instead are used to bring re-

calcitrants into line.

They are used, though not overtly,

to sustain the rural support that the Government has enjoyed,

Letter of resignation from Louis Benoit to Miss
Eugenia Charles, President of the Freedom Party.
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The agencies will be used
even .ore for this
puroo.6 as
the Roseau constituencies
(urban) have turned down
every
member of the Labor
Government who sought election
to the
Roseau Local Government Board
in 1971.
Of course, there
are other agencies which
can be used more effectively
5

to

ensure

a

victory for Labor

and that is the Constituency

Commission, discussed in Chapter
III.
The party continues to give
the image that it is
open and that it belongs to the
common man, but the ultimate leader of the party has openly
said that his best
friend is Astaphans, the richest man in
Dominica, because
he pays the most taxes.
Indeed, at one time 1958-1956,
the party was open, even though the masses
might have belonged to the party to be entertained. it is
no secret
that the party has always been dominated by
a few, who at

one point were as poor as the ordinary Dominican,

Increas-

ingly, one man asserted himself to the point where
he can

now choose his own successor.

conventions.

The party has had "open"

But these have been for the purpose of pro-

posing new plans and that of praising Mr. Edward LeBlanc
and his cohorts.

now only

special conference can unseat him,"^^

a

31

He has entrenched himself so deeply that
and not a

Based on interview with Edward LeBlanc, Summer

1972.
32

1970, p.

LeBlanc Labor. Party, "Constitution," Dominica,
(Mimeographed.)

3.
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QQrinal„vote at a convention.
convent- r^r^
i

m
To show its openness

and

youthfumess, the party has
attracted so.e young and
educated
people.
as

a

It does not see the
entrance of these individuals

minus factor.

These individuals may have
Joined the
party because it shows no signs
of failing at
the polls,
and as a way of ensuring their
dominance of the political

system.

m

effect, the party rules against
itself by
accepting these elites into its fold,
thus against the
people whom it always wanted to protect.
The changing
nature of the party has not sapped its
strength, because
it has been able to make the people
feel part of the Government.
The Government officials and Ministers
live in their
districts and if they do not, they have a "home"
there,

where they can be seen with "their" people.
The Opposition Party tries to give the image
that
it is open to all,

but it is yet to get this message across.

It is not manned with people who can relate to the
masses.

The elites of the party are mostly old politicians who tried

many times at the polls and were turned back by the people.
Presently, like the L.-bor Party, the Opposition is ruled
by

a

chosen few who are not sufficiently united to effect

any meaningful chance within it.

This lack of cohesion has

manifested itself in many ways both openly and secretly.
One former top executive of the Party has openly disasso-

ciated himself with it.
of time in Dominica.

To him, party politics is

a

waste

Further, according to him, the parties
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have not been responsive
to the peopIe^s
clesires.33 ,,,,,
'"''^ '"'^
^^^^
a-stan.in, ovation at
His party.s convention
in 1972 when he
reported that he was
a Professor of Blac.
studies at an A.eric.n
university.
This only demonstrates
that leaders like hi. are
interested
xn '.open- parties to
satisfy their own inner selves.
The Do.inica Labor Party
has introduced an emphasis
on Dominican culture by
encouraging groups which study

Dominica's past.
dence day with

It celebrates the country^s
semi-indepen-

carnival jump-up, which many
Dominicans
enjoy.
On Dominica's last national day,
the Party published
articles which praised the land with
its heroes.
The Party
a

also invited outside dignitaries
to heighten the importance
of the occasion.
But all these nationalistic drives
run
counter to the keen desire to bind Dominica
in a Caribbean
Federation, without looking closely at the
implication of
that union.
it might well be that the leaders themselves
have not formulated for themselves a Dominican
nationalism.
One observer has written that Dominica is one
of the Caribbean islands which would be the first to give up
its sover-

eignty to join into

a

bigger union.

"^"^

This nationalistic

33

Lecture delivered by Edward Scobie to Dominicans
in Support of Progress (Summer, 1972).
3'^Carleen O'Loughlin, Political and Economic Develop ment of the Leeward and Windward Islands' TlMew Haven: Yale
University Press, 19f8), p. 44.
^
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outbu.st du.ing its .est
recent national day
celebration IS
even .ore surprising when
one considers that the
Government
through its newspaper, saw
the need to explain to
Do.inica
about the superiority of the
Dominican Constitution, -which
is on imperial Order issued
by Her Majesty,
The Queen at

Buckingham Palace on 22nd day of
February 1967.
The
Government must have seen the need
for this explanation
since the editorial stated it was
being done to clear the
confusion, so that the people will know.
This must have
done to lend credence to the Constitution,
which would in
turn attribute added legitimacy to the
Government. For
this reason, the Government could not
emphasize that Dominica's leaders did participate in devising the
Constitution.
The fact that it came from the Queen was more
important.
One would expect that the Government would use the

educational system to effect changes in the political system,
since the most overt attempt to control political socialization has been through education.

The leader of the party

has criticized the Church in its relation to the people and

would probably like to replace the Church with the school
to create a new Dominica.

achieve that end.

But he does not know how to

The Government emphasizes the number of

schools built but rarely take into accounL the quality of
35

p.

2.

Editorial, The Educator

,

September

1,

1971,
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the people who

tu.nea out.

sta«

.his

the. o. the .uality
o. the p.oauct

wUX

^^^^ ^^^^^ ^^^^^
leaders have .ostly heen
self-™ade ™en, which forces
the™
to Play down the
importance of formal education.
They still
believe that high standards
are the .ey to success,
disregarding the type of courses
attempted to achieve the
high
standards.
any event, the amount spent
on education is
totally inadequate (Si. 5 million
or 13.7% of the budget
during 1969),^^

m

The Results of These Efforts

Dominica is still very much affected
by an elite
dominating the lower class elements.
The latter has refused to accept that fact when it
is told so by the more
"radical" elements of the society, the
Black Power men
(see Chapter V).
other words, the Labor Party has shown
itself to be for the lower class, though
on occasion the
Labor Party has tried to compete with
the lower

m

class to

suppress its aspirations.^"^

The Freedom Party is also for

the poor man though somehow the poor cannot
see the benefit.
The youth are left out by both parties because
they do not

know what they want yet, the parties believe.

36

Dominica, The
tion Division 1969 p,
,

37

,

V/e s

t

Indies

,

Annual Report, Educa-

3.

A good example is the Castle Bruce Affair recounted in footnote no. 25.
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Evidently, the Labor

foster

P^r^^.~>^=.c
^arty has

seen no need to

national identity since if
.
u
It IS so
intent
on joining
any federation in the
Carihho;,n
t+L-aridbean.
it
waivers in its pronouncements onn BlarV
PrM-ovblack Power,
and^ on creating a new
Dominica.
But that same party can
condemn the Black Power movement
When the latter criticizes
the Government for wasting
valuable
resources on national day
celebrations (1972 cost
a

about

nOO,000).

State-building is virtually at
as the leader of the Party is
determined

a

stand-still

to keep Dominica

"colony" as long as it is "Iqritishly"
possible, to gain
as much aid from the British treasury.
This is done in
retaliation for thbse "horrible" years when
Britain ruled
with an iron hand, maintains Mr. LeBlanc.
a

If state-building has been consciously
stopped by

refusing to have political independence, one
would expect
that nation-building would proceed at an
accelerated

pace.

This would be to ensure

a

better acceptance of independence,

regardless of whether Dominica would be
independent on its own
or be in a federation with the other islands of the
Caribbean.

But instead, the Labor

Party continues to allow

itself to be drawn into useless debates with the Opposition.
It has allowed the renaming of a street to cause so much

controversy, to the point that it cost the country $16,000"^^
to investigate the resulting damages from the ensuing

This figure was arrived at by this writer from a
response given in the House of Assembly by the Minister of
Finance the amount he quoted was $5,270.19 (BWI), but he

—
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the rur., elements
and

see

u.ban people .eel a

Dcinica.

p.Me

'

in

Hany others have very
.ew. good things to say
about the country and both
parties can accept the credit
for that.
The alienation of the
youth is reflected in
their indictment of the
Government
for not allowing the-

opposition time on the radio
station.
those Who feel part of Dominica

On the other hand,

were not necessarily moti-^

vated by the policies of the Labor

Government, though the

influence of that party must never
be underplayed.
One should not get the impression
that a participant
society is about to dawn in Dominica.
Before 1967 there
were glimpses of such

British .still had

a

a

society, because ^t that time the

tight control of the island, with much

executive power in the Governorship.

Then, the Labour Party

was in the same boat with the people: both
were powerless.
But since 1957, the Leader of the Party
has acquired all the
power of the Governor. The Party has somewhat left
the
people behind, making Dominica a partially integrated
society.
The elites a'e integrated in the sense that they
have many

common interests to preserve.

Those who dominate both par-

ties have agreed to disagree on minor issues such as who

pointed out that this was in addition to the "extensive
repairs to the House of Assembly." The cost was further
increased by the necessity to import an overseas magistrate
to prosecute the wrong-doers.
39

December

"Role of Mass Media Discussed," Dominica Herald
1972, p. 1.

2,

,
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own.

a

puMlc .a..et.

On t.e .o.e i„po.tant
issues o. .edi3t.i..tio„ o. ,nco,„e ena
provision o. .ette. nousin,,
the
elites ag.ee not to talk
In ordo. not to
undc™ine thel.
own positions. .Hey
woula have to give up
one o. the th.ee
or four houses they own
Individually,

Even though the L.bor

Party started to wield
power

socialization process.

The Party has ^ade some
rural elernents feel part of the
nation, but feeling is not
enough.
The party has failed to
recruit the better qualified
people
to execute policies which
can benefit the island. It
has
placed ministers and other cabinet
officials in jobs which
they cannot handle. x-c
.-^^
It IS
is ^-Fr-^iH
afraid hr-.
to recruit
men with new
ideas, with imagination to undertake
the task of nationbuilding.
Every recruitment has followed two
patterns;
either the recruit is of such "low"
quality (educationcommon sense) that he can win an election,
but once he has
won., he cannot handle his
assignment well. Or second, the
recruit is of such "high" quality that he
joins the Barty
to gain something for himself or for his
business. Of
course, the latter understands that he is to
behave himself
and not try to be too uppity, for if he gets out
of hand
he will be dismissed.

Credit must be given to the Leader of the Labor
Party, Mr. E.O. LeBlanc.

At times, he has done some strange

things but he has kept the party together.

He has kept one
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He has allowed so.e
incompetent Ministers to
have their way

Of the people.

His democratic orientation
has detracted
fro. his established
able and honest leadership.
He has
^

been slow to recognize
a crisis and has
refused to ta.e
command of a situation even
though it does not come
directly
under his ministry.^! He is
somewhat arrogant and has
not
involved the Opposition Party
sufficiently in the major
issues Which confront Dominica.
But this mentality
is a

direct result of the training
he and others had under
colonial rule. The colonial Governor
almost never involved
the local politician (at that
time the opposition)
in any

major issues confronting the country.

The Governor had a

job to do and he did it without any
help.

Mr. LeBlanc has

followed this tradition and has been
quoted as saying that
he cannot involve the Opposition
because in the British
tradition, which Dominica follows, Edward
Heath does
not

send Harold Wilson to negotiate issues which
Heath's Government is involved in.

The Labor
ture.

Party has not produced

a

political cul-

The people have not been made to accept the legitimacy
40

The Premier must have been aware of the practice
of a certain Minister who used to spend months in Barbados
on his private business while in the pay of the people.
41

A good example v/as the St. Mary's Academy crisis.
The Premier refused to take over the Ministry of Education
to handle the affair even after the School was closed down.
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Of institutions and elected
officials. They have beco.e
cynical Of elected officials,
referring to the. as stooges
and stand-ins for a leader
who is directed by law
to have

certain amount of elected
officials to maintain the
leadership of the country.
Increasingly, politics in
Dominica has revolved around
confrontations where both the
Labor and the Freedom Parties
propagandize the masses.
The Freedom Party does not have
enough members in the legislature to overturn Government legislation,
thus it takes
a

its disagreements to the streets.

It has legitimized

violence whenever it is the one using it
to achieve its
objective. And of course, in an effort
to show who is the
head of the country, the Lsbor Party quickly
takes on the

challenge since it knows it has the machinery of
both police
and army at its disposal to beat off the
Opposition.

Fortunately and very surprisingly, bloodshed has not
resulted from the constant confrontation as both
parties

try

to either their dominance or capture power.

One might expect that the lack of clear-cut ideology

would lead to

a

pragmatism in politics, which would force

the parties to maintain

a

good record to retain power.

This has not been the case.

The Government has had its

way in virtually all major issues such as massive police

brutality against Black Power elements.

It has been ably

supported by the Opposition Party, the Dominica Freedom
Party, whose basic principles supposedly, are to uphold
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freedom of

e:>cnr^c- o

-;

^e-.

a.o..g

other

3ay.n, tHat the
.our.eois element.
.o„,nate the poor class
It has to be so
because the Preedo.
Party condoneO the
policy of Govprnment-t-^
c+-rnment to
stop
free expression.
Little
v/onder that of -t-i^o
^
the twenty members
of the political
elite
xnterviewed, no less than
eighteen said that the two
party
system in Dominica was
working and that system
was there to
stay.
But as far as this writer
is concerned, the
system
could be better. There
could be more meaningful
communication and cooperation in
a positive way to change
the society
to make the people a
little better off.
since the parties
have Shirked that responsibility,
the Blac. Power Movement
has come on the scene to
perform that task. The role
it
has played in the political
system and its relationship
with other groups, institutions
and people in the Dominican
society form the basis of the
following chapter.
+-,

i.

'
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CHAPTERv
THE BLACK POWER MCVEr4ENT
IN DOMINICA

Introduction
Tbe previous chapter dealt
with the failure of the
party to handle the processes
of state and nation-building.
This was seen to be the case
since the party has been unsuccessful in outlining precisely in
which direction Dominica should be heading. Further, it
has failed to draw on
the available talents to tackle the
critical problem
of

making Dominicans feel a part of Dominica.
Because the party has failed to carry on
the task
of nation-building, the Black Power
Movement has been forced,
according to its own prognosis, to undertake
that task. The
activities of that group are reviewed here because
the group
is the only one which has dared to challenge
the Government.

It has not been too successful at that, but it
has received

more than its share of attention.

It has threatened the

very foundations of the present society.

This threat,

whether real or imaginary, has caused those who "have a
stake" in the system, as the elites like to refer to them-

selves, to scamper for cover.
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The Concept of Black
Power

Black Power is one of those
concepts which has been
discussed for some time now.
it has been defined both
literally and figuratively,
and it takes on a new
meaning
depending on the user's disposition.
That is why there is
still a running debate in the
Caribbean between the more
progressive elements which see its
relevance, and others
who see it as irrelevant. Walter
Rodney of Guyana, the
first exponent of the concept in its
present form,
has

shown its relevance."^
Walter Rodney understands Black Power to
mean three
closely related things: "(i) the break with
imperialism

which is historically white racist;

(ii)

power by the black masses in the islands;

the assumption of
(iii) the cul-

tural reconstruction of the society in the image of
the

Blacks."

But who are the Blacks of the Caribbean?

Rodney

writes in response:
I shall anticipate. . .questions on who are the
blacks in the West Indies. I maintain that it is
the white world which has defined who are blacks if you are not white then you are black.
However,
it is obvious that the West Indian situation is
complicated by factors such as the variety of racial
types and racial mixtures and by the process of
class formation. We have, therefore, to note not
simply what the white world says but also how individuals perceive each other. Nevertheless, we can taik
of the mass of the West Indian population as being
^

No attempt is being made here to inquire into the
concept as it relates to the American context. This is not
to be taken to mean that the two situations are radically
different.

2
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black - either African
or Indian
to have been some
doubts on fhf

Th^r-o ^^^"^^

I

i*

^

ur tne contemporary
scene.

Though somewhat of

militant definition of Black,
no doubt it was precipitated
by the reality of the
situa-^
tion in Jamaica where Rodney
worked.
Jamaica, 76.8% of
the population is Black, but
the 0.8% European element
a

m

has

controlled every pary of Jamaica's
life.^
The second part of the phrase,
Power, is simply put
by Rodney: "The Caribbean is
predominantly a Black nation,
and as such the Blacks have a right
to power commensurate

with their own numbers.

On first reading, his position

seems contradictory to his stance on
"Black."
analysis reveals that he is willing to accept

or White, Who is willing to give

a

But further

anyone. Black

fair share to the people

who, by their hard work, keep the opportunists
afloat.

then cites the Cuban experience where

a

He

white man, Castro,

has brought more benefits to the Blacks than when Batista,
a

Black man, was in power.

Walter Rodney, The Groundings with my Brothers
(London: The Bogle-L Ouverture Publications, 196$), p. 28,
•

3

Ibid., p. 30. Of every 100 Jamaicans (1969), 76.8%
are visibly African, 0.8% European, 1.1% Indian, 0.6% Chinese
91% have African blood, 0.1% Syrian, 14.6 Afro-European and
5.4 other mixtures.
^Ibid.

,

p.

29

)
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"^"^
, ,

-

,

self to gene.ate

Mac. p.iae

—

ic. nave accept.^

a„a dignity.

..ey want the
Peop.e to cease tMn.in,
in te™s o. the.seXves
as a wic.ea
people, whose only
onlv ability
;:ihT
is to cause harm
through Obeah
and Voodoo.
They write:
i

•

-i

hat^rdece?? lelL'usv"^'^"
as people

^

^-^^^

full'ofoot^n4°r^"r"

^'"^^

of
ourselves

land fSll Of po?en??ar?s"'

as a

The Dominican movement
has further clarified its
position in its journal
Flambeau in the following way:
that all Dominicans must reali^o
=

u

At the beginning Black Power
meant a rejection of

everything white.

^

But now the Movement sees
Black Power as

the uplifting of the lower
class
enjoy a decent standard of living,of Dominicans to
free from in!
P"^-'*^.
humiliation,
i^literacr^'^f
Illiteracy,
and shabby housing.^
*

Anyone, of any color, who can help in
this undertaking is
welcomed to join the Movement. But in
spite of the ideological bent of the Movement which approximates
Tanzanian

^Hilroy Thomas,
August

1,
^

1970, p.

Flambeau

,

2.

"A New Look" The Dominica Herald,
'
'

'

October, 1970, p. 11.

7

'Caribbean Rebellion and Social Change: Towards an
Understanding of the Black Power Movement in the Caribbean,"
Toronto, 1972, p. 8.
Mimecgr aohed .
(
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sociaXis.. the Movement
ship position,

win

not accept Whites in
a leader-

.here see.s to he

a

contradiction in this
X. the Movement is
concerned purei, with
ideology
the color ^-L
of vjiic
one s sjcin
cv-Jr, ^.u
should hot;
not- preclude
nrer-i
acquiring a
leadership position.

position.

•

<?

-i

,

•

.

The Movement in Dominica

The Black Power Movement
in its present form was
begun in Jamaica and then
transported to Trinidad. From
there, Dominican university
students brought the idea to
Dominica.
But like all groups which
relied on "outsidesustaining power, it was doomed
to failure.
In addition
to these university students,
there was another, Roosevelt
Douglas, who occasionally gave
S
life to the Movement during
his frequent visits to Dominica.

The Movement in Dominica was officially
organized

during May, 1970.

Previous to that, no attempts were made
to start a movement, though many discussions
were carried
out in public places condemning the disparities
in
the

society.

9

At the beginning,

as it was something new.
a

the Movement was very active

it began with one man at the head,

man who had suffered directly because of the inequalities
Q

He is one of the Dominican students who was tried in
Canada in 1969 for taking part in an alledged smashing of
computers at Sir George Williams University. He was a one
time ideologue of the Movement.
9

During the Summer of 1969, Dr. Bill Riviere held
numerous discussions about Black Power in Dominica.
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and contradictions of
the existing society.
.o constitution
was developed; concrete
and realizable projects
were not
outlined. It had the sweeping
mandate to change the human
relationship in the society.
The group had failed to
realize that the present syster.
was not created overnight
and that it could not be
dismantled overnight. Changing
it
required much more time and
commitment than the group was
willing to allow. The situation
was even compounded by the
fact that there was only one main
organizer while the others
were pursuing more important things
outside of Dominica.

The organization engaged in rhetoric
and had affinity for
the dramatic.
That in itself was good since attention
was
concentrated on it for a time, but it did not
do anything
good with that attention. it even alienated
many
of its

would-be supporters.
But it was during 1970 that the group made its

major contribution for which it is yet to receive the
credit.

Then, the leader of the group, Hilroy Thomas, ap-

proached the National Government to have it support more

fully the three private secondary schools.

Previously these

schools had been partially supported and this caused tuition
to be very high, in contrast to the sole school for boys

which the Government was running.
The Movement reasoned that these schools had
to receive more attention from the Government.

a

right

Even though

they were being run by foreigners, the students were
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Dominican nationals.

Besides, the Gove.n„ent
was unaMe to
provide Places for those
students who chose to
attend
private schools.
For the above reasons
and the fact that it
was an
election year, the Government
agreed to underwrite the
expenses of the three schools.
Thus, as soon as the Heads
Of these schools returned
to the island, Mr. LeBlanc
took
the "initiative., and announced
his Government's intention
to help the private schools.
At first the schools were
not
too happy about the affair.
They were afraid that this
involvement was a back door route
to take complete control
of their schools.
Their fear was justified, considering
that LeBlanc had shown himself not
a friend of the Roman
Catholic Church, the owner of two of the
three schools.
Thus, in an effort to sabotage the move,
the missionaries
at the Catholic schools demanded pay for
themselves which

would greatly increase the cost of maintenance.

demand was very significant.

This last

In the first place, the mis-

sionaries were not interested in the money for
themselves,
but only whether they had enough money to pay
their
lay

teachers

a

reasonable salary.

Secondly, if the Government

was able to pay them, this meant that they were dispensable

since any qualified person could take command of the school.
But apparently the missionaries must have been misled by

members of the Opposition Party that the deal would fall

through if they demanded compensation for their services.
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Both the opposition and
the missionaries we.e
w.ong.
The
overriding variable, the
election year fever, was
not
weighted enough. The
Government was not going to
let this
golden opportunity to slip
away.
it decided to pay the
salaries of every .ember of
the staff, in addition
to a
sum for the upkeep of the
schools. The Government made
the mistake, through its
ineptitude, of not paying every
member of the staff individually,
but gave the authorities
a

grant to pay the staff.

Thus, the Prinicpal of St.
Mary's

Academy, one of the private schools,
could say that the
Government did not pay the salaries
of his teachers.

He

was right and the accompanying letter
with the grant read:
"I am directed to inform you that
Government has decided to
make a Grant available to the secondary
schools.

The Government subsequently acknowledged
the efforts
of the Movement for initiating the move by
sending

a

copy

of the very letter it directed to the Secondary
Schools to
the Movement's leader. With this success, the
Movement

began plans to organize
ciation.

a

Secondary School Teachers Asso-

But two important events pre-empted that fact.

The first was a massive demonstration against

a

Canadian

official who had come to Dominica to see in what ways his

Government could help Dominica.

The Movement did not take

Letter from the Office of The Premier to the
Principals of the four secondary schools of Dominica, dated
29th August, 1970, Ref. No. E and H-300/780/2.
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too kindly to this visit
and carried placards at
the demonstration Which told the mood
of the people: "Investigate
the racist Canadians."
"West Indians are catching hell
in
Canada." "Give Black people a
chance." This was an indication of things to come as the
authorities were caught
unawares. The second major event
was related to
the first;

Hilroy Thomas, the main organizer of
the Movement and himself a teacher at St. Mary's Academy,
was dismissed from
his post.
It was reported that his dismissal
was based on

the grounds that he refused to wear a tie
to work.

But the

real reason seems to be to get back at him
because he had
organized the protest march against the Canadian and
because
his employers were Canadian, even though the Government
paid
his salary.

The Movement tried desperately to gather momentum,
to make an issue of the Hilroy affair.

there was no one to generate support.

It failed because

The only one who

could have helped was the very person in the midst of the
controversy, Hilroy himself.
By 1971, the Movement had split up into no less

than five factions.

They were without leadership as Hilroy

left the island to pursue further studies overseas.

In the

meantime, the others were either employed away from Dominica
or were at school in Jamaica, Trinidad or Barbados.

In 1972,

the Movement tried once again to regroup with the return of
two able leaders.

It moved to change its name from Black
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Power Movement to
Movement for
is to build a better
image in

a

New Dominica.

This move

Dominica.

As this is being
written, there are several
supportive groups in North
America and Canada who
are helping the Dominican
Movement
by way Of sending equipment
and money to it. A
discussion
of the Movement in relaf
4-^
inn
relation to other groups in
the society
will form the ou^jecT:
subiect ot
o-F -t-hci
-f/^tt^
the following
sections.
•

The Movem ent and The Dominican
Press

'

Universally, the press has shown
an affinity to
expose sensational news. in their
efforts to capture the
largest reading public, the press
must extrapolate

the bad

which can command attention.

This is understandable in an

advanced country where the practice has
been in existence
for a long time and where it becomes
hard to break away
from.
Besides, in the developed countries,
like the United
States, making money is the name of the
game.
This
is not

to imply that the same drive for money is
not to be found
in the developing countries, but when it comes
to the press,
there is no need to report the bad to sell papers.
For

example, the same "elites" buy all four newspapers in

Dominica regularly to see what slant each has taken on an
issue.

But in spite of the lack of great competition to

capture the reading public, which is small anyway, the

Dominican Press has gone out of its way to blacklist the
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Black Power Movement.

Thus, the Dominican Chronicle
could
give front page coverage to
the fact that Roosevelt
Douglas.
a Black Power xeaaer,
leader "<-rMnw
could ^,,^4get ^^
five years following his
conviction in Canada in connection
with the February 1969
Sir George William (University)
Computer Centre Affair.
There was no analysis of the
implications or reasons for
the conviction because the paper was
already convinced that
Douglas was quilty.

The Star was happy to report on one
occasion that
Black professors were against Black Studies
since it did
not qualify the recipients of such an education
to become

competitive educationally.

^^^^^ missed the point

as it conveniently left out the real reason why
Black

Studies are so widely condemned among Blacks.

The fact is

that too many Blacks have been put in high positions for

which they were never qualified.

They are the ones who

make the programs so inferior and

a

waste of time.

The

editor of the paper should have reported that it is the
Whites like herself who staff the programs with inferior

men and that the programs could be good.

To show how

destructive this paper can be, it reported with "sadness"
the departure of the white Christian Brothers from the

island.

According to it, the Black Power Movement was

^^Dorainica Chronicle , May

1,

1971, p. 2.

^^The Star, May 10, 1971, p. 4.
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responsible, but ironically,
the editor of the paper
was
the very person who
chastised the white priests
and white
nuns for owning too .uch
property in the island. At
th.t
tin,e the editor felt
that they should leave the
country or
give up some of the real estate
they owned at the time,
in fact. She was against the
white nuns' acquiring a piece
Of public property to provide
greater recreational facilities for the girls on the island.
But now the editor of
the paper saw fit to defend the
very people she once
detested.

The Beginning of the Dialogue
The first attempt to begin a dialogue in
the press
on Black Power was in 1968. At that time
Swinbourne

Lestrade was very disturbed by the fact that
girl was a Carnival Princess of Dominica.

opinion that since Dominica is

a

a

little white

He was of the

black country, all its

representatives should be Black. "^^

Of course, this was a

poor analysis of Black Power, although at that point in
time the leaders were still groping to make their positions

clear on the meaning of the concept.
The second attempt was made in 1969 by Julian

Johnson,

14

13

14

His article contained essentially four points

Dominica Herald

,

April 10, 1968, p. 6.

Based on private conversation.
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which Walter Rodney
ley had
naa ^r^ir^y,-i
articulated^ in Jamaica:
blaclc community must
aim to create
4.

.

a)

the

an awareness of being

black; b; Black people
must be mobilized to act
in their
own interest; c) white
cultural imperialism must be
stopped
d) black rule must be
established in black society, it
took him a long time to get
this published since the topic
was then considered too
explosive. But a year before
that,

in 1968, the four papers were
embroiled with the Government
over the issue of freedom of the
press.
^^^^
paper, The Herald, accepted the
article for publication but
instead published an article by Marie
Davis Pierre "Has
Black Any Meaning in Dominica?"^^ In
this article, Pierre
admonished the young to stop using the beaches
as latrines
and urged Dominicans to stop being
lackadaisical.
She has

since continued to express her opinion freely on
this
topic in just about every issue of the papers. "''^
In the Davis Pierre genre, Androcles of the Freedom

Party called on the police to stop the imported revolutionaries.

The peace of the community, he argued, could

not be allowed to be disturbed by persons "indoctrinated

in undesirable, or at best, irrelevant philosophy (Black

^^

The 1968 Seditious and Undesirable Publications
Act was a move to prevent any and all anti-Government publications.
^^

Dominica Herald, April 15, 1969, p.

2.

^"^It is ironic that such an ardent "exponent" of
Black Power, Davis Pierre, refused to fill out a questionnaire for this writer, which dealt with Black Power.
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Power). 18

I. ,e .new anything
about Black protest, he
would have known that Black
Power is not an import to
the
Caribbean. History has shown
that West Indians have been
forced out of the West Indies
to carry on their protest.
^.

They have been forced out because
the Caribbean is so small
and so poor that a true
revolutionary cannot remain the:;re
and survive.

The authorities can effectively
starve
literally by not giving him a job. And
besides,

hi,
.m

he cannot

become anonymous because the place is
too small.
He is
forced out and returns periodically to let
the authorities
know that he is still around to rouse them
from
their

complacency.

It is this going and coming which drives
the

reactionaries to believe that Caribbean revolutionaries
are imports.

But notice Androcles' quick desire to have

the police enter the contest.

This is the chief ideologue

of no less a party than the Freedom Party.

The Government

seems to be right when it says that freedom has no meaning
in Dominica.

19

In May, 1969, a columnist for the Dominican

Chronicle

,

quite appropriately named Peter Simple, con-

demned Black Power since it was too radical and destructive,
It was his contention that the Movement started in the

18

19

The Star , July

7,

1972, p. 1.

The Educator , July 28, 1971, p.

2.

227

united States and it must be
rejected in Dominica.
simplicity, he stated that most

In his

West Indians do not accept

Black

Peer because

"they know that Whites are
more ad-

vanced than Blacks."

But the main reason for rejecting

the Movement is:
^^^^^^2 ^ie^ its leaders with suspicion
l^tl "i^lt staunch
advocates seem to be people ii?h
T^f^^^v."^^?
little background. . .or of no well-dev
eloped stature
society and thus hav e absolutely nothing
to lose If there was any radical
change in our present socio-economic structure. What
those B.P.
fanatics must realize is that many West Indian
Blacks
Whites, but mostly Browns have worked hard.
.
.to
carve out a future for themselves and children.

m

This was

a

frightened man writing.

mined to preserve the status quo.
to come to his aid.

He was deter-

He was begging people

But more importantly, Simple, himself

a member of the propertied class, saw no contradiction in

the society.

He was not moved to give the lower class ele

ments a better chance in the system.
The 1970 election year-politics-press-Black Power .
By 1970 the press was noticeably changing its attitude

toward the Movement.

Both political parties were trying to

make some gains against each other by using the Movement.
This is somewhat strange as the Movement was not that powerful to hold the balance of power between the two parties.

In October, 1969, the Premier made a speech in his

district and attacked the Church for portraying all its
saints as being white, while the devil was black.
Herald, the Opposition's paper, came out with

a

The

headline
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Which read: '.LeBlanc Ma.es
Blac. Power Speech.-^O .^^^
this accusation did not
produce the desired end,
the
Freedom Party, headed by
Black Power.

Edward Scobie, started to
speak
He began talking about
his problems
as a

black man in white Britain,
and portraying his party
as
sympathetic to the Movement. Once
again, the Opposition
had been drawn into a controversy
with the ruling
party.

This demonstrates that Edward
LeBlanc was able to condition
the Opposition, to take it on
head-on and defeat it.
But
as the 1970 elections approached,
both parties tried to
include the Movement into their respective
parties.
The
Labor Party tried to co-opt it since it
had criticized
the

Freedomites for allowing two "outsiders" to
contest the
general election. At the same time, the Freedomites
thought that the Movement was on its side since it
was
using the same symbol as itself.
The post -election period of 1970 .

The elections

over; 21 both parties returned to character and tried to

undo the Movement.

But 1972 saw the publication of a

series of articles explaining the "real meaning" of the

Movement.

20
21

Of course, the exponents were self-made experts

Dominica Herald

,

April 26, 1969, p. 1.

The Labor Party won seven seats, the Freedom
Party two and Independent numbered one.
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Who did not belong to
the «ove.ent. The
fi.st of the
articles ™ade its appearance
in June 1972. and its
author
ventured .o give "an objective
analysis of Black Power in
Dominica.
To him, Black Power ™eant
that the black .an
had the potential to look
after his own affairs. This
is
confusing; either the black
.an can .anage his affairs
now
but has never been allowed to
do that, or, the black

cannot manage his affairs now, but
in time will be able to
do it.
The writer contended that the
concept had relevance
in Dominica since black Dominicans
do not
control their

economy now.

He concluded, quite characteristically,
that

violence is not the answer since alternative
means can be
used to achieve power.
His analysis is not strong enough.

It does not

touch on the vital issues of discriminating
justice, the
widespread inequalities based solely on one's name
and

place of origin.

It fails to see that meaningful change

will come about only when the political elites can
com-

municate with each other in the interests of the masses.
Things will change when the politicians can keep away from
devious means to stay in power.

But to expect these

changes in Dominica is to expect tomorrow not to come.

There must be massive destruction of person, property, and
all the rest to achieve any meaningful change.

Dominica Chronicle

,

June 17, 1972, p.

The leaders

3.
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are too secure and ably
supported by the business
elements
to give up their life
styles to satisfy the "lazy"
Dominican.
Bur the lazy Dominican
has nothing to lose but
time,
and that he has a lot of.
„o„ long can it lastj He
might
just come in the morning:

Another one of those "objective"
analyses came from
Rupert Sorhaindo, an important
member of the Freedom Party.
He alerted the Movement to the
big problem of "after the
revolution." He lamented the fact
that revolutionaries
concentrated on breaking down existing
systems too much.
They ignored in the process what they
would do after power
was acquired.
Sorhaindo then cited examples of past
instances where failure was inevitable since no
thought
was given to this all important problem.
He is very ambivalent.

He is against the present system and on many

occasions has been highly critical of it, at the same time
he does not understand that nothing short of violence
will

change the existing structure.

In his naivete, he believes

that a simple change of personnel will bring the desired

change in the society.

He fails to realize that Dominican

society had created the men who run it and they will do
anything to keep it as it is.

Thus, the urgency of the

situation and the slim possibility of success negate any
precise planning about the future.
far away in time to consider it.

The future is just too
And besides, the future

will plan itself since the Movement has no blueprint as
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such to hand too the
tne n*=>oni^
people.
made aware and then they
cess.

The people have first
to be
_

m

m

can partake
t^ciLtaice in th.
the planning proHistory has shown that
those who have succeeded
at
•

a genuine revolution
have always been able to
muster their

own resources to lead.

The fact remains, planning
the

revolution and executing it
become more urgent. Besides,
since Sorhaindo has raised
that fundamental point and
Js
shown a commitment to changing
the personnel in the government and not the system, it
behooves him to worry about the
aftermath of the revolution. if he
and others like him are
afraid of the revolution, they should
quickly take over the
reins of Government to demonstrate to
the Black Power Movement that exchange is better than
revolutionary change.
In the final analysis, all four papers
at one time

or another have tried to show that the
Movement is a fraud.
Ihs. Hecfll^

accused its leaders of intellectual dishonesty.

Then it showed that people in Dominica have never
ignored
Black Power. They have tried to analyze it from the

point

of view of black consciousness.

The Chronicle has given

the Movement its share of criticism and although not using

those specific terms, accused it of being dishonest.

The

paper demanded of its leaders that they reveal their true

intentions and present themselves to the electorate.

Dominica Herald , July 29, 1972, p.

5.

Of
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Movement.

At present, the
Movement is not interested
in
party politics. At a
future da.e, it .ay have
to present
itself to the people at
the polls, but this ti™e
is a long
way Off. Since the people
do not sufficiently
understand
the Movement now. When
the people realize that
what the
Movement has been talUnr,
=k„,,4i
talKing about. is true, the
Movement will
be ready for the polls.

Finally, The Educator, the
Governmenfs paper, has
Shown itself to be both
irresponsible and ambivalent. On
one occasion it can carry a story
depicting the achievements
of Blacks in all fields to taunt
the "lazy" Black Power
24
advocate,
while on another occasion it reported
in
an

irresponsible way that

a

white man had kicked a black boy

at a racially tense school.

Probably in an effort to

ingratiate itself with the Black Power elements,
it saw
fit to make headlines with this incident.
Since the Movement was not properly organized at the time,
rioting did

not bjteak out.

Such has been the relationship between the

press and the Black Power Movement, though increasingly
the sole radio station in Dominica has begun to be receptive
to the Movement.

This is because the Movement does not

carry the name of Black Power any more, is better organized,
24

The Educator

^^Ibid.

,

May

,

3,

August 11, 1971, p.
1972, p. 3.

4.
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and has produced so.e
^eaning.ul results over
the past yea. '
The results are assessed
in the conclusion o.
the chapter.

The Move ment and the
Studf^nfc
in Dominica, it is very
difficult to make a distinction between the Black
Power Movement and the
High
school students, especially
those from St. Mary-s Academy,
the leading Catholic school.
To be sure the students have

their own organization but
they are very much part of
the
overall movement. St. Mary's
Academy students have highly
influenced their contemporaries
at the Dominica Grammar
School (public High school) and the
Convent High
School

(Catholic girls school - private),
and have been at the
forefront of the Movement. But the
great majority of
students in Dominica is not involved in
the Movement.
There are various explanations for this:
they are still
very young and are controlled by their parents.
Moreover,
the school authorities together with the
Government have
acted as an effective deterrent against their
"revolutionary"
zeal.
The few who are involved have to be reckoned with
and

cannot be taken too lightly.

The authorities realize that

and have had them under constant surveillance.

But by and

large, the revolutionary drive of students is short-lived.

Once they are faced with the crude reality that they need
jobs to survive, the picture changes drastically.

The

situation is even more critical and urgent for the Dominican
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High school graduate because
jobs get fewer every day.
Protest at the High School level
is not really new
in Dorpinica.
Students before did have their own
form of

protest but they were effectively
dealt with. This new
group of students has only been a
little more vocal and
has established greater contact
with their seniors who have
travelled abroad. The students- now act
as lieutenants to
these revolutionaries who, for one reason
or other, are

unable to remain in Dominica.

The students are a good

stand-in because at the time of service they are
not constrained by the harsh reality of having to support
themselves. Besides, they have enough time to devote to

"revolutionary" work.

They can organize the young unem-

ployed and others to get ready for the rebellion.
By the late 1960

's

and early 1970 's, Dominican High

School students were made aware of the blatant disparities

which existed in the society.

And on a very simple level,

they even began to question their own ascribed status in
the society.

In fact, five of them together with Hilroy

Thomas formed the first organized Black Power Movement in
Dominica. 26

This movement began emphasizing the cultural

aspect of the struggle by insisting on the wearing Afro-

hairdo and dashikis.

Flambeau

,

Then the fashion spread to the student

October, 1970.

»
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population as others fro. the
outside helped in bringing
in the style.
The students began to be
led and misled by
"outsiders... They began to use
slogans, such as
the

"domination by the bourgeosie,"
which they did not understand. They were effectively
propagandized and keyed-up
and then left alone to fight their
own battles with their
superiors at the school and at home. But
after spending
so much energy on useless encounters,
the students could
not point to one significant achievement, though
by then

they were feared.

Their actions were seen simply as rebellious
One erudite observer explained it this way: secondary

education was no longer the preserve of the upper class
and that had brought an integration of youth of different

backgrounds.

He continued,

"There is, in other words, a

unified mind among youth and a breakdown of the old class
barriers nurtured by a system handed down from the old
colonial masters and which most parents.

break away from." 27

.

.are loathe to

Of course, his analysis of the situa-

tion is wrong, as the number of students involved in the

Movement is no more than twenty-five at the most out

possible total of some nine hundred.

a

Of the twenty-five

in the Movement, probably ten really understand and are

Pat Pierre, "Why is Youth Rebelling?" The Dominica
Chronicle , August 5, 1972, p. 7.
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comr^itted to the philosophy
of Black Power,

though at

present, understanding of the
concept is spreading to all
elements of the society.
The Academy affair - the m
oveiDent and the student^. .
The role of the High School
students in the Movement can
best be explained through an analysis
of the Academy affair.
St. Mary's Academy is a secondary
school in the capital of
Dominica with an enrollment of some four
hundred
boys.

In

its present form it was staffed by a group
of missionaries
first from the United States and then from Canada.
Under

the first set of missionaries, the school had grown
in

number of students as it produced good results in the
final examinations which were graded in Britain.

But over

the years, it had been poorly administered as the principal
was changed every three years.

The important point to

remember was that discipline had deteriorated as recent

principals did not live up to the standards of the past.
But the last principal was determined to bring back the

school to normal again by tightening up on discipline.
He had become principal after having spent some time in the

school just as one within the ranks.

shake up the school was ill-timed.
Black Power Movement was taking

a

But his drive to
It was then that the

hold in Dominica, and

that the students began seeing everything white as anti-

black.
At the same school, the Black Power leader had been

dismissed and the students
had not forgotten it.
Pro.
this fateful day on. a
handful of students began
to ask
for a greater say in the
running of the school. At
the
sa^e time, they were having
frequent meetings with .embers
of the Movement on the
outside. Had they not been
sustained by these outside leaders,
they would have gotten
nowhere.
Still, the confrontation with
the school authorit les
could have been handled peacefully.
The students would
have lost but the new principal, who
had made it to the
top through devious means, was to
be stern and inflexible.
He committed a great error by being
drawn into the controversy of the warring political parties.
His allowing the

bourgeois elements to give advice as to the
running of the
school was responsible for his downfall. He
believed that
the Government was behind the students in the
former's

attempts to end the Church supremacy in education.
In its characteristic erratic behavior, the Govern-

ment became involved.

For example, when a group of stu-

dents were turned down by the Principal for

a hearing,

they

brought their complaint directly to the Head of State.
They were right to do this because it was intolerable to
have a secondary school in

a

small country like Dominica

with no supervision from the national Government.

The

Principal of the Academy saw the reception afforded the

students as the Government's intention to interfere in the
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running of the school.

.o doubt the Government
wanted to

get into the act because
LeBlanc had always been
antiCatholic,
secondly, the Principal
had already involved
the Opposition, by using
its leader, Miss Charles,
as
legal counsel to the school.
Knowing the nature of politics in countries like
Dominica, where every politician
wants to be recognized. Miss
Charles was a poor choice.
But her selection as legal advisor
was no surprise as the
Principal had always shown himself to
be a great friend of
the elite. And when this writer
questioned him
on that

matter, he responded that his job was to
take from the
rich to give to the poor. In this writer's
opinion, his

shortcomings were just too many to be made principal
at
that critical time but his superiors in the United

States

appointed him.

Even as an ordinary member of the staff,

he always had his few favorites with whom he communicated.

On becoming Principal, this same pattern was continued which

only lowered his own credibility.

Had he been more tactful,

the events which precipitated the closure of the school

would have been averted.
The organized few .

The crisis at the Academy seemed

to have spurred a few Academy students to form a group they

called Student Movement Against Oppression.

They put out

a two-page mimeo to explain their side of the story as

opposed to the authorities side*

In short, they refuted

the charge that they were determined to destroy the school.
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That would be foolish,
fool i cv.
4-u
they argued, since that
would mean
their own destruction. ^8
Subsequently, they produced two
periodicals.
both they have f.und it
necessary to re^iterate their position; they
say:

m

"Our basic aims are:
'° ^"""^

the"sta?e!..''''

How will they educate the masses.
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)

.

^^^^^

.?

the publication of a youth magazine
organize debates. . .
identifying ourselves with the masses
help the youth in education

On unifying youth they propose:
(a) infiltrate youth organizations. .
,
(b) substitute cooperation for hostile
competition
(c) be a moral example
(d) change values toward manual work
(e) agitate for educational reform29

Quite characteristically, the manifesto ends with

a

number

of quotations of Mao, Forbes Burnham, Prime Minister of

Guyana, probably for the effect of engendering commitment
and enthusiasm.

But the group has not said how it plans

to identify with the masses and how it wanted to achieve

the rest.

Not one of the programs outlined has been given

serious consideration.

Besides, these are not only im-

practical but are full of deceit.

This group has proven

itself unable to live up to expectations.

It is very much

part of the ongoing order, wears Afros to be part of the

Student Speaks , August, 1972, p. 1#
Ibid.
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area,

but looks down on
the rural elements.

number of its students
attending the University
of the
West Indies. Thev
ney are
ar^. like
i.-^^ the ,r.
High School students
in
their '.co..it.ent^. to
change.
They were in the larger
islands When developments
were taking place. When
they
returned to Dominica, they
took it upon themselves
to pass

on the newly seen light
to the masses.
But they lacked
the commitment to immerse
themselves into the people's
struggle because they had too
much to lose. They are the
sons and daughters of the
people who now run the establishment.
Thus, only a few among their
number have been able
to "expose" the inequalities
of Dominican society.
And
even they are suspect.

The university students from Dominica
do not have
an organized group.
They have limited themselves to signing petitions which they do not hope
to stand by.
Their
June 1972 manifesto showed their stand with
the masses.

Among the many things outlined in it, the
individuals
"committed themselves to working only in areas where
they
could benefit the masses." They were also committed
to

fight the bourgeoisie and the Church.

30

"Our Stand with the Masses," The Star, June 30,
1972, p. 5.
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given

a

They are still at the
university; they must be
chance to prove themselves
one way or

the other.
But if their past actions
are an indication of future
behavior, they may as well settle
down and accept their
position in life and forget the
masses,
the past, they
have shown themselves to be very
hypocritical and inept.
They may just provide the editor of
The Herald with enough
examples of intellectual dishonesty. At
the same time, it

m

cannot be expected that all students will
become revolutionaries. It is one thing to be very progressive
while still

at school, but it is another when one is
faced with the

reality of physically immersing oneself into the daily
struggle.

The Movement and the Polity

Attention will now be focussed on the relation of
the Movement with the masses, the bureaucrats and business

elements of the society.

The strange relationship which

exists between these elements and the Movement is not surprising.

Black Power advocates are have-nots with nothing

to lose but to keep frightening the masses and the "haves."

In the process, the Movement has been hurt by many factors.

In the first place, it is not united and has not been able
to expose its ideas clearly.

Such is not possible as

several factions have to be satisfied.

Vaguely, the Move-

ment is for the betterment of all Dominicans.
been carried across too well.

This has not

The Movement is further
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Plagued by the fact that
its leaders do not
trust each
other completely. But
these dangers and
impediments can
be corrected.
T he Movemen t a nd the
bur..,,..,..

bureaucracy is

a

^he Dominican

strange mixture of people,

its composition
and pecularities have been
discussed in Chapters Two and
Three. The bureaucrats,
although very dark in complexion,
are now even more frightened by
the Movement.
They are
afraid that a new idea will penetrate
their heads and are
determined to keep the younger elements
of the society
in

their places.

They will do everything to crush any
per-

ceived enemy.
To test their reaction to the Movement,
they were

asked by this writer, "What does Black Power
stand for in
Dominica?" They were next asked,. "What are the
contributions
of the Movement to the island?

questions were negative.

Responses to the above

They were convinced that the

Movement was hurting Dominica.

Then without being asked,

many of them outlined what Black Power should mean.

But on

31

This leads back to the original definition of
Black Power in Dominica. The Movement does not consider the
elites of the bureaucracy as being Black, since the latter
have not shown their commitment to uplifting the poorer
elementc of the society. The Movement applies the concept
of "Black Skin White Mask" of Franz Fanon to the bureaucrats.
32

This writer is convinced that the two bureaucrats
who gave "favorable" responses to the above questions were
not being honest. They had been members of the Movement,
but when they had learned enough about its activities, they
left it to inform members of the Government about the
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close examination, ^neir
their "shoniH^.,
shoulds" and what the
Movement
stands for are almost
identical. They .oth
spea. about
the uplifting Of the
blac. man by providing
more and better
services. On
n tne
the h;::i<5ic
basis of answers to the
question, "What
does Black Power ™ean in
Don,inica7" the following
could be
discerned fro. the responses
of the forty-five
bureaucrats
,

Figure Vlli

:

The Meaning of Black Power
by forty-five bureaucrats. as Perceived
^^^^er

Favorable
Violence
Ant i -White
Take from White
for Black
No response

Percentage

2

4.4

21

45.0

lo

22.0

lo

22.0

3

g^g

The response, though revealing, is not
surprising.
This is an indication that the great majority of
bureaucrats
do not like the Dominican brand of Black Power while
only a
few were favorably disposed to it. Even this 4.5% favorable

response becomes suspect since the respondents were formerly
part of the Movement. They also knew that this writer was
aware of their previous affiliations, so for this reason,

they felt obligated to give

a

favorable response.

There

were a few who chose not to answer the question on Black

Movement's activities and strategies. This explains why
why in the final analysis, their responses were considered
negative.
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Power since they were
afraid to let
xeu tneir
their tr„.
true ^feelings be
^nown. This demonstrates
that bureaucrats in
developing
areas a.e often pressured
on all sides. They
are constantly
presented with a situation
where their principles are
tested and many times they
give in rather than fight.
Thejtovement and the mass...
The assessment here
is very impressionistic,
though the conclusions drawn
are
fairly accurate. The people
can be divided into two groups,
the urban and the rural. The
rural elements seem to be
more politically conscious than the
urban masses because
the former are more able to see
contradictions in
,

•

society.

The politically conscious in the
rural area can see that
the politicians spend much of their
time in the urban area.
But the rural few who are aware of these
disparities
are

not numerous enough to turn down the
politicians at the
polls.
In spite of their small number, they are
larger

than the few urban people who see the same pressing
problems.
The masses in Dominica are never asked for their

opinion.

It is just assumed that they will accept programs

without questioning them, although the immediate urge in
the people is to become "better."

And to be better in

Dominica means to be like the upper rich class and not to

disturb them.

The masses have become convinced that the

rich had to work hard for what they have got.
see this class as exploiters.

They do not

These naive and simple

people have not felt the squeeze that the Black Power
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advocates are talking about.

very narrow.

The world of the masses is

if they want a good Job
for their children

which they all do, they will seek

member of the upper class.

a

recommendation from a

The person writing the recom-

mendation may not even know the candidate
being referred,
but Dominica still talks about
opportunity

for all on the

basis of merit.

The picture is fairly clear that the

masses of Dominica want to be like the upper
class people
and will always support them.
The following encounter with a man of about forty-

five reveals how the people think.
his position on Black Power.

He was asked to explain

He was very critical of the

Movement and went on to talk about their many senseless
acts.

He could not cite anything good about the Movement.

His position is quite understandable when one considers
his life story.

He had worked all his life in

dollar-a-week job.

a

thirty-

He once lived in a shack and was now

living in his own well-built home.

He recounted his

troubles to this writer and concluded that during the time
of his problems no one ventured to assist him.

He was

even opposed to the idea that it was the duty of the Government to either provide decent jobs to earn enough to build
a home or provide such homes to people like him.

He was

particularly critical of his neighbors because they did not
like him for having uplifted himself.

blaming the wrong people.

But he seems to be
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His neighbors are no
Black Power advocates.
They
are all members of a small
society which is always
enmeshed
in petty jealousies and
bickerings. The neighbors are
equally hostile to the Black
Power Movement.
Besides, the
Movement could not have helped
that man because it did not
have the means. The Movement
cannot even help itself, far
less help others.
By and large, the masses hate
the Movement intensely
because they do not understand it. They
cannot understand
that their miserable lives did not
have to be the way they
are.
They are simple people, with simple
aspirations and
do not want any trouble.
The masses have been placed in a

position of dependence vis-a-vis the wielders of
power in
the society. They do not not want to upset the

situation.

The Move ment, the church and education ,

'^en the

Movement speaks about the Roman Catholic Church, it is

referring to the hierarchy.

it does not include members

of the Church, estimated at 95% in Dominica.

This is a

correct assessment since all decisions in the Church are

taken by the hierarchy, composed of the priests and one
bishop, with a few chosen laymen from the upper class.

In

other words, the Church has lived up to its tradition by
leaving out the laity in decision-making processes.
The Church is closely related to education.

While

the Government administered the colony, the Church ran the

schools.

In fact, in 1836, it started the first secondary
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school and at one point
owned every primary school
building
Today, it runs the only
secondary school for girls,
one of
the two secondary schools
for boys, the largest
and best
primary school in the island,
and two other primary
schools
separate villages. It was
the first to introduce technical and vocational training
and still runs the only

placement service for school
graduates,
addition, it
erected, with outside help, the
first day care centers
and pre-school programs.
All these achievements were made
with little or no help from the
Government.
fact, there

m

m

have been instances where some primary
school teachers have
had to be paid by the Church itself,
although the Government
was committed to pay the salaries.
In the area of social services, the
achievements

of the Church have been equally impressive.

vided training for many in the health field.

It has pro-

Doctors

sponsored by it have spent years in the public hospital.
Nurses from the United States have been brought down by it
to help alleviate the shortage in Dominica.

It has under-

taken to distribute free food provided by outside agencies.
It has provided gainful employment to young girls by es-

tablishing an industrial school to produce rugs and local
shirts.

Through its youth organizations, the Young

Christian Students and Workers, it was able to instill
a sense of responsibility in many young men and women.

These young people now staff the bureaucracy and other
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private organizations
.

Also

through these

organizations
many individuals were
^
;.hi
able^ to receive
scholarships to pursue leadership training

m

courses in r
courseo
^
Canada
and returned tc
Dominica to be of
Of service
^c^r-^r^r-^ to
the people.
Above all, the
Church brought the
Cooperative Credit Union
to Oo.inica.
This union has been
able to .eep Dominica's
money in
Dominica. It has taught
the Dominican that with
a little
help, he is able to help
himself and lead a better
y

life.
Thus, to say that the
Church has not done anything

is to be uncharitable
and irresponsible.

Even the politicians agree that the Church
has helped Dominica.
But
everyone is disturbed, for
different reasons
of course,

about the overemphasis the
Church has laid on damnation.
Edward LeBlanc, no friend of the
Church,
has seen this

emphasis as using the superstitious
tradition in Dominican
society to force the people into
submission.
But why
should the Church want to force that
submission. LeBlanc
and others like him were unable
to give a satisfactory
answer. This writer agrees that the
Church
has always

wanted to force submission but he has been
unable to
discern precisely why this is the case. One
can only guess
that the Church wants submission to assert its
superiority
33

The list of those who got their first professional
push" from the Catholic Young Christian Workers Movement is
impressive. The few named here are representative: Charles
Maynard, Havis Shi 1 1 ingf ord M.C. Doctrove, Gifford Dorval,
Robert St. John, LeRoy Mitchell, Barnett Defoe, Henry John.
,

*
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and to get the job
done very quickly.
Thus, in spite of the
impressive record, the
Dominican Church has not
beco.e a friend of the
people.
It has kept its distance.
This is reflected in the
few
native Dominicans who have
been accepted into its ranks,
though it keeps talking
about the desire to have more
native
priests. one can only sur.ise
that the priests of Dominica
do not consider the native
their egual.
This also holds
true for the priests who man
the rural districts and who
are from 'a different order than
the ones in the urban area.
They look at the natives with contempt.
To them, the
natives cannot measure up to the
desired standard.
For these reasons, the Movement and
the Church
have been at odds. The Movement is
convinced that the

Church cannot act in any fashion other than
in concert with
the elite to maintain the status qu^..
And it is
also true

that the Church has always been

initiator of meaningful change.
it has hardly

is found.

a

follower rather than an

Throughout its history,

ever tampered with the society in which it

It is only in rare cases where it stands to

gain that it has taken

a

controversial stand, and then often

only by the "defrocked" priest who does not represent the

viewpoint of the Church.

Ironically, the Church is one of

those few organizations v/hich has the greatest chance to

forcefully speak out against injustice.
its mission is to do ju-t that.

In the first place,

Secondly, it does not
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depend on any Government for
its livelihood,
its directi ves
co.e fro. Rome and whenever
its priests are expelled,
the
Holy Fatner is prepared to
welcome them. Even the persecuted native priests have on
occasion taken advantage of
this warm abode. Thus, one
might be inclined to agree
with
the Movement that the Church
has Joined the conspiracy
to

stifle the aspirations of the
powerless in Dominica.
comes in an era when the Head of

This

State, E.O. LeBlanc, has

consistently accused the Church of being
the number one
enemy of the people. He has said on
occasion that once the
Church keeps insisting that the "devil
is black and St.

Michael White, it will be difficult for us
(black Dominicans)
to make the sort of progress to show that
we, too, have
a

claim to heaven.

And if that is any consolation, the

heir apparent to LeBlanc's job, Patrick John, has
condemned
the Church for not providing more for the masses since
it

pays no taxes.

35

The Movement has taken the position that arguing

whether God exists or not becomes meaningless
people are stil hungry and homeless.

as

long as

Further, the idea

that Dominica is 95% Catholic does not shed light on the

poor quality of life.

If Christianity can bring about a

better life to the common man, then it becomes relevant.
34

Dominica Herald, April 25, 1959,

p.

1.

^^Interview with Ronald Green in Dominica, January
10, 1973.
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But in

Dcinica the Church

has shown itself to
he so.ewhat
reactionary.
And though on the surface
the politician
and Church see. to be
fighting each other, in
reality the
two are working toward the
sa.e end. They both do
not want
trouble.
instead of .aking earthly
promises as the politicians do, the Church speaks
about the coming after life.
While on earth, the sinner
must pray, the Dominican is
told.
He must suffer now to be
happy later. Does it follow
that
the priests are having their
good life now and will have
their hell later? This question
must be raised since there
is no indication of suffering
on the part of the priests.
They live in the best houses and are
well fed. They have
no daily cares about sustenance since
it is provided for.

Their cares on earth are minimal, at
least on the surface.
The Church has done a lot for the people
but
very

little with them.

it has preached about the unpredictable

after life but has refused to consider seriously
the present which has more than its share of tribulations.
Its

company has been privileged class and in the process has
made that class feel superior to the lower class. With
its emphasis on pomp and pageantry, the Church has been

served by the people and has not served the people.

By its

silence, it condoned the dehumanizing practices of the

upper class against the poor.

It has acquired property

and on a few occasions has forcefully evicted Dominicans

from its premises when they were unable to pay rent.

But
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more tragically, its
shortcomings have heen
brought out in
the open by the poor
quality or personnel who
manned its
posts, on many occasions,
the priests were poor
examples
to the people.
Some too. to drinking,
while other pursued
other activities which were
not in keeping with
their own

principles.

But the greatest harm the
Church committed was
to continue and reinforce
the discrimination begun by

colonialism.

it weakened the people, who
were unable to
"lift themselves up by their
bootstraps .
The people had
no other choice but to feel
inferior, to feel that they

were nothing and will always remain
nothing. This contempt
for the masses can be documented in
many ways, but the

best was the attitude of those priests
who during their
weekly confessional sessions openly chastized

the natives.

The Movement on education-

Every time the subject

of education has been brought up in this study,
the story
has been the same.

It

is in a dismal state.

development is non-existent.

There is hardly

for any course, the teacher is simply handed

directed to teach.

Curriculum
a
a

curriculum
text and

Education for the most part takes the

form of memorization and repetition in order to write an
examination, graded in Britain.

The exact nature of the

system has been treated in Chapter Three.

But it is

interesting to note that in spite of the overwhelming
failure of the system no effort has been made to change it.

Failure here is measured in terms of the number of people
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Who write examinations
and the nu.he. who
are successful.
The following chart shows
the situation in select,
;ed subjects
it needs no further
explanation.

Figure

IX

.

Numbe of Students who Wrote
Number
and Massed
Passed
Selected Subjects.

1966

1967

1968

1969

1970
ij^i re

English
language

99

English
literature

53

Mathematics

50

Physics*

/'Wis

51

88

55 124

40 119

80 120

75 156 103

29

50

27

81

64

67

58

52

22

94

60

23

35

21

91

54

96

59

87

46 100

41

8

4

12

5

10

5

20

None

•

1971

9

22

13

All Males

Source: Dominica The Statistical Division,
Department
Development, Annual Statistical Digest No, 4 of
197_2, Roseau, Dominica.
Table 32.

Change cannot be initiated by Dominica alone since
the Dominica system is part of a broader system which
in-

cludes the entire British Caribbean.

If Dominica were to

change its system completely, there is no guarantee that
other islands would either change or even respect Dominica's
move.

That is something the Movement which has talked about

change, has not fully understood yet.

Change is easy to

talk about; the Movement can even speak about phasing out

secondary education to replace it with technical education.
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These are good ideas
and even desirable
but will hurt
Dominica. The change would
call for a change on
the
regional level.
it would mean that
Dominican students
would not be able to
attend the University of

the West

indies.

in itself this would
not be a bad idea since
that
archaic institution does more
harm than good to the Dominican graduates. it generally
makes him feel superior to

other Dominicans.

But severing relations with
that uni-

versity would entail imposing

a

restriction on the indivi-

dual who may still want to attend
it.

To compound this

issue, Dominica cannot afford
a university of its own.
It
cannot even afford a good secondary
school which could produce "desired" results. Clearly,
should Dominica move to
change the system drastically it will
be at a decisive

disadvantage vis-a-vis the other islands of the
Caribbean.
This change the Movement speaks about must
be regional.

On another level, the Movement's view on
education
is not so radical.

Many of the issues it talks about have

been raised by the politicians before, but they have
have
done nothing about them for obvious reasons. The Movement
is dissatisfied with the expensive nature of education.

This precludes massive education with the rural areas

receiving the least attention.

The peasants, by their

labor, are the ones who sustain education but are forced
to send their children to the main town to get a secondary

education.

Because of the costly nature of this undertaking,
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the great .ajo.lty of
the peasants- children
never finish
high school. The
injustices of the situation
can be de..onstrated by the following
figures. They show the
density
Of population in the
.ain town vis-a-vis three
districts.

Figure

X.

Location

^°st Populous Districts
and Number of
Secondary Schools.

No. of citizens

Roseau
St, Andrew

St. David
St. Patrick

20,114

No.

of secondary school:
4

11,998

None

6,709

None

10,085

None

The Movement has also shown concern
over the content of education generally.
It contends that it
is too

white oriented and almost totally irrelevant,
since the
purpose of education is to build and preserve
a desired
society. Therefore, since Dominican society is
an appendage to white society, it stands to reason that
the content
of education will be geared to maintaining and
preserving

what was introduced.

Further, since education is an import,

it will always reflect the biases of the designer of that

system.

The Movement seems to be too presumptuous on this
point.

It is giving credit where it is clearly not due.

The British gave direction to education but never left

a
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concrete plan.

The present pX.n for
education see.s to
be an oral one.
Those who received fne
plan,
observation
for the .ost part, have
endeavored to continue to
stic. to
it as best as they can
re.e.ber. But when all
is said and
done, the Government does
not see. to have any
definite
Plans for the educational
syste. other than their
perennial
empty assertion that Government
seeks by "an intensive
program. . .to provide free
education. " ^6 Quantity is
the
first priority and not quality,
according to this one

sentence plan.
The desired new look in educ.tinn.

The Movement

wants the people to be made aware
of the usefulness of the
land and move away from unproductive
work in the bureaucracy.
It wants to draw a distinction
between certification
and education.
The certified students must be made
aware

to stop looking down on the peasant.

The new Dominican

must know the history of the struggle of
his black brothers.^'
In dealing with examples to illustrate
a point, efforts
must be made to use relevant examples. For
example,
instead

of having a problem in mathematics which deals with
a train

leaving one point and arriving at another in Britain, it
should be stated, according to the Movement, thus:

36

37

The Ed ucator

,

September 29, 1971, p. 12.

Caribbean Rebellion

,

Dominica, p. 24.
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thirty'^ii: ^rAlTna'Tt '°
^ ^-^-ce of
^''^^
because the roads arl bad
on account of landslides
^t°P
'how T^^'.^
^^""^
take that
bus to reach Roseau. -38''
This is a more meaningful
example, asserts the
Movement. it makes the young
Dominican question everything.
It will make him ask how
is it that the road get
blocked so
easily. it will change his
attitude toward the Government
Which seems to be doing so much,
while in fact only a few
programs have been successfully
completed.
But the most distressing aspect
of the educational

system, according to the Movement, is
the rapid realization
that the British have effectively
conditioned the Dominican
to feel that everything white is superior.

The Movement

states its position succintly: "We are like
dummies being
brainwashed for the ultimate benefit of the white
boy and
preserving the upper class dominance in Dominica.
"

What

is being argued here is the fact that the British
have in-

culcated such high standards which often are irrelevant in
the Dominican context that standards become an end. The
only way out of this situation, asserts the Movement, is

by completely destroying the whole system

Ibid., p. 25

—but

how?
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Conclusion
The Black Power Movement
is not the strongest
interest group vis-a-vis
the political
n.r-^^
political parties
in Dominica.
But it is the only group
which has been able to openly
Challenge the power structure
while all other groups work
together with the Government.
The group is still very
weak since it does not have
a sufficient supply of
able
leaders. This is due to the
fact that anyone who challenges
the existing system has been
forced out of Dominica.
Such
leaders cannot remain becauce they
have to find some means
Of livelihood. The few who
remain have not shown them-

selves "radical" enough to be forced
out yet.
Further,
the Movement has been plagued by the
many splinter groups
which developed as leaders disagreed on
tactics.
Some
leaders believed in giving public lectures
to educate

the

people.

Others felt the era for this was over.

time for action.

it was now

But the major stumbling block to the

Movement is its low membership, which might not be
all bad.
Few members can be more easily controlled and directed.
At the end of 1972, the group had decided to make
a concerted effort to change its image and become more

unified and constructive.

By then, three able leaders

were permanently residing in Dominica; they reorganized
the Movement and changed the name from Black Power to the

Movement for

a

New Dominica.

Secondly, they have established

five task forces to tackle the problems of Dominica.

The

une.plov.ent tas. fo.ce
attempts to fina out who
is unemployed and to pxace the.
in appropriate jobs.
The political education division
tries to inculcate a
sense of Dominican history in the people.

The Co^unication
Co^ittee
tries to bridge the gap
between Roseau, the capital,
and
the rural areas. Two
task forces deal with
publication
and fund raising.
This is a good beginning.

if the dynainism of the

Movement continues .any changes
will result.
will increase its credibility
with the

r^asses.

The Movement
It will

demonstrate that it is not all talk
but can do things with
the people.
But its major problem seems
to be its heavy
emphasis on Roseau

where all task forces are situated.

If the Movement could physically
move away from the major
town, it could obtain better and
faster results. For one
thing, the Government could be caught
more unawares. The

Movement would be working to undermine the
Government
without causing any great stir. That is
precisely why
Government response to these programs has been
favorable.
The Government does not understand the implications
of
political education.

it has never tried and will probably

never try it on its own behalf.
The Movement seems to be on the right track.

And

even though the Government is still amazed at the Movement's

commitment to destroy the present society, the Government
has allowed it to operate.

The Government has allowed
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-

Ha.io station., to

the „ove.ent.

usea to e.p....

,,3,,,„„

But it „ust

e.p.asi.e. again t.at
t.e
Oove.n.ent is no ..iena
o. the Movement an.
aoes not .eaXi,
un.e.stana the implications
o. its actions,
eve.ytnin,
.oes acco..in, to pXan.
t.e Movement could
produce tremendous results at the
expense o. .any other
more powerful
interests in the Dominican
political system.
in the final analysis,
the Movement may be
accused

Of proposing only
incremental change. It would
probably
answer that incremental
changes are only feasible
presently.
It .s only When the
masses of Dominica have
become conscious
that they will ,ise up
and get all that they
deserve. The
people are just not yet ready
for immediate revolution.
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CHAPTER

VI

FEDERATIONS IN THE BRITISH
WEST INDIES
Introduct ion
This case study has
treated Do.inica as a
complete
political system, although
it was emphasized that
the system
was affected by other
political systems. it is
true that
Dominica should be treated
as an entity on to
itself.
But
Since 1932 there has been
a Caribbean regional
feeling
Which has affected its
political system. Thus the
purpose
Of this chapter is to analyze
the two major attempts
at

federation in the West Indies.
The chapter begins with a
brief discussion of the
meaning of federation, and why
territories decide on forming a federation.
it leads to a discussion of
the specific
situation in the British West Indies.
Throughout,
the

Dominican political system is treated
as
a larger entity, the British West
Indies.

a

subsystem of

Definition and Reasons for Federating

A definition and reasons for a federation pose
problems.
It is generally accepted that a federalized

state

is "one in which the several units and their respective

powers are constitutionally or otherwise legally united under
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the ultimate powers
of

a

central state and.
^^^tral
government."^
4-

secession

for any one participating
unit is virtually
out
Of the question.
This is ensure, in
some federations
the fact that the
participating units retain
some power!
Which they can apply to
the same people
regulated by the
federated state. At the
beginning of such unions,
it
could be problematic to
draw with precision the
sphere
Of influence of each unit
vis-a-vis the union. But
with
time, such demarcation
could become clearer. The
balance
between the central unit and
the separate units usually
decides the success or failure
of the union.
But the question is why do
people join in federations? The answer is because
they see more to be had from
that enterprise than remaining
as separate units.
William
Riker argues that federations are
set up because they pro-

vide

a

wonderful opportunity to acquire
territory without

the use of force.

occur to ready

a

He states further that federations

government for some military-diplomatic

threat or opportunity.^
Frank Trager adds that the economic motive
and the

cultural tradition of

a

number of states are driving forces

Trager, ''On Federalism," Wh^ Federations
Fail, ed. by Thomas Franck, (New York: New York University
Press, 1968), p. X
"'"Frank

2

William Riker, Federalism: Origin Operation
Significance (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1964), p.
,

,

5,
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which may foster federation.^
surely, the above is an
incomplete list of the
reasons for the creation
of all federations,

m

fact

each federal attempt has
its own inner dynamics.
AccLdin,
to Wheare, modern
federations have come about
because there
has been
A sense of military
insecuritv ^nH
need for common defence^
a desi?ffn

K^

consequent

But motives are not enough
to explain federalism,
according to Henry Teune.^ The
perception of the means
and the seriousness of the actors
to achieve it also

becomes important.
In relation to federation in the
British West
Indies, the question arises whether
these conditions were

present there.

Keeping the above definition in mind, one

can ask whether the islands were ready for
federation.

Frank Trager, "On Federalism," p. XIV.
4

K.C. Wheare, Federal Government (New York; Oxford

University Press, 1964)

,

p. 54^

^Henry Teune, "The Future of Federalism: Federalism
and Political Integration," Federalism Infinite Variety
in Theory and Practice ed. by Valerie Earle (Itasca, 111.:
F.E. Peacock Publishers, Inc., 1968), p. 214.
;

,
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Federation - a Caribbean
Panacea^
The list Of suggestions,
exhortations and attempts
at getting the British
Caribbean islands into a
union i--S
indeed impressive.
Federation see.s to be second
nature
"e
to the Caribbean, but
that is a very deceiving
assumption.
AS early as 1705, the
Leeward Islands (see map)
were joined
in an association that
did not last. Fifty-eight
years
later, the islands (Dominica,
St. Lucia, St. Vincent)
captured by Britain in the Seven
Years War (1763) were formed
into the Government of Grenada.
By 1830, Tobago, Barbados,
Grenada, St. Vincent and St. Lucia
were under one Governor.
But each unit retained its.
legislature.
The main feature of these
pseudo-federations was
the all powerful Governor who
controlled the units with
an iron fist.
No "deviation" was allowed on the
part of
the local politicians. Thus, the
federal principle affected
only the judiciary, agriculture and
education. It was a

federation of bureaucratic structures.

The federation did

^The data dealing with the several attempts
at Federation
the British VJest Indies were collected from the
following sources: Bernard Marshall, "Attempts at Windward/
Leeward Federation," unpublished paper. Honorable S.S.
Pamphal, West Indian Nationhood Myth Mirage or Mandat e
(Georgetown, Guyana: Ministry of External Affairs, 197l7.
Cheddi Jagan, A West Indian State Pro-Imperialist or Anti Imperialist, (Leytown, Guyana: New Guyana Co. Ltd., 1972).
CM. Maclnnes, "British Caribbean Federation," Developments Towards Self Government in the Caribbean
(The
Hague: W. van Hoeve Ltd., 1955T7 pp. 151-175.

m

.

,

Figure XI.
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The "Little Eight" Islands
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not create a regional
.eeUng ana Britain was not
concerned
With that, but instead,
tried to create yet
another federation wichin the Caribbean
reaion
region.
tho attempt
The
involved
uniting Barbados to St.
Lucia, St. Vincent,
Grenada and
Tobago.
Barbados was the unwilling
partner this
'

time,

it

Objected on the grounds that
federation would mean a step
backwards. The islands with
which it was to unite were
not as politically .'advanced.,
as it was.

Barbados had
always prided itself as little
Britain since it never was
"graced" with Crown Colony Government,
while the other
units were still Crown Colonies.^
Barbados never joined
the union but the remaining islands
of Grenada, St. Vincent,
St. Lucia, and Tobago v/ere
joined together to form one
administrative unit. Thus, in the British
scheme
of things,

there were two distinct federations,
the Leeward and the
Windward,^ existing side by side with little
or no contact
maintained between them. it never occurred to
the British,
or even the islands themselves, that they could
more effi-

ciently use their resources by coming together in
union.

a larger

The federations were weak and artificial.

They were

not spontaneous, but were imposed from the outside.

cannot accept the statement made by Hubert Ranee,

a

One

former

7

J.H. Parry and Phillip M. Sherlock, Short History
of the West Indies (London: McMilland and Co., 1960T~£a|slm.
Q

See map on p. 267 for islands in each group.

268

Governor of Trinidad, that
"it has always been Britain's
policy^to .ake the islands work
together to be a stronger
unit."^ At times, they were
forced to work together because it suited Britain's purposes.
But from the very
beginning the islands have not
looked at each other for
help, and instead have been taught
to imitate

the British.

Each island has learned over the
years to agitate for
"advanced and better" conditions for itself
in isolation
rather than fight for regional advancement.
And Britain
did help this state of affairs since it
always responded
to each island's demands in isolation
rather than
on a

Caribbean level.

Consequently, all attempts at federation

have been seen by the more politically "advanced"
islands
as a burden.

Indeed it had to be a burden since the less

"advanced" islands were not ready in many instances to man
the mechanics of modern sophisticated government which
gave

great responsibility to elected representatives.

Toward the end of the 19th century, the idea of
West Indian federation came to

a

standstill.

responding to the needs of the time.

Britain was

It was busy consoli-

dating the power of the Governors in the separate units.
By then, it was taken as a given that the Governor was

going to institute the machinery of representative

9

Sir Hubert Elwin Ranee, "Towards a Federation of
the British West Indies," The Caribbean Contemporary
Trends ed. by A. Curtis Wilgus (Gainesville University
of Florida Press, 1953), p. 244.
;

,

:

.
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government.

He would later turn
over the administration
Of the units when the
natives were ready.

During the first three
decades of the 20th century,
the spirit Of federation
was revitalized, but two
major
Commissions of Inquiry^O ^^^^
Caribbean during that
time ruled out federation.
They felt that the people were
not ready yet, though no plans
were made to get them ready.
The Commissions were mistaken by
blaming the wrong people
for the lack of enthusiasm for
federation. They should
have said that the politicians did
not want a federation

because they were happy to be rulers in
their own domain.
But by 1945, with nationalism in the
air, the separate
units of the Caribbean together with Britain
embarked on
a venture which was destined to produce
different

results.

The British wanted a British West Indian Federation
more

than the West Indians themselves, to get rid of the ever

increasing administrative cost of the colonies.

On the

other hand, the larger islands of the Caribbean embarked
on a course to get their independence from Britain, not
in association with the smaller units.

West Indian federation as

a

They only used

device to get their own

The Colonial Office, Report by the Honorable E .F.L
Wood on His Visit to the West Indies and British Guiana
Dec. 1921~Feb. 1922 Cmd. 1679" (London: Her najesty's
Stationery Office, 1922 and West Indies R oyal Commission
(1938-9) Report Cmd . 6607 (London: Her Majesty's Stationery
Office, 1945)
,

,

^

.

,
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independr*"'-lence.

The Modern Era of West
Indian Federation

Different writers give
different beginnings to
the
modern drive for Caribbean
regional unity. This writer
Chooses to .arlc the starting
point as 1932 because then
the
first genuine move undertaken
by West Indians to show
their
desire for a political union
in the region occurred.
After
this ^ove, it will be shown
that it was all .'downhilln
as

the British undertook to
fashion West Indian unity in its
own way. And every time the
British tried, the Caribbean
was unable to provide the
leadership to counteract unwanted
British influence. The leaders
simply became followers
with little imagination or ingenuity.
""^^

Indies

serious Attempt at Federating the British
Wp.^

The 1932 Dominica conference .

The 1932 conference

was called by Cecil A. Rawle of Dominica
in response to
British move in the same year to impose a
federation on

a

During this London Conference, Jamaica took time
to talk with Britain about its own constitutional
advancement. During the second attempt Barbados showed the
same
ambivalence by pushing for West Indian unity and at the
same time was looking after its own constitutional advancement.
See Michael Hewitt, "The Tragedy of Sherbourne
Advocate, April 9, 1965, p. 3. Hewitt wrote: "I cannot
understand his (Barbados leader Errol Barrow) simultaneous
occupation with the federal efforts, his summit meetings
and his insistence on independence for Barbados."
4.

4-

-.1
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west Indians.

The West Indian leaders
viewed this move
with suspicion.^2 ^^^^ ^^^^
^^^^^^^ ^^^^ ^^^^^^^
wanted the credit for getting
the islands federated,
secondly, the type of federation
Britain wanted to impose
was a reactionary one since
federation at that time would
not bring with it political
independence.
Britain wanted
only unity to save money. To the
West Indian leaders,
this federation was a step backwards.

The conference was timely, but was
not well planned
and was poorly run as a result.
In the first place,
the

delegates found it necessary to show their
allegiance to
the Crown, thus dampening the "revolutionary"

zeal of the

conferees.

Secondly, not all the islands sent delegates.

Some were in Britain asking for more advanced
constitutions

for their separate units.

Lastly, the participants could

not agree on the type of federation they wanted.

Some

wanted a federation even though it did not guarantee im-

mediate independence.

The Trinidad delegate, Arthur

Cipriani, wanted a federation only if independence was

guaranteed immediately."'-'^

In rerrospect, it is easy to

see that this disagreement was unnecessary and puerile.

I

2

F.A. Hoyos, The Road to Responsible Government
(Barbados: Letchworth Press Ltd., N.D.), p. 58.
13
Roy Augier and Shirley Gordon, eds.. Sources of
West Indian History (London; Longmans, Green and Co. Ltd.,
TWel), p. 288.
14

Hoyos, Responsible Government

,

p.

5

9.

Of course, this is
because the delegates who
attended were
not the best educated
ones of the area. They
could not see
that having a federation
was far more important
than
Whether it was politically
dependent or independent.
Had
they been able to achieve
a partial unity first,
then they
would have been able to
press for independence. Their
lack
Of leadership was reflected
in the fact that the idea
of
West Indian unity was dropped
from that tir.e onwards. The
British revived the idea of West
Indian unity in 1947,
although in 1945 they released
a report which had ruled
out the readiness of the Caribbean
for federation.

The 1947 Monteqo Ba y conference .

The British

generally regard this conference as the
first serious attempt to discuss West Indian unity. The
seeds of this

conference were planted in 1947 when

dispatch was sent

a

out by the Secretary of State for the Colonies,
urging
West Indian leaders to meet to discuss their future. "'^
Thus, in February 1947, the British Government
invited
the West Indian leaders to Monteqo Bay

cuss Caribbean regional unity.

,

Jamaica, to dis-

One would have expected

the West Indians to invite the British as observers.

The

British did not only do the inviting, they even chaired the

15

Douglas A. Anglin, "The Political Development of
the West Indies," The West Indie s Federation , ed. by David
Lowenthal (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961), p. 40,
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..eeting.

Reports circulated that some
West Indians had
pushed to have the meeting take
place in London rather th an
the Caribbean because they
all wanted the meeting held
in
their islands.

The conference went very smoothly
and passed several resolutions. The significant
commissions, chaired
by Englishmen, were the Regional
Economic Committee,
to

estimate the economic needs of the separate
units, and
the Standing Close Association Committee,
appointed to

draw up

a

preliminary federal constitution."^^

Lloyd

Braithwaite described its meeting optimistically.

wrote that "hopes ran high.

.

He

.and so general was the

agreement that actual federation was imminent . "-^"^
The hopes were surely premature in spite of the
fact that a spirit of compromise, alien to West Indian

politicians, reigned at the meeting.

Alexander Bustamante,

representing Jamaica, was the only one to indict the
British for lack of concern for the islands. '"^

But before

the meeting ended, Bustamante seconded a resolution for

creating

a

federation.

He went on to remark that he was

aware of the many difficult days ahead, but there was no

Sir John Mordecai, The VJest Indies The Federal
Negotiations (London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1968),
;

p.

37.

17

Lloyd Braithwaite, "Progress Toward Federation,
1938-1956," Social and Economic Studies (1957), p. 146.
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Gordon K. Lewis, The Growth of the Modern West
Indies (London: MacGibbon and Kee, 1968T, p. 355.
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proble. Since they could
be surmounted.
The meeting had
indeed proceeded so well
that Morley Ayearst could
write in
I960 that it was a
"valuable training ground for
federal
politics.',
one wonders about the
sincerity of this statement, but Ayearst continued:
"it helped the island politicians to become better acquainted
and accustomed
to the

problems" of the area. ^0

meeting?

What was so magical about this

No substantial resolutions were
drawn up.

The

delegates simply agreed to meet again
sometime in 1953 to
discuss a proposed federal constitution,
which was hoped
would have been available by then.
The Hubert Ranee Re port and the 195 3
London Con -

ference .

The 1953 conference was convened to discuss
the

federal scheme outlined by Commissioner Hubert
Ranee, an
Englishman and the then Governor of Trinidad and Tobago.
His work on the federal scheme covered the years
1948-1950,

during which he travelled the entire British Caribbean
to gather people's feelings about

stitution.

a

proposed federal con-

Many of the pro-federation leaders of the

Caribbean were part of the Ranee Commission, but not

a

single member came from Jamaica, the largest of the units
of the future federation.

Jamaican pro-f ederationist

Apparently, Norman Manley, the
,

could not have been included

19

Proceedings of the Monteqo Bay Conference Col .
(London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1960), p. 230.
,

No.
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:
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Since at that time he was

a

member of the Caribbean Or-

ganization. ^1

The same applied to Eric Williams,
who had
not yet shown a desire to enter
Trinidad electoral politics.
But the predominance of the
pro-f eder ationists on
the Commission leads one to suspect
that Britain wanted
to release the Caribbean islands at
all cost.
Further to
cut down on too much bickering which would
probably have
hastened the destruction of the federal idea,
all key personnel in the preparatory stage were British. This
could

have had two results and in both instances, the British

would have reached the objective; to be relieved of the

burdens of the Caribbean administration.

The predominance

of the British could have spurred the West Indians to a

nationalistic drive, making them break away from British
tutelage much faster.

This did not happen because colon-

ialism in the British Caribbean has not made the leaders

develop a regional spirit to strengthen their positions.
The British have allowed each territorial unit, through its
leader, to be strong as an individual, precluding the need
to join forces to become powerful.

The second effect, the

predominance of the British could have had, was to make
sure everything went right.

21

Evidently the expected results

This was an organization jointly established by
the British and the United States after the Second World
War to oversee their operations in the Caribbean. For an
account of its activities see: Herbert Corkran, Jr., Pat terns of International Cooperation in the Caribbean 19421969 (Dallas: Southern Methodist University Press, 1970).
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were not realized.

Britain was satisfied to get
rid of
some of its Obligations: both
Jamaica and Trinidad became
independent nations.

The more salient recommendations
of the Ranee
Report^^ were the following^ a
Federal Parliament would
consist of an elected Assembly and
an appointed Senate.
The latter was to be very weak but
could delay money bills
passed by the Assembly for three months.
The Governor had
tremendous power. He would appoint a Council
of State
consisting of six persons. In addition he would
appoint
seven Ministers with the advice of the Prime
Minister.

The Report also allowed each island of the federation to retain all its powers unless each one agreed
to
give them up. The Committee prepared two areas; one,
where

either the Federal Government or the units had exclusive
control, and one where the two bodies could share control.

The "concurrent" area, where both had power, but with the

Federal Government superseding in case of conflict, were
trade, commerce, development of industries, and movement
of persons.

This Committe made three major blunders.

First,

it did not allow the islands to be represented in one of

the bodies of the federal legislature, on the basis of

population, as is done in all successful federations.

22

The

Report British Caribbea n Standing Closer Asso ciation Committee 1948-49 (Barbados; Advocate Company, Ltd.,
,

1949)
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committee, reflecting the British
desire to prevent Jamaica
from dominating the federation,
ruled against the "one man,
one vote" principle for at lea.^t
the Assembly. Thus, on
the basis of some mathematical formula
which was never explained, Jamaica was to receive 16
seats, though it would
pay 40% of the upkeep of the federal structure.
Trinidad
was to have 9 seats, paying 38% of the
federal budget,
Barbados

4,

British Guiana 6.

All the other units had two

seats with the exception of Montserrat which receive
one.
The House was to be made up of 50 representatives.

The second major blunder was the Committee's nega-

tive reaction to dual membership in unit and federal legislatures.

The Committee was not far-sighted enough to

realize that the uncertainty of federal politics would have

inevitably kept "able" men on the islands.

Dual membership

could have forced the holder to relinquish one of the two
as the federation became stronger and the work became too

much.

Lastly, the Committee, without being asked by the

island leaders, recommended that Trinidad be the federal

capital site.

Subsequently, the Caribbean leaders asked

an Englishman to make that decision for them but, at that

point in time, this opinion was not sought.

In West Indian

parlance, the committee was too "fast" (too uppity).
By and large, this report was reactionary.

It

reflected the British view of what the Caribbean federation
should be.

That was no tragedy.

The lack of commitment
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the report showed for
i..ediate independence should
never
have been seen as a
stumbling block to federation.
fact, a golden opportunity
was presenting itself to
the
West Indian leaders to
reject the report and write
one for

m

themselves.

They did not have to rely
on the British for
a constitution by which
they were
be
to

ruled.

On the

other hand, it can be
hypothesized, the islands of Jamaica
and Trinidad used the federal
negotiations as a way to buy
time.
They did not reject totally
the federal scheme but
at the same time did not
accept it. They kept it floating
to achieve their own ends and
in the process used the

smaller units like Dominica to hide
their own selfish
motives, that of achieving their own
independence.
The 195 3 London conference .
It was at

the 1953

London conference that the Hubert Ranee
Report was discussed. The Caribbean leaders must have been
overjoyed
with the location of the meeting since they had
always

preferred to discuss their future outside the Caribbean.
Lloyd Braithwaite wrote of the politicians attending the
meeting that they came not as statesmen to discuss substantive issues, 23 to demand of Britain what type of

federation they

wanted, but came shouting slogans.

paper, the conferees "solved" many problems.

On

They accepted

Lloyd Braithwaite, "Federation," p. 153.
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the holding of dual office
in the unit and federal
legislatures, in effect rejecting
Ranee's suggestion to the
contrary. The federal govern.en'.
was given the power tcraise revenue through taxes.
It was decided that an,end™ents to the federal constitutions
should not be made until
five years after the federation
was established.
Then a

constitutional convention was to be
held to consider
revisions.
The report of the 1953 conference^^
was presented
to the unit legislatures.
it did not cause much stir in
the area probably because the Caribbean
was engaged in more
important matters. in the first place, the
people were
busy celebrating the coronation of Queen
Elizabeth II.
Secondly, the smaller units like Dominica were
only getting
used to the idea of being able to vote in their
representatives.

Thirdly, the economic situation in the small units

was difficult enough to devote attention to something the

leaders themselves did not even understand.

For example,

it was more important to tend to the nascent banana in-

dustry which was going to become more important than to
waste time on federation, a nebulous idea, at best.
The 1953 meeting solved nothing.

Like the 1947

conference resolutions were passed and more committees

24

Plan for a British Federation of the West Indi es
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appointed to solve problems at

a

later date.

One such

committee was to see into the feasibility
of allowing
citizens of the federation to mo /e
freely within the territorial units.
Between 195 3 and 1956, no effort was made
to get
the people better acquainted with the
federal idea. The
partners to the federation still believed that
small

meetings could solve all major problems, of course
neglect
ing to take into account that the leaders had
never shown
a

desire to solve the immediate problems such as communi-

cating with each other.
Hearing

a

federation - 1956 London conference .

At

the London conference of 1956, the Secretary of State for
the Colonies made two major statements at its opening.

He

insisted that no one island would be allowed to become

independent in isolation.

Secondly, aid would continue

after the federation was established.

It was this last

factor which made the British insist on giving the British

born Governor final power in financial matters.

The

Colonial Office wanted close supervision of the British
taxpayers' money.

But there were major issues which were

never satisfactorily settled in the opinion of those who

raised them.

Britain did not envisage immediate indepen-

dence because a grant-aided territory could not be an
independent territory.

Jamaica saw the issue differently.

It insisted on immediate independence probably because
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Britain had given the instruction,
for the first ti.e, of
not allowing any one unit
to go it alone.
Secondly, Jamaica b.lked at the idea of
having an elected

Senate but
did not want the Governor
to have the power to
appoint it.
Rather, Jamaica felt the Prime
Minister should have the
power to appoint the Senate. Thirdly,
Jamaica did not
like the power the federal government
was to wiela in
dealing with customs. It felt that its
own industries
would be hurt if its products were made
available indiscriminantly to the other islands. Of course,
most of that
fear was based on intuitive feeling rather
than facts. As
a consequence, a committee was appointed
to study the customs issue. The 1956 meeting also rejected
Trinidad
as

the capital site; a committee, composed entirely
of

British members, was appointed to suggest another site.
At the close of the 1956 meeting, it was decided to meet

the following year to make plans to launch the federation
in 1958.

The 1957 federal conference .

The 1957 meeting

was the last conference before the federation was launched.

Reportedly

the West Indian leaders met under tension.

They had received the Site Committee report which had cited
Trinidad as an unlikely place for the capital because of
the unpredictable nature of its politics.
25

The Site

Report of the British Caribbean Federal Capital
Commission Col . No . 328 (London: Her Majesty's Stationery
Office, 1956).
,
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committee felt that the
racial troubles of Trinidad
were
too intense to burden
the political syste. with
an additional superstructure, the
machinery of federation.
Further, the British had
already announced that a Briton
was going to be Chief
Justice of the West Indian
Supreme
Court.
Braithwaite wrote later that it
had been confidently expected that a local
would have been made the
Chief Justice.
This writer cannot agree with
this statement since
from the very beginning the West
Indian leaders had shown
a lack of trust in one another.
Each unit guarded against
what it already had and refused to
share with the less fortunate islands. Thus, the British
appointment could have
been welcomed. The British Government
was just not playing
favorites and under these conditions was right
in appointing
an outsider.
This writer is more than convinced
that the

way these leaders were behaving indicated that even
placing
the West Indian federal capital outside the West
Indies
would have been more acceptable than having it in the
Caribbean. So why could they not do with a British Chief

Justice?

They had always revered everything British.

This

last act was merely in keeping with their own desires and

behavior patterns.

Braithwaite, "Federation," p. 162.
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Federation created.

Although the major

i:
-ssues

Which were absolutely essential
to .a.e a viable federation
were net yet resolved, the
British Parliament made the
west Indies Federation a reality
-

in 1958.

Perhaps the

British thought that the problems
would somehow disappear
with the arrival of this -long
awaited day." One often
wonders, who was really waiting
for this day, the British
or the West Indians, though
the first Prime Minister,
Grantly Adams, was quoted as saying
that "we cannot wait
any longer, we might not have another
chance. "^"^ Be
that

as it may,

Princess Margaret declared the federal
legis-

lature open in June 1958.

To substitute for any real ex-

citement which could have generated

a full

commitment to

federation, the islands made large sums, which they
could
ill-afford, available to send entertainers to Trinidad

for

this opening of parliament.

The West Indies was not an independent state,
though.

In reality, it was a joining of all the colonies

into one to make for more efficient administration.

This

interim period before full independence was also meant to

solve the other pressing divisive problems of the union.
But as it turned out, between 1958 and 1962, when inde-

pendence was to be worked at, the leaders at the federal
level began to disagree openly with those at the unit level.

Quoted in Gordon Lewis, Modern West Indies, p. 384.
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They adopted what Arthur
Lewis has called
Shouting at each other to

.-open diplomacy,-.

show their strengths.

Finally
Jamaica felt prepared to go
it ^lone and Britain was
not
about to stop it.
in 1961, after it had
singlehandedly
rewritten the federal constitution
to reflect

its desires,

it decided to withdraw
from the Federation to become
an

independent state.

Trinidad followed in the footsteps
of

Jamaica and became an independent
state in August 1962.
Federating th.

l^L-!^bf

R.^'

M sh

IVest

IndiP.

The First West Indian Federation ended
when

Jamaica and Trinidad decided to leave the
union.
everything else which went before, an act
from

But like

Britain was

required to dissolve the federation.

The leaders of the

remaining Little Eight were not dismayed and may
even have
been overjoyed with the defections of the larger
units.

They moved quickly to begin

a

new federation.

Their en-

thusiasm for the federal idea was great, but this time
Britain was to stop them.

In effect, Britain was warning

them that it was not going to allow another failure.

Apparently the leaders were not intimidated by
Britain's dealying tactics and at
Barbados, in 1961

,

a

meeting held in

they pressed the British to consider the

new federation as created on the very day the first one
ended.

It was also at this meeting that the second attempt

at federation began to fail even before it came into being.

285

The leaders learned that
"considerable economic aid was
going to be needed... ^8
This meant immediate
independence
was again out of the
question.
fact, two things were
coming out in the open which
went against the grain of the
desired unity to achieve statehood.
The first was that
the British were unwilling
to provide the necessary funds
to prevent overburdening
the more prosperous islands with
financing the federation. The second
was a denial of
immediate independence for the federation.
Both became

m

unacceptable to the West Indian leaders.
Between February 26 and March

3,

1962, the leaders

of the Little Eight met with Sir
Arthur Lewis to hammer
out plans for a new federation.
After the meeting, spirits
ran high and it is interesting to note what
Dominica's

chief of state, Edward LeBlanc, had to say on that
occasion.
It was his opinion that the new federation "would
preserve

democracy in the area."

He insisted that there was no

reason why the present leaders could not formulate an
acceptable plan of which this generation would be proud.
Evidently, LeBlanc was not too impressed with the way

Jamaica had handled the other units during the first federal
attempt.

He must have felt that the remaining units could

negotiate as equals to achieve their objective and not be
28
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dominated by an unyielding
chauvinist power.
The leaders met again in May
1962

to frame a new

constitution for themselves.

Tho meeting used the Arthur

Lewis suggestions^^ submitted
to them, and two other suggestions dealing with specific issues
of federation sent
out by the British Colonial Office.
It was at this
meeting that the Eastern Caribbean
leaders officially
adopted the motion that the new federation
would come into
being the day the old one died. Up to
that
point, the

British Government had not been party to this
new venture,
but the West Indian leaders found it necessary
to include
it in order to receive added revenue to balance
the pro-

posed federal budget.

This invitation to London took the

shape of the leaders sending

a

report of their meetings

to Britain, asking the latter for its approval.

was negative to the idea of

a

new federation.

suggested that the proposed federation be

a

Britain
It further

stronger one.

But the greatest blow to this new drive at regional unity

was the message passed on to the unit leaders that "the

British Government.

,

.was unlikely to assist the West

Arthur Lewis, Proposals for an Eastern Caribbea n
Federarion Compromising the Territories of Antigua, Bar bados Dominica Grenada Montserrat St. Kit rs - Nevis Anquilla St . Lucia and St. Vincent (Port of Spain:
Government of the West Indies^ 1962) . The specific suggestions are contained in Appendix A.
,

,

,

,

,
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indies

Little Eight

on a greater scale than has
so far
been envisaged." The British
advised that aid would have
to be sought elsewhere.

Instead of allowing
a

a

White Paper32 ^^^^.^^ ^.^^

new federation to take effect,
^^^^

tion was published by the British.

^^^^

fe<ier^^

It was intended to

make the people better acquainted with
the idea of federation.

This was ill-timed, to say the least,
for the British

were merely delaying the new federation.

The British used

the idea of educating the people on federation
as an excuse
to postpone its commitment of a continuous
subsidy for the

new federation.

in the first place, the people were never

considered before.

They had nothing to do with the col-

lapse of the first federation.

And, most certainly, the

publication of this paper was not going to make any difference in conditioning their attitude to the federal idea.
What occurred in Dominica was fairly typical.

Only a few people were informed about federation,

"^^

and as

late as 1965 when the federal idea was all but buried, the

"Dispatch from the Colonial Office of August 9,
1963 to Caribbean Leaders" Regional Council of Ministers,
Draft Federal Scheme, As Amended at Ninrh Meeting (October,
1964), p. 33.
32

Report of the East Caribbean Federation Conference ,
1962 Cmd . 1946 (London; Her Majesty's Stationery Office,
1964).
33

1963, p.

Letter in The Dominica Chronicle

2.

,

November

3,
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Barbados Advocate
was
CIO still asv-inrr
_
^
asjcmg the leaders
to let the
public know about federation.
And even a year before
that (1964) The Dominica
Chronicle editorialized:
Although we have to rely entirely
on news from
^^^^
generaUy
'^'"^
aareed'th'r'?'* '""^
Federation
^
are well
Sced!^
-i-v,

i

The second paragraph read:
f^q^^ttabl e to have to rpn ^.^ that our sources
entirely:!'^iiuxrj.ciai.
7^ far ast
unofficial
. As
.
nr^ r^,,Ki-!^
no
public and authoritative statement we are aware,
has been mad4
or document published to acquaint
the electorate

discussL^!?5''°"^
V/hat

'^^^^

is being argued here is that,

although it was

good idea to inform the masses on federation,
nothing of
the kind occurred.
Had genuine consultation of the people
taken place, one of two things would have happened.
Either
the people would have asked to be let out of
this controa

versy or they would have decided not to have the type
of
federation that was envisaged. On a very impressionistic
level, this writer suspects that they would have opted for
the first.

The people of the Caribbean have never been

consulted on the simplest things which impinge on their
lives, far less to be asked to decide on federation, some-

thing they barely understood.

David Smithers supports

this theory for he wrote that dfter his travels through

34

"Federation: Open Debate in Public," Barbados
Advoca te May 29, 1965, p. 4.
35

"Federation," The Dominica Chronicle

1964, p. 3.

,

December 16,
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the units in 1965, he found
that the people generally
were apathetic to the idea
of federation.
It must be noted that
even prior to the British
n,ove to

stop the federation, the
leaders had surmounted
the major difficulty, each
territory contributing to the
union according to its ability,
which alledgedly destroyed
the first attempt.
The leaders had already decided to
have
a stronger government than the
previously proposed
one.

The new federal government would have
had the power to tax
at all levels..
In short, the new federation was already
acquiring what the first did not have, an
independent

constituency.

On the surface at least, the leaders were

showing signs of desiring

a

federation.

This commitment

must not have been too great because as soon as the British
'

refused to guarantee the recommended $215 million^*^ over
five year period, the Federal idea began to wane.

a

Arthur

Lewis did not quite see the situation in the same light.
He did not blame the leaders but chastized the British for

not allowing thr West Indian leaders to have what they
v;anted,

a new

federation.

38
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David Smithers, "Federation of the Seven is Dead,"
Barbados Advocate April 1, 1965, p. 4.
,
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The events of 1963 and

IQf^d.

The Little Eight was

reduced to Little Seven in 1962
when Grenada showed
desire to join Trinidad as a unitary
state.

a

Several re--

gional meetings were held during
1963, and during each one
the politicians continued to destroy
West Indian unity.
Their reliance on Britain had driven
them to give up federa
ticn since they thought they could not
afford federation
on their own.
But there were other events which led
to the demise

of the yet to be established federation.

A new government

came to power in St. Lucia in 1964 which meant that

a

new

leader was now at the federal level representing the
island
This new leader,

John

Compton, found it necessary to

make new demands on the proposed federation.

Thus, issues

such as the taxing power of the federal government, which

were thought to have been solved, were brought up again
for further discussion.

necessary to initiate

a

In addition, Compton found it

rivalry between St. Lucia, Dominica

and St. Vincent against Barbados.

39

Compton 's reservations

about the federal scheme were followed by those of Vere
Bird of Antigua.

The latter was of the opinion that the

federal government should not appropriate any power which
was formerly exercised by the territorial governments

unless the latter chose to relinquish those powers.

^^St. Clair Daniel, "St. Lucia Tough on Federal
Plan," Barbados Advocate November 1, 1964.
^•^Appendix II to Draft Federal Scheme "Reservations
to Draft Federal Scheme," Barbados, 1964, p. 2.
,
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Later, Dominica objected
through its chief, LeBlanc,
to the
power Of taxation given the
federal government.
He was of
the opinion that banana
producing countries like Dominica
would be most hurt by it.^^
He was only showing the true
nature of all Caribbean politicians,
that they are unable
to see beyond the shores of
their territories. They have
been unable to see a regional
gain at the expense
of the

individual territories.

Every individual leader began to

object to some part of the very constitution
they had
jointly devised and even accepted.
Quite obviously, many of these objections
were

puerile and untenable.

For example, Vere Bird of Antiqua

worried at one time that the federal government might
acquire the power to direct industries in the region.
This

to him meant that Antigua's "industrialization" drive
would

have been halted since it had more industries than some of
the other territories.

Of course, the possibility of

this occurring was high but Antiqua was sure to benefit
if this was made

a

fact.

Antigua was in such bad shape

economically that Britain had to give it money to salvage
its sugar industry. 42

'^•'•

Ibid .,
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David Smithers, "Case of the Irksome Crumb,"
Barbados Advocate April 15, 1965, p. 7. The fact was
that Antigua was operating its sugar factories very inefficiently, producing 125,000 tons of sugar in factories with
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With these internal fights,
the Eastern Caribbean
federation was never created,
though it would have had
a
better chance for survival
than its i..ediate predecessor.
It is now generally accepted
that the second attempt
was a

fiasco because Britain refused
to guarantee long term
finance for the scheme. It is more
correct to assert that
it failed because the leaders
were not committed to West
Indian federation. Barbados has
since gone it alone, receiving no aid to sustain its independence.
Likewise all
the remaining territories have achieved
some form of independence without a great amount of money aid
from
Britain.

The Failure of Federation
The reasons for the failure of the first
federa-

tion are indeed many.

weak federal structure.

Some observers have emphasized the

Others have written about the in-

ability of the islands to handle the representation crisis,
such as Jamaica's inadequate representation in the first

venture.

This does not hold true, for in 1961, Jamaica got
43

While these pages were being written, the writer
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everything it had requested, such as
the proposal to have
about fifty percent of membership in
Parliament. still
others have emphasized the lack of a
true West Indian
character to create a federal culture. This
is partially
true but history has shown that federal cultures
are
created after

a

federation is in progress.

Gordon Lewis

has written that it is precisely an absence of
a federal

culture which drives countries to federate.
Yet another group of theorists have explained the

failure by emphasizing geography.

It is argued that the

islands were too far apart to develop any lasting bond.
But these theorists fail to take into account that geography
has not prevented either Alaska or Hawaii from joining the

American Union.

Of course, because the distance did not

hamper Alaska's bid to join the

;ij-aerican

union does not

mean that distance could not mitigate against the Caribbean
situation.

In fact, it did hamper unity.

The island

leaders did not know their counterparts in the other islands.
v;ith the

And besides, Jamaica did not want to associate

smaller islands.

Alexander Bustamante of Jamaica

continuously referred to his personal wealth in comparison

Gordon Lewis, Modern We^ t Indies
46

,

p.

369.

Charles H. Archibald, "The Failure of the West
Indies Federation," World Today, (1962), pp. 233-242;
He cited geography as one of several reasons for the
failure.
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with the budget of say
Montserrat/^
American comparison does not

Furthermore, the

hold too much weight because

Alaska or Hawaii were no great
burden to other members
of the American union while
the smaller islands were to
Jamaica, Trinidad and even Barbados.
All these explanations are
partially correct but

these obstacles could have been more
easily surmounted
than three other obstacles which this
writer has chosen
to highlight.
The federal attempts failed because
(11 the
Caribbean leaders did not want a federation,
in spite of
their rhetoric to the contrary; (2) Jamaica and
Trinidad
did not want to have a federal government which
could

control customs, and

(3)

Trinidad did not want freedom of

movement of persons within the territories.
The leaders did not want federation.

In this

writer's judgment, there were four key people in the first
federation.

They were all shortsighted.

Alexander Busta-

mante always wavered on the idea of federation.

He was

concerned about his own political future and not that of
either Jamaica, his adopted home, or the West Indies.

During 1949 and 1955 he wanted federation because he had
no other program to present to Jamaicans.

47

In 1961, he

At all major meetings Alexander Bustamante
boasted that he carried more money in his fob (small
pocket) than the budget of Montserrat - based on interview with E.O. LeBlanc, Premier of Dominica, during
Summer of 1972.
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began spealcing against
federation because the ruling
party
Of Norman Manley was for
federation. Opposition to
federation was a good idea since
the ruling party had deceptively
made Jamaicans believe that
they could receive more prosperity than they were receiving
without federation.
Thus,

when prosperity did not come,
Bustamante blamed it on thl
federation.
He convinced Jamaicans that
their growing
economy would be hampered and was
already hampered by
federation on several counts. in the
first place, Jamaica
would receive less aid from Britain when
the federation
was created since more funds would be
given the less

developed islands.

He was correct

as

the proposed allo-

cation of funds during the first five years of
the federation shows.
See Figure XII.

Clearly Jamaica and Trinidad stood to lose funds
under federation.
had struck

a

Under these circumstances, Bustamante

responsive chord by "showing" Jamaicans that

federation was going to be even more

a

liability in the

future.

Norman Manley was equally shortsighted.

By 1961,

he had already gained for Jamaica the control of the

federation by getting its allotment of representation
raised to fifty per cent.

He thought it was a good idea

to let the people decide on the question whether Jamaica

should remain in the fold.

Many had already warned Manley

that his referendum on the federal question was untimely
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Figure XIII

Area

British Aid to the British West
Indian
Before and After Federation.
(m
millions of dollars.)

Amount to be received
during 1959-1964

Received between
1951-1960

Federal
Government

3.2

Dominica

1.0

16.5

St. Kitts

.9

5.0

St. Lucia

.9

14.5

Antigua

.68

17.0

Grenada

.54

6.0

St. Vincent

.54

12.5

Montserrat

.2

6.5

Barbados

.5

5.0

Jamaica

.25

Jamaica
dependencies

.15

Trinidad

.1

Source;

31.5

9.1

Grants 1951-60 from The Nation (Port of
Spain, Trinidad), July 1, 1960.

Grants for 1960: West Indian Economist,
January, 1960, pp. 10-11.
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and unnecessary.

He was merely allowing the
demagogic

Bustamante to further his own political
future.
Similarly,
Eric Williams alienated many wculd-be
backers of federation
by his arrogance. He chose not to be
a part of the federal

machinery by not running in the first and only
federal
elections, but wanted to run the federation from
his

home

in Trinidad.

And, of course, Grantly Adams must be in-

cluded in the long list of incapable leaders the
Caribbean
has produced.
By default he was the first and only Prime

Minister of the federation, since both Manley and Williains
had chosen not to be part of the Federal Government.

Adams

made many unclear statements which often required lengthy

explanations.

For example, in 1961, after Jamaica had

reluctantly allowed the Federal Government to have the
power to levy taxes, Adams said openly that Federal taxa-

tion would become retroactive to 1958.

This statement

was made without even consulting the leaders of Jamaica
and Trinidad; the two most reluctant partners of the

already sinking federation.
Apart from this general poor leadership, the

Caribbean leaders never wanted

a

federation in spite of

their perennial rhetoric to the contrary.

In the first

place, the federation was not undertaken on West Indian

initiative.

At the start, it was quite appropriately

called the British West Indian Federation.

The word

"British" was later dropped when the West Indian leaders
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were beginning to show some signs
of West Indian nationalism.
But dropping the word "British"
was not enough to
sustain nationalism. it never lasted
because all major
conferences dealing with the union took
place in Britain.
As it was, the federation became
dominated by the British,

who were going to be

a

part of it.

The West Indian leaders

did not worry about that because they had no
reason to

foster any form of union.
any outside force.

They were not threatened by

They could allow every major committee

dealing with their federation to be headed by the British.
Their lack of commitment was adequately shown by their

non-interest in federal elective office.

All the pro-

federation giants, Manley, Williams, Vere Bird, chose to
remain in their secure positions at home.
risk their political future by acquiring

They could not
a

larger con-

stituency, the West Indies, which they could not handle.

One cannot accept VJilliams' excuse that the federal con-

stitution was too weak, 48 thus precluding his participation,
It is true that Britain granted the constitution, but

Eric Williams had enough influence to change it.

Pre-

viously, Norman Manley was the one who advised the influentials to run for federal office.

49

But he was one of the

48

Eric Williams, Inward Hunger : The Education of
a Prime Minister (London: The Trinity Press, lybyj, p.~T44.
4Q

Thomas Franck, ed., Why Federations Fail (New
York: New York University Prss, 1968), p. 183.
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first not to heed the advice
and kept clear of federal
office. His excuse was that he
had to remain in Jamaica
to prevent Bustamante from
leading Jamaica out of the
federation. One cannot accept the
excuse that Manley was
only a mouthpiece for Jamaican
isolation. The low voter
turnout (60.8 per cent) during the
1961 referendum, ^°

which determined the fate of the federation
demonstrates
that Jamaica could have been kept in the
federation
had

its leaders wanted to remain.

The lack of commitment to Caribbean unity among
the leaders showed itself in many other ways.

First they

began quarrelling over how much federation would cost
even
before they could decide on what type of federation they
wanted.

As Thomas Franck has correctly asserted, once

one starts to inquire into the cost of an item which one

supposedly wants, the indication is that one cannot afford
4 4.
It.

51

^

To ^have any successful union, federation must be

A referendum was called in Jamaica by Norman
Manley, after he had already received the proposed federation which Jamaica wanted.
But he felt he had the obligation to ask Jamaicans if they still wanted federation.
The final results of the Jamaican Referendum were::
No. of Jamaicans against Federation 256,261
54.1%
"
"
"
"
for
217,319 45.9%
Report of the Chief Electoral Officer Jamaican Referendum
September T57 1961, p. 2.
,

^^Franck, Why Federations Fail

,

p.

183.

,
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an end in itself.

All secondary considerations such
as

cost to individual territories will
eventually fall into
place as the primary consideration
is unity leading
to

independence.

Thus, little wonder that the Eastern
Carib-

bean Federation failed.

it failed because Britain re-

fused to commit itself to its long range
support. Had
the leaders been committed to what they
liked to call

their freedom, they would have forgotten British
aid and
declared independence. A unilateral declaration of
inde-

pendence would probably have been quietly welcomed by
Britain, but the latter would have known that the
Caribbean

would no longer be content to remain

a

colony.

But many

Caribbean leaders have continued to delude themselves into
believing that their colonial status was and still is an
asset.

For example, leaders in Dominica privately admit

that Britain's grants to Dominica are justifiable debts.

Publicly they maintain that Britain owes Dominica nothing
for past practices.

The government of Dominica takes this

dual position to impress on Dominicans that the government
has done a great deal for Dominica, to get it off British

Qrant-in-Aid.

5 2

By implication, this

is something the

Opposition cannot do.

52

Based on an interview in Dominica.
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Caribbean leaders never talk about
the real factor
which has kept the British Caribbean
islands

m

apart.

each territory, an unquestionable
leader has always emerged,
who enjoyed legitimacy because the
masses looked up to
him.

And,

as the years went by,

of many would-be leaders.

he began to own the careers

He always showed his ability to

singlehandedly run the government for many years.

He be-

came secure, especially as the power of the British
Governor
dwindled. This state of affairs approximated the Latin

American form of personalismo - though

a cult of

personality

does not exist in the territories since no one leader has

been able to rule in absentia.

But the dictatorial ten-

dencies of the individual are ably encouraged by the

pseudo-parliamentary and weak party systems.

To leave

these safe positions of power in the separate islands and
to expose thexuselves to regional politics does not make

sense to the leaders on several counts.

In the first

place, there has been no pressing reason, such as an out-

side attack, to make the leaders come together; not even
a

communist Cuba seemed to threaten Jamaica sixty miles

away.

Secondly, regional unity will lessen the bargaining

power of the individual leader in his attempts to lure

foreign business into his island.

Any personal power over

business in each territory might terminate with federation.
Thirdly, in

a

larger unit, the prominence of the individual

leaders will be lowered.

Thus, they must first be

decolonized to achieve Caribbean
nationhood. They .ust
accept the fact that inter-island
rivalry works to the
detriment of the region. When
they can accept the fact
that the future of the Caribbean,
if there is any, lies
in a strong federation, all
other obstacles could be
surmounted. More than anything else,
Caribbean leaders
have failed the cause of Caribbean
unity because they
have put themselves above regional
interests.

I960.

The uneven economic situation in the
territori p.<.
Another major difficulty deterring
federation was

the economic disparity among the
islands.

During the

formative years of the federation, this received
very
little attention.
But increasingly, Jamaica and Trinidad
became industrialized, raising their standards of
living

and leaving the other territories behind.

Simultaneously

the smaller islands remained one crop economies and even
showed signs of not improving.

The data for the

national incomes for the units of the federation in 1957
are shown in Figure XIII.

The gap between Jamaica and Trinidad on the one
hand, and Montserrat on the other, in Figure XIII, was

wide indeed, since Jamaica and Trinidad showed

a

reluc-

tance to share their wealth with less fortunate islands,
53
p.

4.

Carleen O'Loughlin, Economic and Political Change

,
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Figure XlV

.

Island

Natiomal Income Figures for the
British
west Indies - 1957,

Total in millions
of B.W.I $

Per capita
in B.W.I.
^

% of total
West Indian
Income

Jamaica

821.8

510

54.6

Trinidad

471.5

612

31.3

Barbados

100.0

431

6.6

79.7

244

5.3

15.9

284

1.1

2.8

195

0.2

Grenada, St.
Lucia, St.
Vincent &
Dominica
(Windward Is.)

Antigua, St.
Kitts, Nevis,
Anguilla

Montserrat

Source: National Income Statistics , The West Indies,
Federal Statistics Office, No. 1, 1960.

instead of helping, Jamaica had chosen to dominate the

banana market in Britain, and, in the process, to exclude
the smaller islands which relied, solely on bananas as

export crop.

?.n

Jamaica did that when it had moved away

from agriculture as its main export industry.

For exajmple,

in 1950, Jamaica's exports consisted almost entirely of

agriculture, but by 1960, bauxite and aluminium accounted
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for more than half of its exports.

Trinidad had followed

a

.54
ment.

similar pattern of develoo-

The discovery of oil made it move away
from its
reliance on sugar as a major export product;
that

was in

the wake of replacing Cuba as the main
supplier of sugar
to the American market.
And as an aside, Trinidad
and

Jamaica were cutting their economic ties with Britain
while
the smaller units remained tied to Britain.
Jamaica's
and Trinidad's industrialization drive were sustained
and

conditioned by United States business concerns.

In the

process of switching major trade partners, Jamaica and

Trinidad got involved in
economic development.

a

rivalry to promote their own

For this reason, in the midst of

West Indian unity talks in 1958, Jamaica announced plans
to set up an oil refinery to process crude oil from

Venezuela and not from Trinidad.

Clearly^ the

cause of West Indian nationhood was taking secondary consideration, as Eric Williams of Trinidad protested that
this move was threatening the Trinidad oil industry.
At the heart of the problem was the unwillingness

of Jamaica and Trinidad to shoulder the greatest share
of running the federation.

It was their opinion that it

Amitai Etzioni, Political Unification A Com parative s£udy of Leaders and Forces (New York: Holt,
Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1965), pp. 158-159.
,

'

West Indian Economist, August 1958, pp. 17-22,
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was Britain's responsibility to
pay the share of the
small islands to the federal
venture. Williams once

entertained the idea that it wac the
responsibility of
the wealthier islands to maintain the
federation,

but

this idea quickly evaporated when Jamaica
decided to
leave the union. Williams then warned that
the burden
was too much for Trinidad and dropped the
idea.
The

economic disparity among the islands forced Jamaica
to
vote against a federal customs union.
If the federation had a chance, a customs union

among the islands was absolutely essential.

allowing the federal government to impose

a

It entailed

tariff on all

goods which came from outside the Caribbean region, while
all movement of goods among the islands was to be duty

free.

Jamaica protested because it felt that it would

have been most aff-cted, in that the high tariffs it had

imposed to protect its nascent industries would have had
to be removed.

It is interesting to note that this came

in the wake of evidence to the contrary.

This evidence

was inconclusive, but it showed that there could have

been less potential conflict between Jamaica's drive for

industrialization and the overall development of the
region.

57

Secondly, the opposite was likely to happen.

5 f)

Eric Williams, The Economics of Nationhood (Portof-Spain, Trinidad: Government Printing Press, 1959).
57

.

.

Report of the T^ade and Tariffs Commission
Part I, West Indies Port of Spain: Government of the West
Indies Printing Press, 1958), paragraph 66.
,

(
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It was true that cheaper
labor cost in Trinidad could
have affected Jamaica's
internal markets, but the
Eastern Caribbean islands
were potential dumping grounds
for both Jamaica and
Trinidadian goods. if anyone stood
to lose by a customs union,
it was not Jamaica, but
rather the smaller non-industrialized
islands like Dominica.
Besides, Jamaica had already won
a compromise whereby a

customs union would have been
gradually introduced over
a period of nine years.
This would have given the Jamaican
economy, with adequate federal guidance,
a transitional
cushion period. it would have brought
Jamaica's developmental goals closer to that of the West Indian
nation.
In spite of all these considerations, the

Jamaican leaders used the customs union issue to destroy
federation. Gordon Lewis wrote that Jamaican business
elites did not want

a

customs union because the Federal

Government would have made them more responsive to producing quality goods to remain in competition with other
goods from the union. 5 8

Customs union did threaten the

dominance of another set of highly entrenched people in
West Indian society, the businessmen.

It would have made

them more regionally conscious and more responsive to the
needs of the highly impoverished Caribbean societies.

58

Gordon Lewis, Modern West Indies

,

p.

377.

It
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would have forced them to drop
their money conscious attitudes they had picked up in their
frequent trips to such
places as Puerto Rico and New York.
Freed om of movement as

deterrent to federation

a

.

Closely associated with the economic
disparity in the
islands was the freedom of movement of people

among the

territories of the federation.

could cause
real.

a

The idea that this issue

breakdown in Caribbean unity may sound un-

It is hard to conceive of a political union where

the members of that union cannot move freely within the

units, but that was exactly what Trinidad wanted to do.

Trinidad's lower prices in goods, coupled with much lower

shipping rates had put it in

a

good position to dump goods

on the Eastern Caribbean markets.

But Trinidad was un-

willing to accept some of the unemployed and unemployable
small islanders who bought most of these goods.

The

rationale behind this refusal was the fact that Trinidad
had been able to employ most of its people who had been

willing to work and did even absorb a substantial amount
of immigrants.

But it wanied to have the option to close

its doors to immigrants when it got crowded.

It was of

the opinion that its nascent social services, such as

police and schools, should not be overburdened by large
numbers.

If they were allowed to be burdened, Eric

Williams stood to lose his unquestionable hold over
Trinidad politics.

Thus Trinidad, like Jamaica, made
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the Federal Government stay
out of immigration policies,
immigration, like customs, was
to remain the business
of the individual territories
for some six years after
the federation was established.
The Federal Government
was to assert itself in that
sphere only gradually and
only on Trinidadian terms. These terms
were that any
territory could refuse entrance to a member
of another

territory on grounds of security.

Conclusion
The Federations of the West Indies failed because

they were forced unions.

The islands have a great deal in

common, but this commonality has been hampered by the

desire of the leaders to retain their position of prominance.

The leaders have effectively kept the island

peoples apart, though these people get along well when they
are away from the Caribbean.

And it is not because they

find themselves in a foreign country like the United States,

for Caribbean people live well there and in Britain.

It

is the masses from the separate islands who have been kept

apart.

Caribbean leaders did not play politics with
federai-ion either, as it is sometimes charged, for they

•

have little knowledge of what politics or a federation were
all about.

They did not compromise or even try to
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communicatee with
wirn p^nh
each r>+-hci»other.

tv.

o
They adopted
open diplomacy.

In practice, this meant they
shouted at each other through
the press, the radio.
In addition, Arthur Lewis cites the

example of the leaders securing binding
resolutions from
their respective legislative as.-^emblies before
discussing
the crucial issues with each other.
In effect, the leaders
of the larger and more prosperous islands rarely
worked

with their counterpart from the smaller islands as
equals.

They did not know that federations drew people together,
but this togetherness generates more conflict than agreement.

They should have known that to accomplish anything

meaningful, they must concentrate on what they could
agree on, leaving disagreements to seek their own solutions

when the union got more stabilized.

By then a federal

spirit would have grown to counteract all parochial feelings.

Each leader tried, with little success, to impose

his conception of federation to reflect the bias of the

individual country he represented.
In the final analysis, the federations of the

West Indies failed and will continue to fail because a
series of crises were not handled effectively.

The "desireM

Pattern of behavior of the leaders of the Caribbean is aptly demonstrat d by the exchange between Sir
Grantly Adams and Albert Gomes, contained in "Extract from
a speech by the Prime Minister of the Federation of the
West Indies, Sir Grantly Adams, in the House of Representatives, 16 June 1958," Documents and Speeches on Common wealth Affairs 1952-1962 ed. by Nicholas Monsergh (London:
Oxford University Press, 1963), pp. 166-168.
,

310

crisis was never tackled.

The leaders never genuinely

wanted federation.

They demonstrated that very well
by
findino fault with every aspect
of the federation
but

refused

to do something about the
apparent defects.

The

"participation" crisis could not be handled
because the
leaders were never faced with this
problem before, not
even on their own islands.

'

They did not know how to

make West Indians partake in the federation
in order to
solve the "identity" crisis. The inhabitants
of the

larger units did not feel West Indian.

The leaders who

could have made them feel that way, never rose to the

occasion to accomplish that feat.
at the outset,

This was no setback

since it could not be expected that a

feeling of being West Indian would emerge overnight.
that case the leaders could have acted as

a

In

necessary

succor to help the individual islander make this not so

difficult transition.
the identity crisis.

A federal union could have solved

Finally, the "brother's keeper"

crisis was never solved.

By this is meant the larger

islands refused to accept the responsibility to help the

smaller units develop.

Since Federation was clearly an

initial liability to Jamaica and Trinidad, it was doomed
to failure.

The islands were stronger individaully

,

they

broke up the union, and achieved their independence individually.

A federal union of the types so far envisaged

would have weakened them.

Under these circumstances,
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federation will always be

a

non-starter in the British

Caribbean; it is even more
ludicrous to envisage a union
Of all the niembers of the
Caribbean area; English, Dutch,
French, and Spanish.
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CHAPTER VII
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

An effort has been made in this case study to test
some
hypotheses as they relate to a recently semi- independent coun-

try like Dominica.

It was found necessary to review the lit-

erature dealing with what has been called political change.

From the literature this writer was able to extrapolate an ap-

proach which would meaninsfully assess the Dominican political
system.

This explains why the systems approach was chosen to

carry out the study.
The systems approach is by no means complete, but it can
be made comprehensive.

To an extent, it is dynamic and may ex-

plain, though superficially, the actions of some participants
of a political system.

Its shortcomings lie

in its inability

to explain why actions precipitate certain reactions.

It also

assumes that all parts have specific roles to perform at critical stages to ensure the continuity of the system.

But ap-

parently these roles cannot be accurately identified since all
the actors of the political system can never be identified.

What is being argued here is that an unidentifiable part of a

system may as critically important as an identifiable one.
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The very nature of this study
of Dominica illustrates the
above point. Of all the actors in
its political system, much
attention was paid to the Constitution,
the Governor, the pollticians, the parties, the Black Power
Movement and some outside forces such as the politics of
other countries. In effect,

many parts or actors of the system, such
as trade unions and
the Roman Catholic Church, were not treated
at great length.

This should not be taken to mean that they are
not important.
They have been very important in the past but, in
the judgment
of this writer, their importance relative to the
actors analysed
is minimal.

Chapter

I

discussed the concept of political change.

formed the theoretical setting for the study.

It

Both Chapters

II and III reviewed the impact of colonialism on the colonized

society.

Chapter II examined the role of the colonial consti-

tution in shaping the society, while Chapter III looked at the
social and psychological impact of colonialism.

parties of Dominica were reviewed in Chapter IV.

The political

Chapter V was

devoted to an analysis of the Black Power Movement.

It was stu-

died because it is the only group which challenged the political
parties and their supportive groups in Dominica.

Chapter VII

concerned itself with the several attempts at federation in
the British West Indies,

From all this one conclusion comes out clearly; Dominican

socxety xs divided into two ca^ps.
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The boundaries of the two

may not be clearly defined, but
this division seems to be a
continuation of the colonial
situation.
During colonial times, the two
camps were not always hostile to each other. The European
or camp had effective,
ly co-opted the more educated
Dominicans. The latter were never part of the European camp, but
they were given enough privileges to feel like the European.
The educated Dominican
felt European.
Consequently the Dominican found in the
bureaucracy became very supportive ofthG
colonial administration.
The Governor was the head of this
camp.

se^

The other camp was made up of the local
politicians.
the most part, they were uneducated and
sometLme

For

irresponsible.

They usually came to power through confrontation
and stayed in
power through similar means. They came from the
rural areas,

\^ich made them unacceptable to the more educated urban
element.
The bureaucrats often looked at them with contempt.
As the years went by these politicians were allowed to

wield a certain amount of power.

But their roles vis-a-vis

the bureaucracy and Governor were never clearly defined.

This

seemed to have been deliberate to ensure control of the colony.
Since roles were never clearly defined, the outside authority
always had

-^he

option to dictate the limits of one's pov/er in

any given situation.
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The colonial administration
granted constitutions but always left the role of the
politician vague. The constitutions
gradually allowed the election of
the people^s representatives,
but went on to deny power to
those elected. The colonial
polltician was sufficiently naive to
believe that onee he was elec
ted by the people, he would run
the s-ovemment.
The Governor, ably supported by
the Colonial Office, saw
it differently.
He continued to see himself as
the ultimate
head of the government, regardless of the
number of elected of-

ficials in the colony.

He was even surer of his position,
since

the Colonial Office continued to under^/rite
the budget of the
colony. The intended result of that
arrangement was to produce responsible government.

The Governor had to instill in

the people, especially the emerging political
elites, the idea
of national interest.
But things did not quite work out that way.

the Governor frustrated the politicians.

The role of

The politicians were

forced to remove the confrontation with the Governor from
the
level of bargaining.
As the confrontation bett^een the colonial authorities and

the politicians came to a head, the former relinquished gra-

dually their hold on the colony.
In the process of decolonization, the structures which

maintained the colonial condition were not dismantled.

The

succeeding "advanced" constitutions only became more precise in
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outlining the specific roles of
the two major power contenders
in the Dominican political system,
the Governor and the leading

politician.

The Governor transferred his
power of appoint::ino:
members of the bureaucracy to the
politician.
In fact, the

1959 Constitution specifically stated
that there had to be a
politician, whose role xrould be that of
head of state.

Thus the idea of personal government
first personified in
the Governor, was now finding itself
in the local
politician.

In the same way the Governor had been the
epitome of the colon^
ial system, the local leader is presently
performing a simi-

lar role.

He sets the goals of the Goverrjnent, and
also sees

to their execution.

the bureaucracy.

He handpicks all his major personnel for

In addition, he sets the goals of the society.

He expects everyone to aspire to those ends.
sen the national dress.

He has even cho-

As expected only the Opposition Party

and its followers do not wear the national dress, probably in

defiance of the present Government.

The idea that an all powerful leader should emerge in a

colonial situation might not be all that bad.

As was pointed

out in Chapter I, a powerful leader could be useful in handling
the identity crisis in a country.

This could be particularly

useful in a place such as Dominica

v/here the crisis of identity

has not he.m handled well.

i

It is what the powerful leader does with the newly acquir-

ed power that concerns this writer.

The tendency has been to

i

use power to frustrate
possible challengers.
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The colonial poll-

tictan used to accuse the
colonial power of all the
ills which
Plagued the society. With the
disappearance of the colonial
power, the politician is
forced to
tn find a
,
rorcea
scapegoat.
Thus the

ultimate leader in Dominica has
seen an oppressor in the
Roman Catholic Church. Even the
Opposition Party has fallen in
this role.

Since the leading rubers of
that party seem to be
very affluent, it becomes easy
to portray them as oppressors
of the people,^
In effect, the unquestionable
leader of Dominica has
shown the people their enemies. And
he has shovm himself to be
their friend by opening the doors of
Government to them.
Quite obviously, the people are in no way
involved in the de-

cision mal^ng process.
actor

-

In fact, LeBlanc has developed an

audiece relationship with the people.

He has started

a show which he must keep moving to keep the
people sufficiently entertained.

This does not mean that the show is always

exciting; in fact, it could become intensely dull.

But Le-

Blanc has developed such a reputation as being a great
"actor"
he cannot go wrong

The tendency is to believe tiat that kind of relationship
is confined to the rural areas since the politicians are

from these districts.

This relationship might be more appa-

rent in the rural districts, but some urban elements are very

^he

leaders of the Labor Party are just as
affluent as those
of the Freedom Party.

™.ch pert Of this actor
reluctant to

-

audience relationship.

They are .or^

about it because thoy are
ashamed of that
reality. They are placed
in a situation of having
to accept
the politicians they once
laughed at.
tail,

Everyone who wants to survive
in the system is forced
to
become part of the audience.
And not only that, all must
appUud ,,t all times. Since the locale
of the performance is so
small, the one v*o does not
applaud is likely to bo reprimanded.
The leader in Dominica has been
made to believe
that he

has done so much for the country
that no one should challenge
him.

Very surprisingly, the unquestionable
leadership LeBlanc
has maintained has not precluded his
commitment to West Indian
Federation. Since comins to office in
19(^i
he has always sup,

ported West Indian unity, both in words and
deeds.
first to spesk for a federation in 1962.

He xms the

In addition, although

he was not an original signatory to the Carifta
Agreement of
1968, he accepted the agreement when approached.
LeBlanc joined the Caribbean Free Trade Association
(Carifta), even though Dominica stood to lose from that
union.

rifta is not a common market, but it

allov/s goods

Ca-

regionally

produced to be imported tax free in the British West Indies.
In 1971, LeBlanc was the first to sign the "Grenada Decla-

ration",

^-rtiich

West Indies,

was intended to produce a federation of the
The idea was short-lived as the opposition

i
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parties of the islands concerned
nn^stered enough support
to
defeat the proposal. LeBlanc
was the last leader to
withdraw
from the proposed union
How decs one explain that desire
for unity? One would
expect that the safe position
LeBlanc has carved out for
hL...
self would negate his desire for
a larger union, where he
would certainly be a subordinate.

There are several explanations
for LeBlanc»s acting out
of character.
First, it is typically Dominican
to be self contradictor^^.

Second, Dominica is one of those
few islands which
has not developed an identity yet.
It comes out clearly in the

Dominican students

study in Jamaica, Trinidad and Barbados.

Within a year the Dominican student takes
on the ways of his
temporary home. He speaks like the people
around him and may
even dress like them. On returning to Dominica,
he passes

these on to his brothers.

It is not being argued here that

the few Dominicans studying abroad are responsible
for the lack
of identity in Dominica. The example simply
demonstrates
that

it is because of a lack of identity that the Dominican
easily

falls prey to "alien" cultures.

A third reason for LeBlanc's drive to have West Indian
unity could be couched in his laiowledge of his o\m limitations.
He might be aware of the fact that he is unable to satisfy the

demands made on the political system.

A West Indian Federation

could help solve some of the pressing problems.
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Lastly, Since LeBlanc may
be coming to the end of
his political career, he could secure
an appointive post in
any fed-

oration,

He would be goins on
record as the one Caribbean
politician most in favor of West
Indian unity.
•

This is not to imply that all
of Dominica is for any type
of federation.
There are two groups who were
opposed to the
Grenada Declaration, the Opposition
Party and the Black Power
Movement. The Opposition claLmed
that the Declaration was negotiated secretly. Both the people
and the Opposition Party
were left out of the discussions leading
to the Declaration.
The Black Power Movement was against the
Declaration because it felt that the people were not
consulted properly.
Further the Movement believed that a federation
at that tiiTie

would only make it easier for the "imperialists"
to control the
islands.

The Movement reasoned that presently the
"imperialists"

were forced to deal with the separate islands,
a chore which
made it discourasins for concerted exploitation.

In its view,

a federation would be a liability to the islands.

Presently the Movement believes that each island must first

have political independence.
federation.

Then they can jointly consider

With political independence, leaders of Dominica

will be able to control the economic life of the island.

If

all the islands follow a similar pattern, unification can

haA-a

meaning.
Of course, the leaders of the Movement are not that naive
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to believe that the present
leaders of Dominica wiXl
automati-

cally extend their control in
the economy with the
co,„in, of
political independence. The
Kovement cautions that there
n^st
be a fundamental change in
attitude of present leaders.
This
change involves a commitment which
calls

for sacrifices by all.

But on the idea of cxpectins
all to

malce

sacrifices, the Move-

ment seems to be too idealistic.
This suinmary leads to one basic
question - what are the
prospects for a stable society in Dominica?
There is no question
that the present political climate is
not a healthy one. Since
1967, v^en the island sot its last "advanced"
constitution,

there have been no less than three major
confrontations which
have reached crisis proportion. In one,
the Defence Force was
alerted to contain the people. In the second,
one of the only
two boys' schools closed do^^ because of
racial problems.
In

the third, one of the most productive estates
closed down.

Presently anyone visiting Dominica is struck by the
hidden tension which pervades the entire society.
The tension is further maintained by poor economic conditions.

Jobs have become scarce, XThile unemployment remains at

about thirty to forty per cent.

The major crop, bananas, which

accounted for seventy per cent of the island's exports, is

virtually

disaster,^

^^inistry of Agriculture, "Radio Address by the Minister."
In his talk the Minister revealed that Britain was about to
give $744,000 (BWI) to save Dominica's banana industry.

The social system is equally
bad.

The masses are keot in

their places and are continually
told that things will be bettter.
The party system and other
institutions such as the

Church and the bureaucracy continue
to foster the inequalities
in the system.
As a result of the disparities,
protest groups such as the

Black Power Movement develop.

As was explained in chapter

V, the name of the group is a
misnomer, since the perceived

oppressors are just as Black as members of the
group.
Groups

the Movement seem to be endemic to
colonial
and recently "liberated" societies. The movements
are crealilce

ted because the distinction between the haves and the
have-nots
is easy to perceive.

The Dominican situation is further complicated by the fact
that the society is far from being integrated. The
political
elites numbering no more than fifty, may form a closely knit
group to protect their vital interests.

They may even receive

outside help from the British or the United States.

But this

outside help can only provide temporary solutions to a grave
problem.

But why should confrontation remain a fixture of the

Dominican political process?

rJhy

does it always have to

tal<e

a confrontation to attempt rectificrtion to obvious problems?

Confrontation will remain an important ingredient of the political system because imaginative leaders have not been produced.
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Ironically the inherited
system does not operate on
the
crisis phenomenon.
It calls for and demands
a ,reat deal of
spirit, discussion, compromise
and friendship.

Unfortunately,
these qualities are alien to
Dominicats politicians.
If the present system is
failing, what are the alternatives open to Dominica? In answer,
there are several issues
to be considered.
Firstly, the present system was not
created
overnipiit, even though certain parts
of it ^.ere hurriedly
im-

posed.

The social underpinnings of the
present system began to
evolve as early as 1898, when Crown Colony
Government was introduced.

Secondly, political independence might not
be the answer.
If history is any guide, the politically
independent islands

of Jamaica and Trinidad are exhibiting the same
problems as
Dominica,
In fact, they seem to be worse off, they both have

experienced urban riots.
isolation.

Further, Dominca is not existing in

It can become independent and adopt any system of

government it desires.

But it must take into account the po-

litical systems which surround it.

Thus political independence

however exciting, could be more harmful.

The poor economic

conditions seem to negate independence in isolation

an3a^ay.

Because Dominica is intimately connected with its
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neighbors. does not preclude
an attempt to uplift
its poor.
Clearly the upliftins of
the poor is in no way
related to the
type Of political or economic
system in a country. At
least
the two Should not be
related; a socxalist or
capitalist system in Dominica can be
equally effective in dealing
with the
problems of its poor. And
the politicians would be
the first
to admit that the two are
not connected. This writer
is not
even advocating that the
politicians consult the people
on all
the issues which beset Dominica.
Chances are the people are
not interested. At the sa-^e time,
it is not being argued that
the self appointed messiah
should impose his system on Dominica.
The best political system for
Dominica does not lie in ,*ether
it is democratic, autocratic or even
socialistic. The system
which can tackle the problems of
unemployment, social injustices and the like seem to be the best
suited for Dominica.
But on a more realistic and concrete
level, the answer to
Dominica's problems lie in the Hest Indies and
not necessarily
In Dominica. The West Indian islands could
get together, pull
their resources together and solve their common
problems. Too
much has been done for these islands. They
can now manage

their own affairs;

If only they are left alone, they might

come up with their own PWestindian" know-how.
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Professor Arthur Lewis
had prepared and
submitted
to the leaders of the
"Little Eight" a document
entitled
££2mals f^ an Eastern carihb^
the Territories of
iJ^ntserrat. St.

Anti^,

Barbados. Do.lnlca, Grenada.

Kitts^s^AnaulUa,

St. Lucia and St.

Vincent.

He stressed at the
beginning of the document
that
"these proposals (are) merely
a starting point for
discus-

sions between the Governn,ents
concerned.
i have no official
authority for any of these
proposals, and do not necessarily
myself feel coramitted to any of
them."

The main features of Professor
Lewis- proposals
for "a new independent state" were:

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ECONOMIC
^*

^ Governor-General for the Federation
and the unit territories should not
have Governors or

moni^rdutl::!'
b.

^--^-^i-tenants to perform cer^-

c.

The federal capital should be located in
Barbados.
There should be a single chamber (therefore
no senate
and each unit should elect one member per
40,000 population, with a minimum number one member per unit.

d.

Provisions for amending constitution.

e.

Provisions for accession of new units.

f.

Provisions for freedom of movement.

g*

Provisions for customs union as from the day the Federation comes into existence.
The transfer of services from Units to Federal Government e.g.. Inland Revenue, Audit, Postal Service,
Judicial, Police, etc.

Freedom of the Federal Government to levy any kind of
tax.
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Commencement of the
secession from the Feder.^^
°^
Jamaican
West Thh
jnto effect.
^^^^^^^ion comes
Provision
forTy.
to become the
°^ Barbados
GovIrno?-Gener
a^^^^^^
Provision
for an

interim%^%^1,f Cabinetf^^'^^-

Budget for first three
lion to $14.5 million! ve^r^
1.

^r.

''^''^^

^""^"^

.

"^^1-

Recommendation -t-ha-t- +-v,^ tt j
should continue to
pay aran^f-'''"?^"'" ^^overnment
years on a tapering'^SLisr
.

The secretary of state
had also submitted
a .e.orandu. containing the Views Of the
Colonial Office witK respect
to proposed Federation
a.

E^°iisierM:t^

^°

^^^^^ ^°

e"riu"stoT'"
Customs, movement of people
h=r,n„„ currency,
banking,
income tax, ports and

h^bours.
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Methodology
The research for this study
was carried out during
the summer of 1972.
Previous to that I ^ept in touch
with
the events in Dominica through
the newspapers, personal

correspondence and direct contact with
those who visited
the island from time to time.
During my stay in Dominica, many
documents which
dealt with the political situation were
made available

to

me.

I

also had the good fortune of attending the
national

party convention of the Freedom Party.
I

From that meeting

was able to observe the elites of the party in action
in

dealing with the party members.

In addition,

I

interviewed

twenty leading politicians, ten from the Dominica Labor
Party and ten from the Freedom Party.

Twenty leading businessmen were also interviewed.
An attempt was made to identify their party affiliation, to

ensure a balance appraisal of the two major parties.
it became very difficult to solicit such information.

But
A

few were frank enough to state their party affiliation, but
the great majority refused.
In a small society like Dominica, it is almost always

difficult to conceal one's party leanings, but businessmen
will try hard to do so.

This is quite understandable con-

sidering that one's success or failure at business depends
on the type of tax incentive the politicians are willing to
offer.

For example, I was reliably informed that the present
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Government of Do.inica has
raised the tariff on foreign
car imports to put a
non-Governn,ent supporter out of business. Tnere is no question
that Dominican businessmen have
had to be very cautious in their
dealings with the Government.
This same caution exercised by the
business ele^
ments was very evident when I tried to
interview the elites
of the bureaucracy.
The plan was to have them respond

directly to

a

questionnaire.

But after the first encounters,

the series of "no comments" became very
disconcerting.

new approach had to be devised.

I

A

finally decided to dis-

tribute the questionnaire to sixty bureaucrats.
These bureaucrats were all heads of their departments
or divisions; some assistant heads were also included.

Of

the sixty distributed, forty-five completed forms were

gathered.

The uncollected ones were either conveniently

misplaced or kept for whatever reason.

There was one in-

teresting case where the bureaucrat "lost" the questionnaire,
but was able to reproduce it to make the desired answers.
I

can only conclude that this was done for self preservation.

If I did quote him by name, he would have been able to de-

fend himself by presenting what he actually wrote.
But of all the elites interviewed, the bureaucrats

proved the most difficult and uncooperative.
here though, that

I

I

should add

was able to gather a great deal of in-

formation through informal interviews with my friends, even

-
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though they too showed some
hesitancy.
I spent a lot of time in
the government buildings.

This made them very curious about
my activities. In addition, talking with me gave the observer
the impression that
they were very busy. After they had found
out all they
had wanted to know, i was able to discuss
their attitudes
and frustrations in Dominica.
To an extent, these comments
apply to some of the politicians I interviewed.

Generally the politicians were easy to talk with.
My approach was to put them at ease first by asking them
to relate the good thing

for Dominica.

I

"know" their parties were doing

They were particularly happy to set the re-

cord straight by showing that they were the ones who could
solve Dominica's problems.

In their opinion, the real

enemy of the island were the other political party or the
Black Power Movement.

But when it came to discussing their

own "faults," they were usually reluctant commentators.
Another approach which

I

found very rewarding was

to be where the politician would be delivering a speech.

He usually came over to say hello and showed interest in

the progress of my work.

was

On such occasion the politician

usually at ease and was able to talk at great length.
I

the masses.

was unable to carry any in depth interview of
I

travelled around the island observing the

reactions of the people to current government policies.

I

was fortunate to be present when both the St. Mary's Academy

and the Castle Bruce crises
were co.ing to a head. Fro.
the St. Marys Academy crisis
I was able to assess
the
attitude of the students to the
government's policy of non-

intervention in the crisis.

I

was able to do the same for

the Opposition Party and the Black
Power Movement.

The inability of the political
system to muster
the desired unity to handle this
relatively minor crisis
was clearly shown.
The Opposition together with its

supporters were delighted that the Government
showed signs
of being unable to handle the crisis.
The Government,
on

the other hand, blamed its inability to handle the
crisis
on the Opposition Party.

The masses were of the opinion

that the Black Power Movement had driven the White Brothers

away from Dominica. The newspapers of Dominica agreed with
them.

During the Castle Bruce crisis,

I

was able to ob-

serve how the masses from one district could get united

behind one leader who was only articulating the demands of
the people for them.

The Government erroneously concluded

that this leader was putting revolutionary ideas in the

people's heads.

The people showed their lack of trust in

the Government and in especially their representative from
the district.

It is important to relate here that both

r.he

Government and the Opposition Party joined forces to deny
ownership to the people of the land under contantion.
In addition, both the Government and the Opposition blamed
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the Black Power Movementovement for
fr^r- <-k
the unrealistic demand
of
wanting ownership of that
land.

m

my travels and in informal
interviews with the
people. I was able to find
out that some have the
highest
regard for the present
Government. It was particularly
hard to determine their
party affiliation, but
the rural

sector favored the Labor Party.

m

addition, the present

Government occupies all three
seats from the urban areas.
But presently, the people
are beginning to show concern
over
the high cost of living and in
the low prices for
bananas.

The anxiety of the people are not
sufficiently grave to
cause a major crisis.
Final N ote on the Selection of Elites
"Elite" is being used here very loosely,
anyone in
a leadership position in politics, the
bureaucracy and

business is referred to as an elite.

In a small island

like Dominica, these people will always know of
the factors

which affect the island.
The political elites were chosen from the executives
of the two major parties.

The secretaries of both parties

w ere also helpful in identifying certain individuals who
we re once involved in electoral politics.

The twenty inter-

V iewees related sufficiently well the political situation in

Dominica from their point of view.
It was a little more difficult to select the bureau-

cratic elites.

No effort was made to distinguish precisely,
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between the "niH"
^r-,^
m
old and
"new" bureaucrat.
It was only after
I had started to
carry out the Interviews
that I realized
that the two had different
assessments of the problems
of
Dominica,
..

,

The "new" bureaucrat seems
to be more submissive
to the politicians because
the former owes his position
to rhe latter.
Be that as it may, the
interviewed bureaucrats were chosen on the basis
of the job they held.
For
this reason only assistant heads
and heads of departments

were interviewed.

Of the sixty bureaucratic elites
origi-

nally approached for interviews,
forty-five cooperated.
I used the Dominican Annual
Statistical

Digest to

select the business elites to be interviewed.

I

chose to

deal with the twenty richest businessmen in
Dominica.
I
was unable to speak with the foreign business
elements
who own property in Dominica. Instead, I spoke
with their
Dominican representatives. In addition, the Dominica Employers' Federation, which represents the interests of
the

business elements in the Dominican society, provided me
with some valuable insights on the situation in Dominica.
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QUESTIONNAIRE USED FOR DOMINICAN
ELITES

Bureaucratic Elites
1.
^»

4'
5.

7

When did you join the service?
Present post
achievement of Statehood?
0?^.^^^"^
'^^^'^^ instructions about a se.i-^nd'erend^nt^sL^e'^^^
Do you know if Ministers receive
training on the same'^
ministers Lrun^ualxTi^d
LTeU^ien^'^ '"f education to "be in charge of
ministeries^
wLr^
f
--^--r^ts do you thinkhhold ^h^'""
View thTLnr.""
view
that "Ministers a^e unqualified for
their positions?
^^^^5^
number
(c)
the
majority.
\
whi^
^^""^ adjusting to associate
statehood^^""^

T

^

ft

10.
11.

12.

13.

If you minister wished to pursue a line of
action
which yo'J Gisagreed, what would you. do (a) do it with
without
question (b) press your point of view
(c) take some
other course of action.
Which of the above would the majority of civil servants
follow in your opinion?
regard s the ultimate head of state as
If you are given conflicting instructions bv you minister
and the premier, which course of action would you follow:
(a) obey
your minister
(b) obey the premier
(c) con-

sult the pren^.ier?
When a new government comes to power, what action would
you recommend to a civil servant who has aligned himself
with a particular government, (outgoing).?

14.

Could you cominent on the events of December 1971?

15.

Hov/

16.

In your opinion what will be their role in the future?

17.

Would you say that the two party system is working in
Dominica?

18.

Why did you take the position you did?

19.

V;ho

20.

In your opinion,

21.

If elections were held now, which party would win?

do you the present role of the police?

is

-

the real leader of the Labor and Freedom Parties?
hov;

much pov/er does Armour have?
Why?
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ise

23.
24.

Why did you answer the way
you did?
What are the good and bad

points of LeBlanc as

leaderf
26.

v;as

^""^

leader?

^^^^ -Carles as a

Dominica under colonial rule?

StatehooS?^°'°^''

a

Why?

government prepare Dominica for Associate

28.

Is Dominica ready for full
independence now?

29.

Does Britain owe Dominica grants with no strings attached?

30.

In your opinion where has government wasted too rrrach ti.-e?
How could government have gone around these problems?

31.

In your opinion what precipitated the split in Labor in
1970?

32.

What does Black Pov/er mean?

33.

Could you comment on the Grenada Declaration?

Why?
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Business Elites
What are your views concerning
the general economic prospects for Dominica?

most

ws concerning the prospects for
your

nding?

In what ways could they contribute more
a) workino
harder, b) using more local products c) saving
moi-e
d) investing more at home
e) making less demands for
wage increases f) any other ways?

Could you comment on the events cf Dec. 1971.

What has the Church done for Dominica?
How do you see the Police?

What will be its future role?

Could yoi: comment on Carifta and tell me how it has
affected your business?
Do you think that Dominica's problems can be solved in
the capitalist system?

Would you say that the two party system is working in
Dominica?
If you don't mind could you tell me for which party you
voted in the last election? Why?

Who is the real leader of the Labour and Freedom parties?

Can the parties do without either of them?
What arc' the good and bad points of LeBlanc as

a

leader?
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^"""^

leader^

^''^

^^^^ Charles as a

P"^^""^^

15.

What power does Ronald Armour wield?

16.

If elections were held now which party
would win.
Why do you think people vote the way they do—

17.

a)

party

b)

leader

c)

Why?

because of

other.

18a. In the final analysis do you think that government
is

18b.

corrupt?
Was Dominica betver under colonial rule?

Why?

19.

Did Crown Colony government prepare Dominica for Statehood?

20.

I^ Dominica ready for full independence?

21.

What do you fear most if independence comes now?

22.

Does Britain owe Dominica grants with no strings attached?

23.

Could you comment on government's ways of making public
policy.

24.

Name a few good policies of government since associate
statehood.

25.

In what areas has government wasted too much time?

26.

VJho

27.

Should medical care be available
ability to pay? VJhy?

28.

Please comment on the educational system of Dominica.

29.

Should secondary education be available to all?
you impliment such a program?

30.

In your opinion why was there a split in labor in 1970?

Why?

is behind most of government's policies?
to,

all regardless of

How would
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Political Elites

.

1.

When did you get involved in
politics?

2.

What event or persons influenced you?

3.

What are the major problems of this
country?

4.

How did you see the events of Dec. 16, 1971?

5.

What should be the role of the newspaper?

6.

VJhat has

7,

What does Black Pov7er mean to you?

8.

v;hat is

9.

Why did the first federation fail?

been the role of the Church?
--

the present role -f the police?

10.

Could you comment on the Grenada Declaration?

11.

Evaluate parliamentary government in Dominica

12.

What should be the role of the civil sevant?

13.

Is the two party system working?

14.

What does your party stand for?

15.

What does the other party stand for?
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16.

Who is the real leader of
Labour and Freedom?

Why?''°'''

18.

^^^^^^^

^^'^ve

mentioned?

Wh.t are the good and bad points
of LeBlanc as

a

leacer?

19.

Do the same for Miss Charles.

20.

How powerful is Donald Armour?

21.

If elections were held now, which party would
win?

22 .

Why do you think people vote the way they
do?
of a) party
b) leader
c) other, specify.

23.

khat do you regard as the most important:
a) Dominicans
snoulQ elect any party or system of government thev
wantb) they should choose a government t .at will
attract lot of foreign capital;
c) they should elect a Government
that will encourage only local investments?
Why did you choose the one you did?

—

Xhy?

Because

'

24.

In the final analysis you think government is corrupt?
Be specific.

25.

WgLS

26.

Did Crown Colony Government prepare Dominica for Associate
Statehood?

27.

Is Dominica ready for full independence?

28.

What do. you fear most if full independence is given?

29.

Does Britain owe Dominica aide with no strings attached?

30 i

Could you comment on why Trinidid asked for independence?

Dominica better under colonial rule?

'•"hy?

Why or why not?
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31.

How do you see the making of
public policy here?

32.

Name a few good policies of government
since 1957.

33.

In which areas have government wasted too
much time?

34.

Who or what is responsible for this waste?

35.

Who or what is behind most of government policies?

36.

Should medical care be available to all recardless of
ability to pay? Why did you take such a position?

37.

Could you comment on the educational system in this
country?

38.

Should secondary education be available to all and free?
you say yes, how would you implement such? 'Ahy did
you take such a position?

If

39.

Why did the Labor Party split in 1970?
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